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XChapter 1
Introduction
The fall of the Communism and the ongoing integration of the global econ-
omy are aﬀecting the living conditions within countries in several ways. The
magnitude of this shock becomes obvious as 29 percent of the world popula-
tion lived in Communist countries while only 16 percent in OECD countries.1
Thus, almost over night, around 1.6 billion people entered the world market
by supplying factors and demanding goods and services. Apparently, the dra-
matic process of worldwide economic integration leads to immense increases
and shifts in trade, capital as well as migration ﬂows. The increased possi-
bility of international transactions allows a better allocation of factors and
goods. Thus, great opportunities arise for the economic development. Par-
ticularly, the worldwide trade and capital ﬂows increased enormously during
the last decades. As many economists and the theory of international trade
suggest, the worldwide welfare should beneﬁt from the economic integration.
However, even if the whole world might gain, the outcome may diﬀer for an
individual country, group of persons or even a single person.
During the last decades, the globalization of economic relations became
increasingly the focus of the political and economic discussion. The costs and
beneﬁts of globalization evoke controversial debates. Which countries might
gain from the worldwide economic integration: highly developed countries
or less developed countries? The multiple shocks of globalization lead not
solely to a reallocation of economic activities between countries. Moreover,
1 The numbers refer to 1990; own calculations based on data from the Federal Statistical
Oﬃce of Germany and the OECD.
1the globalization process produces winners and losers inside countries as well.
Diﬀerent social classes, people with diﬀerent educational levels as well as ge-
ographical regions within each country are aﬀected by the global political,
economic and technical developments in diﬀerent ways. Therefore, the pro-
cess of globalization raises various fears of people in highly developed as well
as in emerging countries.
There are several channels through which such an external globalization
shock aﬀects countries. The main feature of the process of globalization dur-
ing the recent decades was the rapid increase in international outsourcing
and foreign direct investment.2 International outsourcing refers to the frag-
mentation of the production process in sequential stages. This slicing-up
allows that the activities can cross international borders. The international
fragmentation can take place within the boundaries of the ﬁrm or in form
of arm’s-length transactions. While the former implies vertical foreign direct
investment, the latter corresponds to imports of intermediate inputs from
foreign markets. This thesis will explore the eﬀects of both types of interna-
tional outsourcing.
Previously, international outsourcing was associated with the relocation
of low-skilled workers’ jobs from developed countries to emerging countries.
Today, however, even high-skilled workers in rich countries are threatened
by the competition from low-wage countries. This process highlights a new
phenomenon in international outsourcing. In the case of Europe, the for-
mer wave of international outsourcing occurred immediately after the fall of
the Communism. In the most recent years, high-skilled workers in Western
Europe are increasingly aﬀected by the competition from former Commu-
nist countries. Two Western European countries are at most aﬀected by the
opening-up of Eastern Europe: Austria and Germany. I will concentrate my
analysis on these two countries.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Austria and Germany have experienced
multiple shocks of globalization. Besides the ongoing global integration, the
deepening integration of the European Union, and the IT revolution, both
countries were particularly aﬀected by the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 and
2 See Krugman (1995) and Feenstra (1998).
2subsequently the large eastern enlargement of the European Union in 2004.
Before, the Iron Curtain intersected Europe for more than 40 years. Europe
was divided into two parts; Eastern and Western Europe.3 Furthermore,
Austria’s accession to the European Union in 1995 has certain impacts on
its economy. Moreover, Germany is speciﬁcally aﬀected since the Iron Cur-
tain divided the country internally in East and West Germany. After the
reuniﬁcation, Germany lies now in the center of the European market. On
the other hand, Austria is fairly closely located to Eastern Europe in terms
of geography but also in terms of culture and economic relations. All theses
events are reﬂected in changes in the volume and pattern of trade, foreign
direct investment, and international outsourcing.
In this thesis, I will focus on two subjects which both correspond to
internal eﬀects of international outsourcing. First, the thesis addresses the
following question: What impacts does international outsourcing have on
the relative demand for human capital in Austria and Germany? Usually,
outsourcing is assumed to have a skill-biased eﬀect. The existing studies in
this ﬁeld conclude that the international fragmentation favors high-skilled
labor. I aim to assess if this is also true for Austria and Germany when
considering the recent years. Secondly, I examine the location determinants
of outsourcing FDIs in Eastern Europe. In which regions do outsourcing-
oriented aﬃliates of Austrian and German investors locate? Furthermore,
I consider the trends in the spatial organization of production in Central
Europe which is aﬀected by the locations of foreign subsidiaries.
As starting point, Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical background of factors
which inﬂuence the relative demand for skilled labor. Moreover, it outlines
alternative approaches for explaining the trends in labor market. In a further
section, I concentrate on the impacts of international outsourcing as driving
force of the labor market outcomes. Additionally, the chapter provides a
broad overview of related empirical studies for diﬀerent countries.
The subsequent Chapter 3 focuses on the impacts of international out-
sourcing on the German labor market. The contribution of this investigation
3 In 1990, around 48 percent of Europe’s population lived in former Communist coun-
tries. (Source: Own calculations based on data from the Federal Statistical Oﬃce of
Germany.)
3to related empirical studies on Germany lies in the following factors. First,
facing a striking shift in the pattern of outsourcing sectors in the most re-
cent years, I employ a sample which reaches from the year after the German
reuniﬁcation to recent years of present decade. This extended time period
allows to capture the eﬀects of the shift in outsourcing towards high-tech
sectors. Secondly, prior empirical examinations of Germany ﬁnd evidence for
the positive impact of outsourcing on the demand for human capital. How-
ever, re-estimating those results by employing a proper econometric speciﬁ-
cation reveals that the found evidence appears extremely weak. Therefore,
I estimate the impacts of outsourcing while taking into account alternative
explanations, like technological change. Furthermore, I inspect trends of
individual sectors in a detailed analysis.
Chapter 4 concerns with the eﬀects of international outsourcing on Aus-
tria’s human capital. Rarely any other western country has gotten more of
a taste of Eastern Europe’s opening-up and its consequences than Austria.
And as a small and open economy, it gets notably involved in it. This chap-
ter examines the impacts of international fragmentation on the labor market
outcomes of high-skilled and low-skilled workers in Austria. The investiga-
tion is based on data of the recent period 1995-2003. It allows to capture
the eﬀects of Austria’s accession to the EU, as well as, the consequences of
Eastern Europe’s integration with Austria. In addition, I consider the eﬀects
of several parameters of the technological change on the demand for skills.
Chapter 5 investigates on the economic geography of the Central Euro-
pean region which was divided by the Iron Curtain. Will there a ’new’ Central
Europe emerge? Thus, I consider the major trends in industry location in
the Central European countries along the former Iron Curtain. They are
Austria and Germany in Western Europe and the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, and Slovakia in Eastern Europe. In a second part of this chapter, I
examine econometrically the determinants of location choice of Austrian and
German FDIs in the border regions of Eastern Europe. Particularly, I focus
on the location of outsourcing FDIs.
Finally, Chapter 6 provides a summary of the main ﬁndings of the thesis.
4Chapter 2
Outsourcing and the Demand
for High-Skilled Labor: Theory
and Empirical Literature
This chapter gives an overview of the theoretical background of the topic
on how international outsourcing aﬀects the labor market outcomes of high-
skilled and low-skilled workers. After considering some alternative candidates
for explaining the labor market trends, I focus on the theoretical model of
Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) about international outsourcing. In a second
part of the chapter, I review existing empirical studies on the impacts of
outsourcing on the labor market in diﬀerent countries.
2.1 Theoretical Background
2.1.1 Technology and Trade
Since the appearance of a strongly widening wage gap in the United States
during the last two decades, there is a theoretical debate on possible fac-
tors explaining this trend. Despite the broad consensus that the relative
demand shift towards more-skilled labor took place mostly within sectors,
there is still disagreement on the question; what factors could be responsible
5for these changed labor market outcomes? Since several parameters simulta-
neously changed in an substantial manner during the last decades, they all
come into consideration.
Initially the skill-upgrading of employed labor was attributed to tech-
nological change. In an empirical assessment, Bound and Johnson (1992)
identify the skilled labor bias of technical change as the major cause for the
increased wage divergence in the US during the 1980s. Controlling for shifts
in product demand and labor supply of diﬀerent skill groups, they empha-
size on the computer revolution as the principal source of the increase in
educational diﬀerences within sectors. Berman et al (1994) mainly conﬁrm
these results from the period 1979-1987 by investigating the shift in relative
demand towards skilled labor in 450 US manufacturing industries. Since
the shift of labor demand takes place mostly within sectors, they argue that
international trade cannot be an important determinant. Additionally, im-
port shares and outsourcing are simply too small to account for a substantial
part of the skill-upgrading. Their empirical analysis shows that investment
in computers and R&D expenditures together can explain approximately 50
percent of the changed labor market outcomes. In a related paper, Berman
et al (1998) undertake a similar estimation for ten developed countries and
ﬁnd strong evidence for pervasive skill-biased technological change across
countries.
Autor et al (1998) also ﬁnd evidence on positive inﬂuence of technical
progress and computerization on within-sector skill-upgrading in the US.
Their long-run examination indicate that the relative demand for high-skilled
workers rose more rapidly during the more recent period (1970-1996) than
during the previous decades in the middle of the century (1940-1970). Their
empirical analysis shows that skill-upgrading takes place particularly in more
computer-intensive sectors. Card and DiNardo (2002) remark critically that
skill-biased technical change to which the rise in wage inequality in the US
labor market during the 1980s was usually attributed, is not adequate to
explain the labor market trends in the 1990s. A fundamental problem for the
hypothesis of skill-biased technical change is that wage inequality stabilized
6in the 1990s, despite continuing advances in computer technology.
International trade comes into consideration as second candidate for ex-
plaining the skill-biased demand shift. However initially, many researchers
came to the conclusion that increased competition from low-wage countries
cannot explain the shift in the rising relative demand for skills. Feenstra and
Hanson (2003) discuss three reasons why trade is thought to have played a
minor role in many studies.
First, trade in general and especially with developing countries would be
too small to explain signiﬁcantly the relative demand shift for skills. This
view is supported by low shares of trade in GDP, particularly for the US.1
Arguing that a general shift away from merchandise towards services distorts
the numbers, the picture changes taking only into account merchandise trade
with merchandise value-added. This merchandise ratio has grown substan-
tially between 1913 and 1990 in virtually all developed countries but not in
the US and Japan. Furthermore, the composition of worldwide merchandise
trade experienced a shift towards intermediate goods over time.
The second reason why trade is not an important factor in explaining the
changes in labor market outcomes relates to sectoral bias in price changes due
to international competition. Import competition from low-wage countries
should lower prices of low-skill intensive goods relative to more-high-skill
intensive goods. However, prices of low-skill intensive goods rose in the 1980s.
According to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem,2 this should result in higher
relative wages for low-skilled workers.3 Observing exactly the opposite let
Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) state that price changes could not explain the
rising relative wages of high-skilled workers. However, Feenstra and Hanson
(2003) argue that taking into account imports of intermediate inputs which
may diﬀer in their factor intensities compared to domestic products, the
1 Krugman (1995) and Feenstra (1998) states that for many developed countries the
trade share in GDP in 1970 was not higher than before World War I.
2 See Stolper and Samuelson (1941)
3 See Leamer’s (1998) analysis of Stolper-Samuelson eﬀects on relative wages in the US.
He states that goods prices rather than trade volumes matter. Krugman (2000) contradicts
this view and notes that trade volumes are not irrelevant. He considers that the absence
of trade volumes in the Stolper-Samuelson theorem which displays a thought experiment
of the relation between goods and factor prices, does not mean that volumes are irrelevant
to infer the impact of trade on factor prices.
7story changes. They mention that domestic prices within individual sectors
have grown faster than import prices. These price movements conﬁrm the
importance of international outsourcing for explaining the observed wage
movements.
Thirdly, international trade should cause an expansion and a contrac-
tion of particular sectors, respectively, resulting in a movement of workers
between sectors and not within sectors. However, in the US as in many
other countries the reallocation of workers occurred mainly within sectors.
Some authors conclude that due to the minor role of between sectoral shifts
trade cannot be a dominant factor in determining relative wages. Feenstra
and Hanson’s (1996a) model presented below goes further into the question
whether international trade can be related to movements within sectors.
In a related study on the interactions among technology, trade and domes-
tic outsourcing of services, Morrison and Siegel (2001) ﬁnd that technological
change has a stronger impact on changes in labor composition favoring high-
skilled workers, than imports and service outsourcing. Using data on 450
US manufacturing industries for the period 1959-1989, they estimate a dy-
namic cost function to capture direct and indirect eﬀects as well as short and
long run impacts. Their results indicate that technological change and par-
ticularly computerization simultaneously reduces the demand for low-skilled
workers and increases the demand for more highly educated workers. Invest-
ment in computers and R&D appear to have the largest potential cost-saving
impact and the largest positive impact on college educated workers, while
outsourcing services activities domestically has the smallest. Furthermore,
trade stimulates computerization, which exacerbates the direct negative im-
pact of trade and technology on the demand for workers without a college
degree, and augments the positive eﬀects on the demand for workers with
a college degree. Morrison and Siegel (2001), however, do not examine the
mechanism by which trade stimulates computerization.
While the standard Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade explains trade in
goods which diﬀer in their factor intensities between diﬀerently endowed
countries, the new trade theory predicts trade ﬂows between similar coun-
8tries. Based on the concept of economies of scale, models of the new trade
theory were developed in the late 1970s as a reaction to the empirically
observed increasing share of trade between advanced and similar countries.
However in the last decades, the new phenomenon of international outsourc-
ing implied a change in the composition and the pattern of trade.4 A change
in the composition occurred with respect to the increasing relative impor-
tance of intermediate goods at the expense of ﬁnal goods which is induced
by the increasing international fragmentation of the production process. At
the same time in many developed economies, an increasing share of imports
from low-wage countries in total imports is observed in recent years. Devel-
oped countries are threatened by import competition from Asian as well as
Latin American countries, and particularly Western European countries feel
a pressure originating from imports from Eastern Europe. This new trend
leads to a recovering of the factor-proportions framework.
Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) provide a theoretical model on the impact
of international outsourcing on the relative demand for skills. They argue
that ignoring the phenomenon of outsourcing misses an increasingly impor-
tant channel through which international trade aﬀects the labor demand for
diﬀerent skill types within industries. Starting from the empirical fact of a
rising wage gap in the US and Mexico, as well, they introduce trade in in-
termediate goods in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework.5 The factor-proportions
theory models only trade in ﬁnal goods which diﬀer in their factor intensities.
Countries specialize in producing goods in which they have a comparative
advantage. Opening of countries to foreign trade implies a sectoral shift
towards industries in which the speciﬁc country has a cost advantage com-
pared to its trading partners. If the country is relatively well endowed with
high-skilled labor, specializing in skill-intensive sectors results in an increased
demand for high-skilled workers relative to their low-skilled counterparts, the
second factor of production. Therefore, trade in ﬁnal goods implies a shift
in employment between sectors. The factor of production that is used inten-
4 See Hijzen et al (2003).
5 Krugman and Obstfeld (2003) present in their text book the standard Heckscher-
Ohlin model. In an extension of this model, Dornbusch et al (1980) allow for a continuum
of goods instead of only two discrete goods.
9sively in the import-competing sector is hurt. It means that the country’s
abundant factor gains, while the scarce factor loses. This is true in relative
as well as absolute terms. Additionally, the Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts
the equalization of factor prices between trading partners which means that
factor prices move in the US and Mexico in opposite directions. It does not
accord with the empirical fact of increasing relative wages in both countries.
However, the Heckscher-Ohlin theory cannot explain how trade in intermedi-
ate goods aﬀects the labor market outcomes. The role of this growing part of
international trade in the relative demand for skills is the subject of Feenstra
and Hanson’s (1996a) model.
2.1.2 International Outsourcing
Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) apply a Heckscher-Ohlin set-up with two coun-
tries, North and South. Each country is endowed with three factors of pro-
duction; low-skilled labor Li, high-skilled labor Hi, and capital Ki. Their
respective factor prices are denoted by wi, qi, and ri, where i indicates North
N and South S, respectively. They presume that the North is relatively well
endowed with high-skilled labor and capital, while the South is abundant
in low-skilled labor. In contrary to the two types of labor which are only
mobile between sectors, capital can ﬂow freely between countries if foreign
investment is not restricted. However, the skill structure of labor supply is
not exogenously ﬁxed in the long-run. The supply will respond to changes in
relative factor prices of low-skilled and high-skilled labor. It can be thought
of increased incentives for investing in education in the case of an increase in
relative wages of high-skilled labor. Furthermore, the relative factor endow-
ments diﬀer suﬃciently so that the factor prices are not equalized between
North and South. According to the factor-proportions theory, these relative
endowments are reﬂected in South’s higher returns to capital, rS > rN, and
higher relative wages of high-skilled workers, qS/wS < qN/wN.
On the production side, Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) assume that a
homogeneous ﬁnal good is produced using a continuum of intermediate goods
as inputs, indexed by z ∈ [0,1], which can be traded internationally. The
10assembling from intermediate inputs into the single manufacturing good Y is
assumed costless. However, producing each unit of the intermediate input z
requires all three factors of production. While capital enters the production
of each input in a constant proportion, the inputs diﬀer with respect to the
factor content of high-skilled and low-skilled labor. Moreover, capital K(z)
can substitute labor modeled as a Cobb-Douglas production function. As the
term in brackets in equation 2.1.2 shows, the two types of labor are combined
in a Leontief style, where aL(z) and aH(z) indicate the usage of low-skilled
and high-skilled labor per each unit of input, respectively. The intermediate














Ai refers to diﬀerences in the production technology between both countries.
The production function corresponds to the following minimum unit cost
function of producing each intermediate input x(z):




where B is a constant. The unit cost depend on the prices of the three
employed factors of production where the content of low-skilled and high-
skilled labor is by deﬁnition a continuous function of z. Figure 2.1 shows
for ﬁxed wages the loci of minimum costs for producing intermediate inputs
ranked regarding to ascending z. Line CSCS depicts the minimum unit cost
for ﬁrms in the South, and CNCN correspondingly for the North, assuming
that all types of inputs are produced in both countries.
The ﬁgure indicates the ranges of inputs which are produced in North
and South according to the comparative cost advantage, respectively. Each
country specializes in the production of a diﬀerent set of intermediate goods,
thus leading to international trade in inputs that originates in diﬀerences















Source: Feenstra and Hanson (1996a), p. 94.
Figure 2.1: Minimum Unit Costs of Inputs
Although the absolute slopes of the minimum cost lines cannot be determined
by assumptions of the model, their relative slopes are determined. Because
of the low relative wages of low-skilled workers in the South, Southern ﬁrms
have a comparative advantage in producing inputs using low-skilled labor
intensively. The more high-skilled labor is relatively used, the more the
comparative cost advantage of the South diminishes. Along the horizontal
axis only the mixture of using the two types of labor changes, while capital
enters for all input goods z with the same cost share (1−θ). The intersection
of the two minimum cost lines z∗ marks the marginal input good where
the unit costs are equalized in both countries. The production of inputs
z < z∗ takes place in the South, while the North produces the more high-skill
intensive inputs z > z∗. Therefore, both countries specializes in producing
inputs in which they have a comparative cost advantage. For the trade
pattern, it implies that the South exports low-skill intensive inputs, while
the North exports high-skill intensive inputs.
If the initial restrictions on international capital ﬂows are removed, e.g.
in the case of an economic integration, Northern ﬁrms have an incentive to
12invest in the South since the returns to capital are higher in the capital scare
country. What impacts does a capital ﬂow from the North to the South
have on relative wages of the two skill groups? Assuming further on that the
wages for low-skilled and high-skilled workers are constant, the international
capital movement leads to higher returns to capital in the North on the
one hand and on the other hand to lower returns in the South. The cross
border investments imply a convergence in endowment with capital between
North and South. As Figure 2.1 shows, it lowers the minimum cost line in
the South to C0
NC0
N and raises the unit costs in the North to C0
SC0
S. The
increasing capital stock in the South relative to the North shifts the dividing
input z∗ upwards in skill intensity. Thus, the new marginal input good z0
uses high-skilled labor more intensively than formerly. Consequently under
the presumption of unchanged wages, the South has now a cost advantage
in producing inputs in the wider range [0,z0) resulting in a broader variation
of skill intensity across activities. The gaining of the transitory activities
[z∗,z0) which are relatively high-skill intensive from the Southern perspective
but low-skill intensive from the Northern perspective, results in an increased
relative demand for high-skills in the South. Analogously under the new
critical value z0, the Northern input production concentrates on more skill-
intensive activities leading to an upward shift in the relative demand for
skills. Finally, both countries experience at constant wages an increase in the
relative demand for skills originating from an upgrading in the average skill
intensity of produced inputs.
Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) propose that unambiguously the relative
wages of high-skilled workers will raise in the North as well as in the South
and the relative number of workers employed in producing inputs will remain
constant or, depending on the labor supply elasticity, increase. Which means
the relative demand for high-skilled labor increases in both countries, in North
and South. Furthermore, Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) show that the South-
ern workers, both skill groups taken together, obtain a larger proportion of
global factor compensations at the expense of workers in the North. Although
the low-skilled workers in the North obtain a smaller share of global factor
compensations all workers can possibly gain in real terms depending on the
13price index and the country size, respectively. Moreover, the changes in rel-
ative capital endowments as driving force have not necessarily to be thought
as foreign investments of Northern ﬁrms. The results hold also for an ex-
ogenous capital accumulation in the South relative to the North, ˆ KS > ˆ KN.
Alternatively to changes in capital endowments, a technological progress in
the South relative to the North, ˆ AS > ˆ AN, also leads to an increasing z∗.
Summarizing, in Feenstra and Hanson’s (1996a) model, international out-
sourcing can be thought of an “endogenous technical change” in the following
sense; outsourcing low-skill intensive stages of production in order to seek low
costs, is comparable to a cost-reducing innovation that lowers the relative uti-
lization of low-skilled labor. Feenstra and Hanson emphasize the factor bias
of outsourcing which induces skill-upgrading domestically and abroad. Thus,
outsourcing has similar eﬀects as skill-biased technical change aﬀecting the
skill structure of labor demand within sectors. The relocation of low-skill
intensive parts of the value added chain depresses the relative demand for
low-skilled labor within each sector. This within-sector shift in factor inten-
sities contradicts the common view, as the Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts,
that international trade can cause only a shift between sectors.
Glass and Saggi (2001) approach theoretically the eﬀects of international
outsourcing on wages and in particular on innovation. Outsourcing from the
North to low-wage countries causes a decline in Northern wages where in this
model labor is not distinguished with respect to skills. Based on a product
cycle model, they show that risen proﬁts of Northern ﬁrms resulting from
imported inputs at lower costs, increases the incentives for innovating. Thus
by increased innovation, international outsourcing can potentially oﬀset the
initial decline in Northern wages. Glass and Saggi (2001) see their model as
a complement to Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) by determining the impact of
international outsourcing on the rate of innovation.
The diﬀerent theoretical approaches suggest that it is mainly an empirical
question whether international outsourcing is a suﬃciently large phenomenon
in order to account for the observed changes in labor market outcomes.
142.2 Empirical Literature
The empirical literature on the relationship between international outsourc-
ing and the relative labor demand shifts in favor of skills was initially shaped
by the experience in the US of a dramatic widening of the wage gap between
low-skilled and high-skilled workers. Consequently, the debate on explaining
factors of this development was raising. The debate results mostly in the
empirical discussion whether skill-biased technical change on the one hand
or on the other hand international trade and outsourcing are responsible for
the deteriorating situation of low-skilled workers. Focusing on the latter fac-
tor, this section gives an overview of the existing empirical studies on this
topic examining diﬀerent countries and using various measures of outsourc-
ing.6 Table 2.1 at the end of this chapter gives an overview of the existing
studies and summarizes their major results.
Feenstra and Hanson (1996a, 1996b, and 1999) are the ﬁrst who address
the rising wage inequality to international outsourcing. The starting point of
their analysis is the empirical ﬁnding of a widening wage gap in the United
States and simultaneously in Mexico during the 1980s. The authors put these
very similar trends in both countries in the context of the trade and invest-
ment liberalization facing the NAFTA integration. Their results suggest that
outsourcing contributes substantially to the increase in relative wages.
For their ﬁrst empirical assessment of the role of international outsourc-
ing in the observed shift in labor market outcomes in the US, Feenstra and
Hanson (1996a) apply a fairly broad deﬁnition of outsourcing. Using im-
port data at the level of 436 sectors they measure international outsourcing
as the share of imports in domestic demand. The annual changes in these
import shares more than doubled in the 1980s compared to the three pre-
ceding decades. Simultaneously, the same happened to the non-production
workers’ wage bill share. Applying the estimation technique of Berman et
al (1994) to the sample period 1959-1987, they extend these regressions by
their outsourcing deﬁnition as additional explanatory variable. Feenstra and
6 Feenstra and Hanson (2003) and L¨ ubker (2005) provide comprehensive reviews of
existing empirical literature about outsourcing and relative demand for skills.
15Hanson’s (1996a) main ﬁnding is that outsourcing accounts for 15 to 33 per-
cent of the increase in the relative demand for non-production workers in US
manufacturing. The contribution depends not only on the speciﬁcation but
also on the period under consideration. The highest value, 33 percent, refers
to the sub-period of the 1980s.
In a following-up study on the US, Feenstra and Hanson (1996b) use a
less general deﬁnition of outsourcing. They combine import data with data
on purchased inputs at the disaggregated level of 435 four-digit SIC indus-
tries for the period 1972-1990. The resulting narrower deﬁnition approxi-
mates outsourcing by the share of imported intermediate inputs in totally
purchased non-energy inputs. Where this share increased rapidly by 0.33
percentage points per year during the 1970s and 1980s, 11.6 percent of mate-
rial purchases were imported in 1990. Regressing, as in Feenstra and Hanson
(1996a), the non-production workers’ wage bill share on outsourcing, they
ﬁnd quite diﬀerent results for the 1970s and 1980s. While in the period
1972-1979 outsourcing has no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the relative
labor demand, the impact of outsourcing is highly signiﬁcant and positive in
the period 1979-1990. In the later period, 31 to more than 50 percent of the
increase in the wage bill share can be explained by international outsourcing.
Since the results are somewhat stronger than the results obtained by Feen-
stra and Hanson (1996a), this measure of outsourcing seems to be preferable
to the general import share.
According to a more recent work of Feenstra and Hanson (1999), even
the deﬁnition of outsourcing in Feenstra and Hanson (1996b) appears to be
too general. Outsourcing measured in a stricter way might be more rele-
vant since international outsourcing represents the shift of activities abroad
which were done formerly in the US within the boundaries of the ﬁrm. Thus,
Feenstra and Hanson deﬁne outsourcing now be restricting it to those in-
puts that are imported from the same two-digit SIC industry abroad as the
good being produced in the US. Using this narrow deﬁnition, outsourcing can
also be deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the broad deﬁnition as in Feenstra
and Hanson (1996b), and the narrow deﬁnition.7 Moreover, they include as
7 In Section 3.3.2 of Chapter 3 I will show in more detail the deﬁnitions of these
16a further structural variable, technical change in their regression measured
as expenditures on high-technology capital such as computers. Employing
the same basic dataset as Feenstra and Hanson (1996b), the results of the
re-estimation indicate that total outsourcing can explain 13-23 percent of
the shift towards non-production labor, while technology accounts for 8-32
percent depending on the speciﬁcation of technological change. Distinguish-
ing total outsourcing in narrow outsourcing and the diﬀerence, it follows
that narrow outsourcing (11-15 percent) is more important in explaining the
skill-upgrading than diﬀerence outsourcing (2-8 percent).
Furthermore, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) develop a new methodology
to gauge the relative importance of trade against technology for explain-
ing wages. Additionally, in order to resolve the conﬂict in the literature
whether factor-biased or sector-biased technological change aﬀects relative
wages, they use a two-stage estimation procedure to endogenize product
prices in a ﬁrst stage. In a second stage using a price regression, changes
in factor prises can be attributed to the decomposed contributions of out-
sourcing and technology. Incorporating the Stolper-Samuelson mechanism,
they ﬁnd that both outsourcing and computers play an important role in ex-
plaining the increase in relative wages, where the latter factor, contributing
35 percent, is more than twice as large as the former.
Anderton and Brenton (1999) consider the impact of outsourcing on rel-
ative wages and employment of low-skilled workers in the UK. They focus
their analysis on the textiles and non-electrical machinery industry during
the period 1970-1986.8 The authors argue that textiles are representing a
low-skill intensive sector, while non-electrical machinery is characterized by
using intensively high-skilled labor. The main contribution of their paper is
the disaggregation of UK’s imports according to diﬀerent groups of source
countries in order to examine whether the source of imports matters. Criticiz-
ing former empirical studies which proxy outsourcing by overall imports9 or
imported intermediate inputs10 from all countries, they distinguish between
outsourcing measures.
8 The two broad industries are disaggregated to 11 sectors at the 4-digit ISIC level.
9 For example Feenstra and Hanson (1996a).
10 For example Feenstra and Hanson (1996b, 1999).
17imports from industrialized countries and imports from low-wage countries.
Thus, Anderton and Brenton (1999) use as proxy for outsourcing the share
of imports solely from low-wage countries in each sector’s domestic demand.
Trade in ﬁnal as well as intermediate goods with low-wage countries might
shift relative demand away from low-skilled towards high-skilled workers in
high-wage countries like the UK. In contrast to other empirical studies, they
argue that trade in ﬁnal goods can also cause a relative demand shift within
industries, since outsourcing applies not only to intermediate goods but also
to ﬁnished. Anderton et al (2002a) stress some examples where ﬁrms out-
sourced selected stages of production or the whole production process to
abroad and import the ﬁnal goods for marketing and sale in the domestic
market.
Their estimation results indicate that imports from low-wage countries
have a signiﬁcantly negative impact on low-skilled workers in the UK mea-
sured by the wage bill share of high-skilled workers and alternatively by their
employment share. However, they cannot ﬁnd any signiﬁcant impact of im-
ports from industrialized countries on low-skilled workers’ economic fortunes.
Furthermore, their estimates suggest that imports from low-wage countries
may account for around 40 percent of the increase in the wage bill share
of high-skilled workers in the textiles sector. Additionally, they ﬁnd some
empirical evidence that low-skilled workers in sectors which use this factor
intensively, are more aﬀected by outsourcing than their colleagues in more
skill-intensive sectors.
In contrast to Anderton and Brenton (1999) who use import penetration
measuring outsourcing, a recent study of Hijzen et al (2003) analyzing the
eﬀects of outsourcing for UK’s labor market employs imported intermediate
inputs as measure for outsourcing. They take data for 53 manufacturing in-
dustries from input-output tables for the period 1982-1997. Furthermore, the
employed labor market data allow them to deﬁne ﬁner skill groups based on
information on qualiﬁcation and experience, instead of the rough distinction
between non-production and production workers. They ﬁnd for UK’s quite
ﬂexible labor market a signiﬁcant increase in the skill premium, while rela-
tive employment of high-skilled workers remained unchanged. At the same
18time, narrowly deﬁned outsourcing remained constant during the 1980s at 11
percent of value added and increased to 19 percent in 1995 which indicates
that outsourcing is predominantly a phenomenon of the 1990s. Furthermore,
they observe a sectoral shift in outsourcing over time. While outsourcing was
more pronounced in 1984 in low-skill intensive sectors, in 1995 ﬁrms of the
high-skill sectors pushed up clearly their outsourcing activities in contrast to
a slightly falling outsourcing of low-skill sectors.
The regression analysis of Hijzen et al (2003) provide empirical evidence
of a signiﬁcantly positive inﬂuence of outsourcing on the relative demand
for skills. In particular, the narrow measure of outsourcing contributes more
than 50 percent to the labor demand shift. While the diﬀerence deﬁnition
of outsourcing is not signiﬁcant when diﬀerence and narrow outsourcing are
simultaneously included, narrow outsourcing accounts for about half of the
increase in skilled labor cost share. The results do not change when replacing
the wage bill share as dependent variable by the employment share. More-
over in all speciﬁcations, technical change favors high-skilled workers. Using
import penetration alternatively to outsourcing of intermediate inputs, Hi-
jzen et al (2003) conﬁrm the results of Anderton and Brenton (1999) that
increased import competition from low-wage countries has a stronger impact
on relative demand for skills than imports from developed countries.
In a further study, Anderton et al (2002a) summarize the results of some
of their empirical works. They examine in very similar set-ups the role of
outsourcing on the labor market inequality in four industrialized countries
whose labor markets diﬀer fundamentally; in the UK, the US, Sweden and
Italy. Thus, they separate for each analyzed country between imports from
low-wage and high-wage countries at a highly detailed industry level. In
their empirical analysis, the authors supplement the standard variable cost
function by an import penetration term capturing the ﬁrms’ incentives to
outsource low-skill parts of the production process.
Their empirical results demonstrates the signiﬁcantly negative impact
of imports from low-wage countries on the economic fortunes of low-skilled
workers in all examined four countries. Additionally, they ﬁnd that technical
change plays an important role in rising wage and employment inequality dis-
19favoring low-skilled labor.et al (2002a)11 For the US, Anderton and Brenton
(1998) distinguish 40 manufacturing sectors according to their skill intensity
during the period 1970-1993. In the low-skill as well as high-skill intensive
sectors the strongest increase in the wage bill and employment inequality
occurred in the period 1978-1986. The estimation results indicate that in-
creasing import competition from low-wage countries attributes signiﬁcantly
to the declining relative demand for low skills. However, this is only the case
in low-skill intensive sectors. Contrary to low-skill intensive sectors, techni-
cal change can explain substantially the rising inequality in more high-skill
intensive sectors.
In contrast to the UK and the US, Sweden is a much smaller but more
open economy. Additionally, Sweden poses strong regulations concerning the
labor market compared to the highly ﬂexible labor markets in the two Anglo-
Saxon economies. During the sample period 1970-1993, skill-upgrading took
place almost exclusively in Sweden’s high-skill sectors. Furthermore, due to
strong labor market institutions, virtually only the employment side was af-
fected, while the skill premium remained constant. Anderton et al (2002a)12
ﬁnd that import penetration measured in volume terms have a signiﬁcantly
positive impact on the employment and wage bill share of high-skilled work-
ers, but only for imports from low-wage countries as in the case of the UK
and the US. However, they report a quite interesting result for the import
competition by OECD countries. High-skilled workers in Sweden are aﬀected
negatively by imports from OECD countries, in the employment share as well
as wage bill share. Another notable result is that the impact of imports from
low-wage countries on the relative demand for skills seems to be larger for
high-skill intensive sectors than for low-skill intensive sectors. Furthermore,
technical change aﬀects positively the relative high-skilled workers’ demand
but the eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant only during the recession period of
1990-1993. For the entire sample period, outsourcing to low-wage countries
account for about 25 percent of the shift in employment share, while technical
change contributes more than 50 percent.
11 The detailed results for the UK are already shown in Anderton and Brenton (1999).
12 The results for Sweden are shown in more detail in Anderton et al (2002b).
20For Italy, Brenton and Pinna (2001) report a decrease in employment
share of blue-collar workers by 12 percentage points between 1973 and 1995,
while the wage bill share declined by 7 percentage points. This reﬂects a more
pronounced adjustment of employment rather than wages, as in Sweden.
Moreover, until the mid-1980s, mainly Italy’s powerful trade unions caused
a compressing wage gap between high- and low-skilled workers. Because of
this fact, Brenton and Pinna (2001) ﬁnd no inﬂuence of economic variables
in the developments of labor market outcomes in the 1970s. However in the
1980s and early 1990s, import competition from low-wage countries aﬀects
the relative demand in favor of high skills but signiﬁcantly only in Italy’s
high-skill intensive sectors. In these sectors, import penetration accounts
for about one third of the rise in employment share, while technical change
has no signiﬁcant impact. According to the econometric results for low-
skill intensive sectors, technical change puts contrary to high-skill sectors
signiﬁcant pressure on skill upgrading, while outsourcing does not determine
the relative labor market outcomes.
A similar study was undertaken by Hsieh and Woo (2005) for Hong Kong’s
labor market. The opening-up of China’s economy to foreign investors in
1979 leads to a tremendous relocation of low-skilled jobs from Hong Kong
to China.13 At the same time, a large movement of workers from manu-
facturing to outsourcing services and an increased utilization of skilled labor
within manufacturing occurred in Hong Kong. Hsieh and Woo report a sharp
increase in the share of non-production workers in total manufacturing em-
ployment from 17 percent in 1981 to 48 percent ﬁfteen years later on. Feen-
stra and Hanson (2004) mention Hong Kong’s speciﬁc role in intermediating
trade between China and the rest of the world.14 It conﬁrms that Hong Kong
is specializing in trading and outsourcing services. Hsieh and Woo (2005) use
two alternative measures for outsourcing; the share of imports from China
in the sum of domestic shipments and imports from China and as a second
13 Hsieh and Woo (2005) refer to this development as “perhaps the largest case of
increased outsourcing in world history”.
14 So in 1998, total trade accounts for 259 percent of Hong Kong’s GDP, see Feenstra and
Hanson (2004). Also Krugman (1995) mentions Hong Kong’s role as supertrader where
Hong Kong was in 1990 behind Singapore the second largest supertrader worldwide.
21measure, the intermediate inputs imported from China as a fraction of total
intermediate inputs. As the OLS regression analysis shows, both measures of
outsourcing have similar impacts on non-production workers’ wage bill share.
An instrumental variable estimation conﬁrms the result of a signiﬁcantly pos-
itive eﬀect of outsourcing to China on the within-industry skill-upgrading.
The authors conclude that outsourcing to China can explain 40 to 50 percent
of skill upgrading in Hong Kong’s manufacturing sector.
In the case of France, Strauss-Kahn (2003) identiﬁes a substantial contri-
bution of outsourcing to the deteriorating situation of low-skilled workers.
She calculates an index of vertical specialization measuring international
outsourcing at the level of 50 industries by the share of imported inputs
in production. Over the period 1977-1993, vertical specialization of France’s
manufacturing sector rose strongly from 9 to 14 percent. Arguing that the
French labor market is highly inﬂexible, Strauss-Kahn (2003) focuses her
analysis on changes in relative employment rather than on relative wages
which did not change signiﬁcantly over the past three decades. According to
her ﬁndings, outsourcing accounts for 11 to 15 percent of the within-industry
decline in low-skilled workers’ employment share over the period 1977-1985
and for about 25 percent over the period 1985-1993 which corresponds to an
observed acceleration in outsourcing.
The presented results indicate that foreign outsourcing is associated in
almost all countries with an increased demand for high-skilled labor. How-
ever, all mentioned studies show less evidence on the question what form the
outsourcing activities take. Imported intermediate inputs may reﬂect either
arm’s-length purchases from foreign suppliers or intra-ﬁrm imports from af-
ﬁliates abroad owned by domestic ﬁrms. Slaughter (1995, 2000) examines
empirically the role of foreign direct investment abroad in the evolution of
US wage inequality. In contrast to a-priori guess, he ﬁnds that multinational
outsourcing by FDI contributes very little to the widening wage gap in the
United States.
Slaughter (1995) analyzes the role of outsourcing by US multinational
companies in the within-sector demand shift towards more high-skilled labor.
Primarily in order to exhaust international wage diﬀerentials, US multina-
22tionals transfered in the 1980s low-skilled labor intensive activities from the
US to foreign countries within the boundaries of a US-headquartered com-
pany. To test whether these multinational companies substitute between
less-skilled production labor in the US and abroad, Slaughter (1995) esti-
mates factor-price elasticities for demand for the period 1977-1989. Domes-
tic production labor and production labor in foreign aﬃliates appear to be
weak price substitutes. Additionally referring to stylized facts that indicate a
slight decline in absolute and relative aﬃliates employment during the 1980s,
he concludes that intra-ﬁrm outsourcing contributes very little to the rising
wage inequality in the US.
In a further empirical assessment for the more recent period 1977-1994,
Slaughter (2000) highlights evidence for increased transfer of production
stages by multinationals to foreign countries. Although aﬃliates employ-
ment abroad declined in absolute terms during the whole sample period, it
increased relative to total multinationals employment. Moreover, the ab-
solute number of US-owned aﬃliates expanded in the period 1982-1994 af-
ter contracting earlier. Estimating a standard translog cost function, the
US industry data provide no support for the hypothesis that multination-
als’ engagement abroad15 contributes signiﬁcantly to the within-sector skill-
upgrading in the US. Slaughter (2000) states that this ﬁnding appears to
be inconsistent with approaches where aﬃliate output substitutes for parent
low-skill intensive activities.
In a related work on Japan, Head and Ries (2002) examine empirically
the role of multinational enterprises in domestic demand for skills. They
employ, however in contrast to Slaughter (1995, 2000), ﬁrm-level data on
oﬀshore production of Japanese companies pooled over the years 1965-1990.
During this period, Japanese multinationals moved dramatically production
activities oﬀshore. While in the 1970s their foreign aﬃliates’ employment was
concentrated in low-wage countries, the distribution shifted towards more
high-wage countries in the 1980s.
Head and Ries (2002) mention that the eﬀects of vertical FDIs which are
15 Slaughter (2000) uses ﬁve diﬀerent measures for multinationals transfer: employment,
wage bill, capital stock, value added, and value of intraﬁrm imports from foreign aﬃliates.
He puts each of these sizes in relation to respective parents’ numbers in the US.
23associated with fragmenting the production process, on the skill intensity of
domestic production depends on two factors: the stages outsourced and the
relative factor endowments of the home and host country. They approach
oﬀshore activities of Japanese companies by the ratio of ﬁrm’s overseas to
worldwide employment. Estimating a translog cost function with industry-
level data to reproduce Slaughter’s (1995, 2000) results, shows that multi-
nationals’ foreign activities does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the non-
production workers’ wage bill share. Whereas Head and Ries ﬁnd a large
positive inﬂuence of FDIs if they use their ﬁrm-level data which is consistent
with vertical specialization. Furthermore, this strongly positive relationship
depends on the income per capita of the host country. Moving activities
oﬀshore to low-income countries raises signiﬁcantly the skill-intensity of do-
mestic production, while this skill-upgrading eﬀect diminishes as FDI moves
towards higher-income countries. Additionally, Head and Ries (2002) ﬁnd
some evidence for skill-downgrading if stages of production are outsourced
to countries with higher income per capita than Japan, as the US. Overall,
the oﬀshoring of Japanese multinationals can attribute about 9 percent to
the increase in the share of non-production workers’ wage bill. Head and
Ries (2002) state that this marks a relatively small contribution compared
to other studies’ results. However, it has to be taken into account that they
use a very narrow measure of outsourcing as concentrating only on intra-ﬁrm
outsourcing. On the other hand, Campa and Goldberg (1997) mention in
general a relatively low importance of imported inputs in Japanese manufac-
turing.16
For Germany and Austria, Geishecker (2002, 2005) and Egger and Egger
(2003) performed analyzes on the impact of international outsourcing on the
skill structures of the respective labor market. In conclusion, the results
for both countries conﬁrm the positive inﬂuences of international trade and
outsourcing on the increased relative skilled labor demand found for most
countries. I will present these studies in more detail in my investigation on
Germany and Austria in Chapter 4 and 3, respectively.
16 Campa and Goldberg (1997) state in a comparative analysis on external orientation
of the manufacturing sector of Canada, the US, the UK and Japan that Japan shows a
low general import and imported inputs share.
24All studies presented so far in this section dealt with the the impacts
of international outsourcing on labor markets of developed countries whose
ﬁrms move production activities abroad and receives imports of intermediate
inputs. Actually, there exists, however, still less evidence on impacts on
countries which host outsourced stages of the production process. In which
way are their labor markets aﬀected? As seen, the theory predicts also for
emerging countries as trading partners of developed countries, an increasing
relative demand for high-skilled labor. In the following, I will take a look at
three studies concerning host countries of outsourcing activities; one about
Mexico and two about Eastern Europe.
An application of their theoretical model outlined in Section 2.1 under-
take Feenstra and Hanson (1997) for a “Southern” country, Mexico. Based
on the fact that Mexico has experienced a similar rise in wage inequality than
the US, they are one of the ﬁrst researchers analyzing the implications of for-
eign activities on labor movements in low-wage trading partners of developed
countries like the US. In their empirical investigation on Mexico, Feenstra
and Hanson (1997) argue that the rising wage inequality during the 1980s is
linked to capital inﬂows from abroad. The capital transfer from the North to
the South, here from mainly the US to Mexico, corresponds to a special form
of outsourcing, the relocation of activities by multinationals across countries.
According to their theoretical model (Feenstra and Hanson (1996a)), invest-
ments of Northern ﬁrms in the South cause an upward-shift in skill intensity
of production in both countries resulting in higher skill premia.
Since Mexico has been relaxing its restrictions of foreign investments in
the early 1980s, FDI increased tremendously ﬂowing mainly into regions at
the Mexico-US border. The emergence of US-owned assembly plants in these
border regions suggests that the eﬀects of foreign activities on labor demand
might vary strongly across regions. Overall the share of FDIs in Mexico’s
total investments increased from 1.4 percent to almost 10 percent between
1983 and 1989. In their empirical analysis, Feenstra and Hanson (1997)
use regional data on the number of foreign-owned assembly plants for nine
industries over the period 1975 and 1988. They highlight a positive and sig-
niﬁcant inﬂuence of FDI on the relative demand for high-skilled labor. In
25border regions where foreign activities are concentrated, FDI can account for
52 percent of the increase in the non-production workers’ wage bill share.
Separate estimations for relative wages and employment suggest that FDIs
aﬀect predominantly relative wages and not relative employment. Remark-
ably, while outward FDIs have been found by Slaughter (1995, 2000) to have
no signiﬁcant eﬀect on domestic demand for skills in the United States, the
opposite appears for inward FDIs in the case of Mexico which is one of the
major low-wage trading partner of the US. To gage the eﬀect of NAFTA
which enacted in 1994, on Mexico’s wage structure, Hanson (2003) examines
recent trends in wages during the 1990s. He emphasizes that the regional
wage dispersion within Mexico has widened which conﬁrms the experiences
for the 1980s. It highlights the exposure of regions to foreign markets as ma-
jor force for regional wage diﬀerentials. Moreover, Hanson ﬁnds for Mexico
a sustained increases in the returns to skill during the 1990s.
Bruno et al (2004) analyze the rapidly increased wage inequality between
high-skilled and low-skilled workers in the three largest new EU members;
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Facing the enormous inﬂow of for-
eign direct investment, the goal of their paper is to examine whether foreign
capital transfer has contributed to the raise in the skill premium in these
Central and Eastern European countries. During the transformation from
planed to market economies, the countries have experienced a substantial
widening in wage inequality. Bruno et al (2004) report for the Czech Repub-
lic and Poland an increase in skill premium from 1.4 to 1.8 between 1993 and
2000, while the relative wages have risen in Hungary from 1.9 to 2.3. Their
sample consists of panel data on six sectors over seven years. In an initial
speciﬁcation where the three countries are pooled together, the impact of
FDI on the wage bill share of non-manual workers is not signiﬁcant. On the
skill premium, however, the presence of foreign ﬁrms has a strongly positive
impact which underlines the importance of multinationals for these transi-
tion countries. Pooling only the Czech Republic and Hungary together, the
results appears to be robust. In the case of Poland, the results suggest that
FDI is responsible neither for the increased relative demand for skills nor for
risen relative wages. Concerning the speciﬁcity of Poland, Bruno et al (2004)
26argue that the transition process took place at a slower pace in comparison
to the Czech Republic and Hungary.
In opposite to Bruno et al’s (2004) results for Poland, Lorentowicz (2006)
ﬁnds a highly signiﬁcant impact of foreign ﬁrms on the skill-upgrading in
Poland’s manufacturing. She uses more aggregated data, 23 NACE manu-
facturing sectors, for the period 1994-2002. The results for this more recent
period probably conﬁrm the view of the former study regarding the pace of
Poland’s transition process. Between 1990 and 2002, wages of high-skilled
workers in Poland increased dramatically relative to those of their less-skilled
counterparts by annually 4.1 percent on average and reached 203 percent of
production workers’ wages. Contemporaneously, the stock of foreign capital
increased from 4 percent of Poland’s GDP in 1994 to 34 percent in 2002.
Measuring the presence of foreign ﬁrms by the share of foreign-owned in
domestic ﬁxed assets, Lorentowicz (2006) ﬁnds in a ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation
a highly positive impact of FDI on the relative demand for high-skills in
Poland. This result is also true for the enormously rising skill premium. For-
eign capital can attribute 34 to 52 percent to the increase in non-production
workers’ wage bill share during the period 1994-2002.17 As further factors,
technological change and the general transition process which liberalized the
wage setting mechanism, appear to be responsible for the skill-upgrading in
Polish manufacturing.
In summary, most of the mentioned studies ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant
correlation between outsourcing activities and relative demand for skills, al-
though outsourcing is measured in quite diﬀerent ways. In the last decades,
almost all countries experienced an increase in the demand for high-skilled
labor relative to low-skilled labor. Contemporaneously, their integration in
the world economy rose strongly. Furthermore, the positive impact of out-
sourcing on skill-upgrading can be found in developed countries whose ﬁrms
move stages of production abroad, as well as in low-wage countries which
mainly host outsourcing activities.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chain: Impacts on High-Skilled
Labor
3.1 Introduction
Germany experienced several political and economic shocks in the past 15
years. The most prominent events were the fall of the Communism and
the global economic integration. These external events, which reﬂect the
process of globalization, required extensive adjustments within the country.
In addition, the foreign politics had to react to the changing global relations.
Internally, the shocks aﬀect in particular the highly inﬂexible German labor
market.
The shocks reach from the fall of the Iron Curtain between Western and
Eastern Europe to the deeper integration of the European Union and even to
the liberalization of world trade and to the technological progress in IT. In
response to the reinforced pressure from international competition that Ger-
man companies have been under in the past few years, they have undertaken
tremendous restructuring measures. Thus, they have strongly restructured
with respect to ownership relations, as is even more pronounced with respect
30to an international organization of the value added chain from a ﬁrm’s per-
spective. German enterprises moved stages in which their own country has
no comparative cost advantage, to foreign countries. Consequently, from a
country’s perspective, Germany is highly integrated in the international value
added chain which combines geographically separated stages of production.
This restructuring and reorganization process of the German industry has
various impacts on the labor market and on the demand for individual skill
groups. Furthermore, it gives some insights into the role of Germany in the
international value added chain and on which stages of production Germany
is specializing.
Previously, international outsourcing was associated with the relocation
of low-skilled workers’ jobs from developed countries, like Germany, to emerg-
ing countries, e.g. Eastern European transition countries. This former wave
of international outsourcing occurred immediately after the fall of the Com-
munism. Today, however, even high-skilled workers in rich countries are
threatened by the competition from low-wage countries. This process high-
lights a new phenomenon in international outsourcing, which is characterized
by the threat of low- and high-skilled workers and by an increased number
of outsourcing ﬁrms.1 Initially, only big multinational companies engaged in
outsourcing; today, even many German small and medium-sized enterprises
(SME) outsource parts of their production process. The resulting impacts
are much larger since SME play an outstanding role in the German economy.
In this chapter, I examine empirically the impact of international out-
sourcing on the demand for skills in Germany since the beginning of the
1990s. Can international outsourcing explain the changes in the relative de-
mand for high-skilled workers in German manufacturing? Who loses and who
gains from outsourcing? This chapter should answer the question of whether
the outsourcing activities of German ﬁrms hurt the economic prospects of
human capital in Germany.
Why is Germany an interesting case in studying the impacts of interna-
tional outsourcing? As already mentioned, Germany is one of the countries
most aﬀected by shocks of globalization. Moreover, Germany is one of the
1 See Der Spiegel, 44/2004, “Bye-bye ’made in Germany’ ”.
31most open countries worldwide in terms of international trade. In 2003,
Germany was the world’s biggest exporter accounting for almost 11 percent
of worldwide exports. Furthermore, for the past seven years, Germany has
been the world’s second-largest importing country. The phenomenon that
simultaneously to Germany’s strong export position a large part of the inter-
mediate inputs are imported, is highly debated in Germany under the term
“bazaar economy”.2 At the same time, its labor market is highly regulated by
law and dominated by powerful unions. Additionally, Germany steadily spe-
cializes fairly intensely in the industrial sector compared to other developed
countries.3
All of these exogenous, and thus unanticipated, shocks bump on an eco-
nomic system which has emerged over the past 50 years in a more or less
continuously growing economy. In this period, the social net has become
increasingly thicker, and Germans have become accustomed to a high level
of social security.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 takes a look at the main
events which have impacted Germany in last 15 years. In Section 3.3, I show
the major trends in the relative demand for high-skilled labor and the trends
of international outsourcing in German manufacturing. Section 3.4 reviews
the existing empirical literature on the inﬂuence of outsourcing on the rela-
tive demand for skills in Germany and makes critical notes on these studies.
The subsequent Section 3.5 brieﬂy outlines the empirical implementation of
Feenstra and Hanson’s (1996) theoretical model of international outsourcing.
Before presenting the empirical results in Section 3.6, I discuss the data sam-
ple employed in the analysis. Finally, Section 3.7 provides a conclusion of
my ﬁndings.
2 See Sinn (2005).
3 For example, in the last decades the UK underwent a dramatic change from an
industrial economy towards a service-oriented economy. While in 1970, 45 percent of
workers were employed in manufacturing, today less than 24 percent are. In Germany,
however, still 30 percent of workers are employed in the manufacturing sector. See ’Der
Spiegel’ (2004).
323.2 Germany’s Shocks of Globalization
Germany is battling the consequences of at least ﬁve shocks that occurred
in past 15 years. Besides a general integration of the global economy, Ger-
many is confronted with the consequences of its reuniﬁcation, the fall of the
Communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the deeper integration of the
European Union and its eastern enlargement, and the introduction of the
euro. In this section, I sketch brieﬂy each of these major events and discuss
some indicators and consequences of these shocks.
The year 1989 is a very decisive date in Germany’s history. The fall
of Communism in the former planned economies aﬀected Germany twice;
internally through the reuniﬁcation and externally through the opening-up
of Central and Eastern Europe. And later on, Germany was through the
accession of 8 of these countries to the European Union in May 2004.
After 40 years of being a divided country, the fall of the Berlin Wall on
November 9, 1989 made it possible for West and East Germany to unify in
the following year. In contrast to the widespread initial opinion, the transfor-
mation of the former Communist East Germany into a democratic political
system with a market economy has required signiﬁcant breakthroughs and
committed long-term eﬀorts. The impacts of the German reuniﬁcation on the
Eastern German economy, especially on the labor market, are tremendous.
The restructuring of East Germany’s planned enterprises and accompany-
ing raise in Eastern German wages to a comparable level with the west has
resulted in extremely high unemployment rates in former East Germany.
To absorb these dramatic changes that required painful adjustments, huge
transfers form Western to Eastern Germany have been undertaken.
As the lower line in Figure 3.1 shows, the employment in Eastern Ger-
many’s mining and manufacturing sector declined tremendously by about 46
percent in the ﬁrst whole year after the reuniﬁcation from 1.76 million em-
ployees to 0.94 million in 1992. During the following years, the employment
continued to fall before employment levels stabilized at a low level in 1995.
In contrast to the mentioned decline, the industrial output grew rapidly over
the same time period. After declining slightly during the ﬁrst two years after














-  64 %
1992=100
Notes: The numbers refer to the mining and manufacturing sector (NACE C
and D).
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Federal Statistical Oﬃce of
Germany.
Figure 3.1: Output and Employment in Eastern Germany
The fall of the Iron Curtain between Western and Eastern Europe did not
only result in Germany’s reuniﬁcation but also in an opening-up of all former
Communist economies. The subsequent transition from planned economies
into market economies had tremendous eﬀects on the political and, in par-
ticular, on the economic systems of these countries. However, each of these
Central and Eastern European countries is aﬀected in a diﬀerent way with
respect to timing and procedures of transition. A changed trade and FDI
pattern indicates the consequences of this transition process for Germany.
The changes should be remarkable, since Germany is, besides Austria, the
Western European country that is most integrated with Central and Eastern
Europe.
In addition to this opening-up, some countries which are most advanced in
their transition process, deepened their economic integration with Western
Europe. This resulted in their accession to the European Union. After
the last round of the enlargement of the European Union in 1995, with the
34accession of Austria, Sweden, and Finland, in 2004, the biggest and most
drastic enlargement of the European Union took place. The EU enlarged by
10 countries, 8 of which were Central and Eastern European countries. In
2007, with Bulgaria and Romania two further Eastern European transition
economies might access to the EU. This enlargement creates a larger free
trade area, which should improve the trade intensity and the international
competition.
Table 3.1 shows Germany’s import and export pattern by regions and
countries, respectively. Particularly on the import side, Germany is highly
integrated with Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). While the share of im-
ports from CEE declined from 11.2 to 7.7 percent between 1985 and 1990, it
has nearly doubled since 1990. As the data show, in particular the imports
from the ﬁve Central European new EU members experienced a continuous
increase from about 3 percent of Germany’s imports from all over the world,
to almost 10 percent. In terms of value, the imports from these ﬁve countries
are more than 6.5 times higher in 2004 than in 1990. At the same time,
the German economy increased its export activities to the Central European
countries from about 3 to nearly 8 percent of total exports.
In the course of the ongoing integration of the European Union, the com-
pletion of the Internal Market at the end of 1992 marked a milestone. The
Single Act allowed a free movement of goods, services, persons and capital
ﬂows between the EU member states. Another milestone in the economic
integration of the EU was the launch of Europe’s common currency in 1999.
The introduction of the euro led to a harmonization of the interest rates
among the EU member states, 4 but also to a reduction in transaction costs
which facilitates further trade integration. Both events should support the
intra-EU trade of the former 15 member states. However in Germany’s case,
the integration with its co-members in the eighties was already so deep that
the integration has remained unchanged or has declined since the 1980s. Ger-
many exported more than 55 percent to other EU-15 countries and received
in most recent years roughly 50 percent of its total imports from the EU-
15. Considering the enlarged EU-25, intra-EU trade accounts for almost 60
4 See Sinn(2003), pp. 82-84.
35Table 3.1: Germany’s Trade Pattern
1985 1990 1995 2000 2004
Import Pattern (in percent)
EU-15 53.53 58.13 56.44 50.89 49.54
CEE 11.23 7.73 8.81 11.95 14.44
EU members 3.03 2.77 5.52 7.70 9.67
Russia 6.11 3.18 2.55 3.51 3.78
USA 6.44 6.49 6.82 8.75 7.07
China 0.56 1.41 2.41 3.45 5.70
Japan 4.21 5.75 5.33 4.99 3.75
ROW 24.03 20.49 20.20 19.97 19.51
Export Pattern (in percent)
EU-15 55.16 60.94 58.16 56.47 55.33
CEE 9.84 9.07 8.14 10.18 12.50
EU members 2.83 2.96 5.04 7.23 7.87
Russia 4.88 4.13 2.17 1.96 3.26
USA 9.57 6.90 7.29 10.34 8.87
China 1.17 0.62 1.44 1.58 2.87
Japan 1.40 2.57 2.51 2.21 1.74
ROW 22.86 19.89 22.47 19.22 18.69
Notes: The numbers show the percentage distribution of trade ﬂows. The CEE EU-
members correspond to the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, and to
Slovenia. Russia refers to countries of the former Soviet Union, including the Baltic states.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Federal Statistical Oﬃce of Germany.
36percent of German imports and for more than 63 percent of German exports.
Finally, trade ﬂows between Germany and China seems to be growing
quickly. Speciﬁcally on the import side, the changes are exceptionally high.
The imports from China to Germany grew from 1.5 to 32.8 billion euros
between 1985 and 2004. This growth resulted in Chinese imports comprising
5.7 percent of Germany’s total imports in the year 2004.
In summary, Germany is not only a driving force of the rising world trade
which is supported by a process of trade liberalization. As Table 3.1 shows,
also the geographical pattern of its trading partners changed substantially
over time. Particularly the shift in Germany’s trade pattern towards emerg-
ing countries emphasizes the intense pressure from international competition
for German ﬁrms. The development adds pressure on the German labor
market.
In the last decade virtually all countries were aﬀected by major improve-
ments in information and telecommunication technologies. In particular, the
availability of the computer technology and the widespread use of comput-
ers in the economy during the 1990s led to a dramatic reorganization in the
work process. It has certain impacts on the demand for skills on the one
hand and enables, on the other hand, ﬁrms to outsource individual stages of
the production process. Besides the mentioned opening-up of many countries
to international trade, the revolution in IT in the 1990s is a second reason
for the rise in international outsourcing.
After showing the multiple shocks of globalization that might substan-
tially aﬀect substantially the German labor market, I focus my analysis in
the remaining part of the chapter on one decisive channel of the mentioned
shocks: international outsourcing. In this section, I already discussed the
trends in international trade as the main phenomenon of globalization. One
part of international trade which is growing, is the trade in intermediate
goods. The volume of traded inputs measures immediately the new interna-
tional division of labor emerged by slicing up the value added chain across
countries.5
5 See Krugman (1995) for a ﬁrst description of this new phenomenon in international
trade.
373.3 Outsourcing and Germany’s Human
Capital
3.3.1 Trends in Wages and Employment of Skills
Although the German labor market is known as inﬂexible and dominated by
powerful trade unions, noticeable variation of labor market outcomes over
time can be observed. While Germany’s labor market institutions prevent
large movements in relative wages, the change in relative demand is reﬂected
in relative employment and unemployment, respectively. This is in contrary
to the USA and other countries with ﬂexible labor markets, where changes
in the demand for skills predominately aﬀect the wages, which adjust to
changes in demand. Thus, it resulted in the case of the US, in a widening of
the wage gap between high-skilled and low-skilled workers of about 8 percent
from 1979 to 1990.6 On the other hand the German experience is in line
with most other Western European countries. For example, in the case of
France and Sweden, the skill premia remained relatively stable during the last
decades. Arguing that employment share is the more appropriate variable,
Strauss-Kahn (2003) and Anderton et al (2002b) focus their analyzes of the
French and Swedish labor markets, respectively, on the employment side.
In general economic sense, the relative demand for high-skilled labor con-
sists of two components: price and quantity. In the context of the labor
market, these two components are called wages and employment. The mul-
tiplication of these two parts gives the demand for labor, as in the realized
state, called wage bill. The classiﬁcation of workers according to their en-
gagement in production and non-production stages of the value added pro-
cess in a ﬁrm is commonly used as a proxy for the skill-level of workers. It
is assumed that non-production workers are more-skilled workers than pro-
duction workers. Micro-data on the educational level of workers support this
assumption, as Berman et al (1998) show for the US and Head and Ries
(2002) for Japan.7 Along the lines of the existing literature, in this paper,
6 See Feenstra and Hanson (1999).
7 However, Leamer (1994) criticizes the classiﬁcation into production and non-
production workers since it might be misleading for some activities with respect to the
38high-skilled and low-skilled workers are classiﬁed as non-production and pro-
duction workers, respectively.8
Figure 3.2 illustrates the movements in German the labor market that
occurred during the last 15 years. It graphs the ratio of high-skilled to low-
skilled workers’ wages and employment on the one hand and, on the other





























Source: Own calculations based on data taken from the Federal Statistical Oﬃce of
Germany.
Figure 3.2: Demand for Skills in Germany’s Manufacturing
As the data show, the wages of high-skilled workers remained fairly con-
stant relative to those of their low-skilled counterparts. The evolution of the
skill premium in Figure 3.2 is scaled on the right-hand side axis. After a
small peak in 1993 and a decline until 1995, the wage gap between high-
skilled and low-skilled workers starts to increase from about 160 percent in
1995 to 164 percent in 2004. However, over the whole period, the changes
skill-intensity.
8 According to the German system, non-production workers correspond to “Ange-
stellte” and production workers to “Arbeiter”. This distinction seems to be roughly con-
sistent, particularly since my analysis focuses only on the manufacturing sector. Thus,
problems disappear which might emerge by comparing service and manufacturing sectors
with respect to the mix of production and non-production workers.
39are marginally small. Overall, in German manufacturing the non-production
workers earn about 60 percent more than the production workers. This size
of the skill premium is roughly comparable with other developed countries
which are partly characterized by a highly ﬂexible labor market. As already
mentioned, in the US the skill premium rose sharply in recent decades and
reached a level of about 67 percent in 1994.9 The skill premium trends vary
substantially across German manufacturing sectors. While the skill premium
was 107 percent10 in the clothes sector in 2004, it only reached 38 percent in
the food and beverages sector.
Turning to the relative employment, as Figure 3.2 shows, the employment
of non-production workers relative to production workers rose by 27 percent
from 48.0 percent to 62.4 percent between 1991 and 2004. This trend in rel-
ative employment is associated with a steady decline in absolute production
workers by 38 percent from almost 6 million to 3.6 million during the pe-
riod 1991 to 2004. Over the same period, the employment of non-production
workers in manufacturing declined only by 21 percent. The developments in
Eastern German manufacturing that I mentioned in Section 3.2, contributes
a certain amount to the overall decline in employment. I will discuss the
special situation of Eastern Germany in more detail below.
The changes in the relative wages and the relative employment reﬂect
a rising aggregate demand for high-skilled workers where the positive em-
ployment eﬀect tips the scales. The non-production workers’ wage bill share
rose steadily by 15 percent over the sample period of fourteen years. How-
ever, the computer sector alone reduced its demand for high-skilled labor
where a sharp fall in the skill premium outweighs the positive trend on the
employment side.
A similar trend, the aggregate demand, displays the non-production work-
ers’ wage bill relative to the production workers’ wage bill instead of in rela-
tion to total wage bill. It increases by 24.4 percentage points from 78 percent
to 102 percent during the period 1991 and 2004. The large proportionate
movement of relative employment compared to relative wages suggests that
9 See Slaughter (1999), Figure 1.
10 Which means that non-production workers earn 107 percent more than production
workers in the same sector.
40the rise in relative wage bill owes more to increasing disparities in employ-
ment than to a widening wage gap. A simple decomposition of the relative
demand in a separate wage and employment eﬀect11 can gauge the contribu-
tion of these two trends.
The decomposition suggests that the overall slight increase in the skill
premium contributes 2.8 percentage points to the rise in the wage bill of
high-skilled workers relative to low-skilled workers, which comes up to 11.4
percent. The increased employment of non-production workers relative to
production workers attributes 21.6 percentage points to this change. The
variation in the relative employment accounts for 88.6 percent. As already
graphically seen, it points to the stickiness of wages in German manufactur-
ing and the reaction of the relative employment. However, the decomposition
for the most recent years shows that between 2000 and 2004, 17.5 percent of
the rise in the relative demand for skills can be attributed to relative wages,
and 82.5 percent contributes to the increased relative employment. Appar-
ently, in recent years the relative wages in Germany became more ﬂexible.
The results of this decomposition conﬁrm Geishecker’s (2002) ﬁndings for a
shorter period between 1991 and 2000.12
What is the role of the German reuniﬁcation in the evolution of the over-
all relative demand for high-skilled labor? The restructuring process in the
Eastern German manufacturing sector caused a dramatic decline in the em-
ployment of low-skilled as well as high-skilled workers in absolute numbers.
While the number of production workers declined by 62 percent between 1991
and 2003, the employment of non-production workers declined even more by
68 percent. In 1997, the production as well as the non-production workers
achieved the lowest status since the reuniﬁcation. Afterwards, in particular
the number of production workers increased slightly by 15 percent. It means
that the employment of the non-production workers relative to the produc-
tion workers declined from almost 50 percent in 1991 to 42 percent in 2003.
11 See Geishecker (2002) for the formula for the decomposition.
12 He ﬁnds that the development of the relative wages of high-skilled workers contributed
in the nineties only 9 percent to the increased relative wage bill. But 91 percent can be
attributed to the rising relative employment.
41As Figure 3.3 shows, the development in Eastern and Western Germany are
opposite. In contrast to Eastern Germany, the relative employment of non-
production workers experienced a strong increase by 16 percentage points.
While at the beginning of the 1990s the relative employment in Eastern and
Western Germany is very similar, it diverges dramatically from 1992 onwards.






















Source: Own calculations based on data taken from the Federal Statistical Oﬃce of Germany.
Figure 3.3: Demand for Skills in Eastern and Western Germany
Moreover, the trends in the skill premium in Eastern Germany diﬀer re-
markably from these in Western Germany. The relative wages have remained
almost constant in Western Germany while the data show a strong increase
in wage dispersion favoring skills in Eastern Germany. In 1991, the high-
skilled workers in Eastern Germany’s manufacturing earned only 33 percent
more than their low-skilled counterparts. However in the most recent years,
the skill premium in Eastern Germany is even higher than in the old West
German states. After the compression of the relative wages in the era of
the Communism, the wage gap between low-skilled and high-skilled work-
ers experienced a tremendous widening in all Eastern European transition
countries. For example, in Poland the relative wages for high-skilled work-
ers increased in the last decade from a level which is comparable to that of
42Eastern Germany to more than 200 percent in 2003.13
The shown skill-upgrading at the aggregate level of the reunited German
manufacturing sector could have occurred due to two possible reasons. On the
one hand, a shift in employment away from low-skill intensive sectors towards
more high-skilled intensive sectors could be responsible for the aggregate
movement. And on the other hand, a skill-biased demand shift could also
explain the aggregate pattern. While the former reason is associated with a
shift between sectors, the latter indicates a change which occurs within each
sector. Following Berman et al (1994)14 the aggregate shift towards more-
skilled labor is decomposed into a between and a within component.15 Table
3.2 gives an answer to the question which of the two eﬀects dominates.
At the aggregate level, the employment shifted towards non-production
workers by 4.45 percentage points during the period 1991-2003. The within
sectoral shift by 5.28 percentage points can explain more than 100 percent of
the aggregate skill-upgrading in manufacturing. It indicates that the change
in the allocation of employment across sectors contributes in the opposite
direction than the within sector movement. The negative sign on the “be-
tween” term is evidence of a shift towards less-skill intensive sectors that
favors the relative employment of production workers. These results are in
line with Geishecker’s (2002) ﬁndings.
Splitting the sample period into two sub-periods reveals a new aspect.
The rates are annualized to make changes comparable across time periods of
diﬀerent length. Compared to the previous period, the overall move towards
13 See Lorentowicz et al (2006).
14 See also Geishecker (2002) and Strauss-Kahn (2003), who carried out similar decom-
position exercises.
15 The decomposition exercise is undertaken according to the following formula presented

















i is the proportion of non-production workers in total employment in each
individual sector i. Si denotes the employment share of sector i in aggregate employment.
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side reports the between change, while the second term
reports the within shift.
43non-production workers decelerates from 0.54 to 0.27 percentage points per
year over the period 1997-2003. However, the clear dominance of the within-
sector movement appears evidently in both sub-periods.
Table 3.2: Decomposition of High-Skill Employment Share
overall within between within/
change sector sectors overalla
changes in percentage points
1991-2003 4.45 5.28 -0.79 119
annual average changes in percent
1991-1996 0.54 0.64 -0.10 119
1997-2003 0.27 0.30 -0.03 111
a Ratio of within-sector change to overall change, in percent.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Federal Statistical Oﬃce of Germany.
The stronger within sector shift compared to between sectors suggests
that the relative skilled labor demand in Germany has arisen mainly in a
changed demand structure for skills within each sector. Therefore, as shown
in Chapter 2, skill-biased technical change, which aﬀects all sectors, came
as candidate for explanation into consideration. As a second candidate with
qualitatively similar eﬀects, factor-biased outsourcing appears to be relevant
as approached by Feenstra and Hanson (1996a). If ﬁrms move stages of the
production process oﬀshore to take advantage of factor-cost diﬀerential across
countries, the skill composition of domestic labor demand should shift within
each sector. Below I will examine econometrically the explanatory power of
the two factors that aﬀect the within-sector employment structure. After
inspecting the trends in international outsourcing in the following section,
I will take a closer look at the developments of labor market outcomes and
outsourcing at the sectoral level.
443.3.2 Trends in International Outsourcing
The goal of this chapter is to estimate how much international outsourcing
attributes to the shown outcomes of the German labor market. There exist
diﬀerent ways to measure the outsourcing activities of ﬁrms. The most obvi-
ous measure that is often cited in public discussion is the movement of stages
of production abroad by multinational ﬁrms. Almost every day you can read
in German newspapers about such relocations of jobs to foreign countries.
Table 3.3 reports the engagement of German ﬁrms in foreign aﬃliates and
the geographic pattern of German FDI over time.
Table 3.3: Employment of Foreign Aﬃliates of German Multinationals
1991 1997 2003
FDI employment sharea 16.39 27.32 34.24
Geographic Pattern (in percent)b
Developed Countriese 71.05 63.56 61.57
Developing Countriese 28.95 36.44 38.43
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
EU-15 42.65 39.28 35.99
CEE 3.16 14.72 18.92
North Americac 21.39 18.03 18.39
Latin Americad 15.07 9.03 6.60
Asia 10.01 11.86 14.36
Other 7.72 7.08 5.74
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
a Share of employment of foreign aﬃliates of German multinationals in total domestic
employment of German manufacturing.
b Distribution of employment of foreign aﬃliates of German multinationals across re-
gions.
c North America refers to the USA and Canada.
d Latin America refers to Latin American countries and the Caribbean.
e Developed and developing countries are classiﬁed according to UNCTAD where devel-
oping countries include the Central and Eastern European transition countries.
Source: Own calculations based on data from UNCTAD, World Investment Directory
(2005).
45The numbers in Table 3.3 show evidence of the proceeding international
organization of the production process carried out by German companies.
As the development of the FDI employment share indicates, the importance
of employment of foreign aﬃliates owned by German multinationals gains
dramatically over time relative to domestic employment in manufacturing.
So the relative employment of foreign aﬃliates more than doubled between
1991 and 2003. However, the internationalization diﬀers signiﬁcantly across
sectors. In the motor vehicles industry, the proportion between foreign and
domestic workers was 38 percent in 1991 and increased to 85 percent in 2003.
Also the companies of the tobacco, leather, and chemicals industries are each
highly internationalized with a FDI employment share of about 75 percent
in 2003. Whereas in the food and beverages and computer industries, the
employment of foreign aﬃliates accounts for less than 8 percent of respective
domestic employment.
The second part of Table 3.3 takes a look at changes in the geograph-
ical pattern of the foreign aﬃliates’ employment over time. While in 1991
about 71 percent of workers employed abroad by German multinationals were
located in developed countries, less than 62 percent are so in 2003. Con-
sequently, the distribution shifted by almost 10 percentage points towards
workers in developing countries, which means that in 2003, almost 39 per-
cent of German FDIs employees were located in low-wage countries. It seems
noteworthy, however, that the category developing countries include the Cen-
tral and Eastern European transition countries. Without these countries the
share of developing countries fell from 26 to 20 percent of total foreign em-
ployment of German multinationals. This fact highlights the tremendously
increased importance of Central and Eastern Europe as host region for Ger-
man FDIs. As the table displays, 19 percent of worldwide employment of
German FDIs in 2003 is located in the region of Eastern Europe whereas
only 3 percent belonged to this region twelve years ago. For the declining
proportion of Latin America is mainly the development in Brazil responsible.
Furthermore, the increasing share of Asia is for the most part accountable
to China.
In order to take advantage of the possibility producing abroad at lower
46costs, a ﬁrm has to decide how to organize its production process internation-
ally. Either it can undertake FDI and relocate the production stage inside
the ﬁrm to a foreign aﬃliate, or it can close down the formerly in-house
production and replace this stage of production by importing intermediate
inputs from suppliers abroad.
Using FDI as a measurement for international outsourcing has two short-
comings, as Slaughter (2000) mentions. First, intraﬁrm imports from foreign
aﬃliates to the domestic parent ﬁrm which can be proxied by the shown
FDI employment share, misses arm’s-length interactions between foreign and
domestic ﬁrms. Second, FDIs do not immediately induce intra-ﬁrm trade.
Market-seeking foreign engagement should not aﬀect the skill-structure of
parent’s domestic labor demand. Therefore data on the imported intermedi-
ate inputs usually taken from input-output table are mostly preferred in the
literature.
Figure 3.4 presents the utilization of intermediate inputs in the production
process distinguished according to their origin. The intermediate inputs are
presented in percent of averaged total manufacturing output. Therefore, the
diﬀerence between intermediate inputs and output corresponds to the value
added. While the value added of ﬁrms of the manufacturing sector was on
average 40 percent in 1991, it declined to 35 percent in 2000. This trend
underlines the increased importance of intermediate goods and highlights
the fragmentation of the production process in separate stages.
As Figure 3.4 indicates, intermediate inputs become more relevant over
time. Most importantly, the share of imported inputs rose rapidly by 34
percent between 1995 and 2000, while it declined slightly during the early
1990s. Comparing the numbers of 1991 and 2000, suggests that the declining
value added can be attributed mainly to increased outsourcing activities. Or
in other words, the new outsourcing opportunities did not lead to a decline
in the purchase of domestic inputs. Therefore, imported inputs accounted
in 2000 for almost 30 percent of purchased total inputs while they were only
23 percent ﬁve years ago. It highlights that outsourcing is predominantly a
phenomenon of recent years. Therefore, extending the analysis to the early


















Notes: The bars show the domestic and imported inputs in percent of output
averaged over all manufacturing 2-digit NACE sectors.
Source: Own calculations based on data from input-output tables of the Federal
Statistical Oﬃce of Germany.
Figure 3.4: Domestic and Imported Inputs
Measuring outsourcing as imported inputs aim to capture ﬁrms’ decisions
about undertaking an individual production stage domestically in-house or
move it abroad both arm’s-length and within the boundaries of the ﬁrm by
FDI. However, the drawback of this measure is that the output of relocated
last stages of the production process, which assemble ﬁnal goods sold abroad
or even re-imported to Germany, is not taken into account.16 This tends to
underestimate the volume of outsourcing activities.
Utilizing data on imported intermediate inputs from input-output tables
allows the construction of diﬀerent measures of outsourcing.17 All variables
which I will present are expressed relative to gross output of the considered
16 Slaughter (2000) notes that this measure of outsourcing captures only outsourced
stages that return to the domestic market for further processing. Therefore, he favors
diﬀerent measures of FDI to estimate outsourcing. Furthermore, Anderton et al (2002b)
argue that input-output tables, where data on imported inputs are taken from, are reported
infrequently and mostly interpolated using import data. Thus, they prefer the direct use
of imports that includes both ﬁnal and intermediate goods.
17 See Feenstra and Hanson (1999).
48sector, Yi.18 The wide deﬁnition of outsourcing OUTSwide takes the imported
intermediate goods of all manufacturing sectors into account. Each industry
i purchases imported inputs ImpInpij from manufacturing industries n =
1,...,j which corresponds to the column sum over all NACE D industries in








By restricting the imported intermediate inputs to those which are pur-
chased from foreign ﬁrms of the company’s own industry, I obtain a second







where ImpInpi denotes the imported inputs that are purchased from the
same 2-digit NACE sector as the good being produced. Imported inputs of
the own sector are taken from the main diagonal of the input-output matrix
of imported goods.
The reason why the literature prefers the narrow deﬁnition of outsourcing
over the wide deﬁnition is that the former measure reﬂects more appropri-
ately the idea of substituting domestic in-house production with imported
intermediates. Only the relocation of stages of production to abroad that
could have been done domestically in the same sector matters for the im-
pacts on the domestic skill-structure of an individual sector. Sourcing inter-
mediate inputs of all manufacturing industries from foreign countries (wide
outsourcing) does not directly aﬀect the prospects of workers of the same
sector. These imports substitute domestic inputs formerly purchased from
other sectors and correspond from the other sectors’ perspective to import
competition in ﬁnal goods. Therefore, the narrow measure captures the idea
of outsourcing in the sense of import competition in intermediate inputs of
18 Measuring outsourcing in terms of output captures the general trend of fragmentation
reﬂected in a higher utilization of intermediates which can be purchased from abroad or
domestically. Whereas outsourcing measured in terms of total intermediate inputs only
takes into account the composition between domestic and foreign inputs. Egger and Egger
(2003) employ both measures and ﬁnd in a regression analysis only slight diﬀerences.
However, they state that outsourcing in terms of output appears to be preferable.
49the same industry in the most proper way.
A third measure of international outsourcing makes use of the diﬀer-
ence between the wide and the narrow deﬁnition. The diﬀerence outsourcing
represents the intermediate inputs imported from all manufacturing sectors














Notes: wide outsourcing: imported intermediate inputs of the manufacturing
sector (NACE D) in percent of gross output.
narrow outsourcing: imported intermediate inputs of the sector’s own NACE
2-digit sector in percent of gross output.
diﬀerence outsourcing: imported intermediate inputs of the manufacturing sec-
tor (NACE D), excluding inputs of the sector’s own NACE 2-digit sector, in
percent of gross output.
Source: Own calculations based on data from input-output tables of the Federal
Statistical Oﬃce of Germany.
Figure 3.5: Wide, Narrow, and Diﬀerence Outsourcing
Figure 3.5 displays the trends in those three deﬁnitions of outsourcing.
Averaged over all manufacturing sectors, the wide outsourcing increased sub-
stantially from 11.9 percent of output in 1991 to 14.7 percent in 2003. The
major acceleration occurred between 1996 and 2000. This rise in wide out-
sourcing is driven for the overwhelming part by the trend of increased out-
sourcing activities within the same sector. The average narrow outsourcing
grew considerably from 5.7 percent in 1991 to 8.6 percent at the peak in 2001
50while the diﬀerence outsourcing variable remained stable over time. In the
last two years, these outsourcing measures have shown a slightly declining
trend. This is in line with the development of FDI.19
The trends on average imply that outsourcing activities of German ﬁrms
are largely a phenomenon of substituting domestic stages of production with
foreign inputs of the same sector. It means that ﬁrms close down produc-
tion stages in Germany and replace them with inputs from abroad, either
purchased arm’s-length or imported from newly established foreign aﬃliates.
The development of narrow outsourcing over time conﬁrms the view that this
measure best captures the idea of outsourcing. However, the developments
diﬀer considerably between sectors. While in sectors such as printing and
publishing, manufacturing of rubber and plastics, and tobacco products out-
sourcing within the same sector is negligible, the computer, transport, and
communication equipment industries extensively import inputs of the same
2-digit NACE sector. Roughly 25 percent of their output in Germany in
2003 is assembled from intermediates that are purchased from foreign ﬁrms
belonging to the same sector. Furthermore, the textiles and clothes sector
shows also relatively high rates with about 20 percent. In the next section, I
will consider in detail the variation of growth of outsourcing activities across
sectors on which my empirical analysis in Section 3.6 is based on.
3.3.3 Trends in Outsourcing and Labor Market at Sec-
toral Level
Up to now, I considered the trends on average of the manufacturing sector.
The aggregate trends are informative but they mask substantial heterogeneity
across sectors. In Figure 3.6 the sectors are ranked with respect to their
average annual growth rate in outsourcing intensity over the period 1991
through 2003.20 The ﬁgure gives some insights in how the labor market
19 The share of employment of foreign aﬃliates in domestic employment declined after
the peak in 2001 from 35.6 percent to 34.2 percent in 2003, see Table 3.3.
20 Ranking the sectors according changes in percentage points of the outsourcing variable
reveals a fairly similar picture.
51outcomes of each sector are related to the trends in outsourcing and if these
links change over time. Therefore, I broke down the sample period into two
sub-periods, the early nineties, between 1991 and 1996 and the more recent
years 1997-2003.
Apparently, almost every sector fragmented its production process in-
ternationally during the considered 13 years, shown by the blue bars. The
changes in outsourcing activities21 range from a rise by 13 and 10 percent
per year in the tobacco and computer industry, respectively, to an average
annual drop by -0.7 percent in the manufacturing of wood, and glass and
stones.
The inspection of changes in relative wages shows that they exhibit a
substantial variation across sectors although they are fairly stable at the ag-
gregate level. Four sectors22 even experienced even a decline in the relative
wages during the period 1991-2003. This trend was most pronounced in the
computer sector, where the wages of non-production workers dropped dra-
matically from the high level of 239 percent of the production workers’ wages
by 1.48 percent per year. Over the same period, the relative wages increased
by about 0.8 percent each year in both the leather and the basic metals in-
dustries which marks the highest growth rate across sectors. Distinguishing
the sample period in two sub-periods reveals that in the earlier period be-
tween 1991 and 1996, both sectors with the highest increase in outsourcing,
tobacco, and computers, experienced a substantial reduction in their relative
wages. This suggests a negative impact of outsourcing on the skill premium.
However, the picture in the remaining sectors is not that clear. In the later
period, the relative wages increased considerably in the two sectors which
reduced their outsourcing activities at strongest over the entire period.
Rising relative wages of non-production workers should have led to a shift
in employment away from non-production workers. It would be the reaction
along the demand curve. However, this standard reaction cannot be observed
for most sectors, indicating that the demand curve has shifted outwards.
So both the clothes and leather industries show one of the highest growth
21 Outsourcing is measured according to the narrow measure.
22 Out of 18 NACE 2-digit manufacturing sectors for which data are continuously avail-













































































































































































































Notes: The numbers show average annual growth rates over the respective period. The
sectors are ranked in descending order with respect to their growth rates in outsourcing
during 1991 and 2003. Outsourcing is deﬁned in the narrow way. For further details of
variable deﬁnition see Table 3.15 in the Appendix.
Source: Own calculations based on data from input-output tables and labor market
statistics of the Federal Statistical Oﬃce of Germany.
Figure 3.6: Outsourcing, Wages and Employment
53rates in relative wages, and at the same time, their relative employment of
non-production workers increased most strongly. The relative skilled labor
employment tripled in the clothes sector and reached 91 percent in 2004.
Considering the data on relative employment for individual sectors shows
for the entire period that only in the sector of manufacturing basic metals the
ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled workers declined slightly. Also in both sub-
periods, most sectors increased their employment of non-production workers
relative to production workers. It seems remarkable, concerning the computer
sector, that the strong variation of relative wages over time was accompanied
by an enormous movement of the relative employment. So the relative non-
production workers’ employment increased between 1991 and 1996 from 151
to 227 percent, followed by a sharp decline to 140 percent in 2001 and a rise
again in recent years. It reveals the high volatility in the labor demand for
skills in the computer sector.23
In Table 3.4, I take a closer look at the sectoral pattern of outsourcing and
its time structure. In examining trends in the two sub-periods, two broad
facts emerge. First, 16 out of 18 sectors increased their outsourcing activ-
ities over the entire period of 1991 through 2003 but only 11 sectors show
a positive growth rate in the more recent sub-period. Second, a sectoral
shift towards more skill-intensive sectors can be observed. As the table indi-
cates, high-skilled labor intensive sectors are the main outsourcers of German
manufacturing in the latter sub-period.
One could argue that the incentive to outsource stages of production to
low-wage countries is greater in low-skill intensive sectors where low-skilled
labor accounts for a substantial portion of total production costs. In general,
for the entire period, the ranking of the sectors conﬁrms this view, generally
spoken. However, the trend during the total period does not tell the whole
story. It misses the sectoral shift over time.
In the early 1990s, ﬁrms particularly in the computer, tobacco, plastics,
leather, and textiles sectors increased their imported intermediate inputs
23 Diehl (1999) identiﬁes similar trends of the computer sector in Germany for the period
1970-1993. He states that the employment share of production workers in this sector
declined dramatically by 37 percentage points, while the relative wages of production







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































55from abroad. In the more recent period, the plastics, leather, textiles and
basic metals industries reduced their outsourcing activities rapidly.24 At
the same time, the electronics, chemicals, machinery, and the medical and
optical instruments sectors which are characterized by low or negative growth
rates in the ﬁrst period, increased their outsourcing activities strongly during
the later period. In Table 3.4, this trend can be seen in the numbers in
parentheses in the column of the period 1997-2003. These numbers reﬂect
the ranking of the industries in the earlier period. What do these sectors
have in common? Out of these sectors come high-tech industries, since their
human capital intensity lies clearly above the average. Whereas the sectors
which decelerated signiﬁcantly the growth of imported inputs, are usually
characterized as low skill-intensive and traditional sectors. The last column of
the table shows the sectors’ rankings according to human capital intensity.25
The sectoral shift suggests that in the early nineties, low-tech sectors mainly
outsourced low-skill intensive intermediates to low-wage countries, while in
more recent years, human-capital intensive sectors increased substantially the
imports of intermediate inputs. The latter might come from more advanced
countries which are well endowed with high-skilled labor relative to Germany.
As a result, the factor content of imported intermediates might have changed
towards more skilled-labor.
Because of the visible strong shift in the pattern of outsourcing sectors, it
seems reasonable for the econometric examination to distinguish the period
of 1991-2003 in two sub-periods. Furthermore, it appears to be worth ana-
lyzing the impact of outsourcing on the skill-structure of individual sectors
and groups of sectors classiﬁed according to their human capital intensity,
respectively. After reviewing existing empirical studies in the next section, I
will analyze these phenomena econometrically.
24 Two of these sectors show negative growth rates and the others clearly lower growth
rates in the period 1997-2003 compared to 1991-1996.
25 Since data on the human capital intensity at the level of individual sectors is not
available in oﬃcial statistics, I use as a proxy data from a unique data set of German and
Austrian multinationals.
563.4 Existing Empirical Literature
Recently, the relocation of jobs by German multinational ﬁrms from Ger-
many to abroad created a great public sensation. And although the impacts
of international outsourcing on the German labor market is highly debated in
Germany’s publicity, empirical studies about this topic are rare. Geishecker
(2002, 2005) and Geishecker and G¨ org (2004, 2005) are the only studies for
Germany that investigate the eﬀects of international outsourcing on the de-
mand for diﬀerent skill groups during the 1990s. They highlight in their stud-
ies that outsourcing leads to skill-upgrading within each sector. Therefore,
they conclude, low-skilled workers in Germany are losing from outsourcing.
The result conﬁrms the predictions of the theoretical model of Feenstra and
Hanson (1996a), and it is in concordance with the large part of the existing
empirical literature presented in Section 2.2.
Diehl (1999) undertakes an investigation on the impact of international
outsourcing on the skill-structure in German manufacturing during the 1970s
and 1980s. He mentions that outsourcing can be understood as substitution
of imported inputs for domestic low-skilled workers. In contrast to most
other studies, in a cost function framework, he uses relative prices instead of
volumes of imported intermediates inputs. Estimating factor demand func-
tions for 28 German manufacturing industries between 1970 and 1993, Diehl
(1999) ﬁnds only weak evidence on the impact of outsourcing on the domestic
skill-structure. In only 16 out of 28 industries has outsourcing had a statisti-
cally signiﬁcant impact on the relative labor demand. While in 11 industries
the relative employment of production workers is negatively aﬀected by out-
sourcing, in the remaining ﬁve industries, which are in large part low-skill
intensive industries, outsourcing favors production workers. These ambigu-
ous results cannot identify the impact of outsourcing on the demand shift
towards non-production workers.
As Geishecker (2002) states, this is the ﬁrst empirical assessment of the
impact of international outsourcing on the demand for low-skilled workers in
Germany’s manufacturing sector during the 1990s. Recently, a large discus-
sion emerged about the role of the welfare state in the process of globalization.
57There exists a broad common sense that the welfare state should compensate
the losers from globalization and in particular from international outsourc-
ing, thereby compensation the low-skilled workers for the disadvantages they
experience. The mentioned empirical studies of Ingo Geishecker and Hol-
ger G¨ org support the widespread opinion about the deteriorating economic
situation of low-skilled workers in Germany. After presenting Geishecker’s
(2002) major conclusions in the next paragraphs, I will prove the robustness
of his empirical results.
Geishecker (2002) analyzes the role of international outsourcing in the
relative demand for low-skilled workers in German manufacturing. He re-
ports that in the aggregate manufacturing sector the relative wage bill of
low-skilled workers declined by 23 percentage points within the period 1991
to 2000. While the predominant part, 21 percentage points, of this change
can be attributed to a decreased relative employment of low-skilled workers,
the decline in relative wages contributes only 2 percentage points. It indi-
cates the power of Germany’s labor market institutions, especially the high
unionization of many manufacturing industries.
In addition, he ﬁnds that the observed skill upgrading occurred mostly
within individual manufacturing industries. Decomposing the overall shift in
the employment share towards high-skilled workers of 3.2 percentage points
between 1991 and 2000 shows that the “within” industry relative demand
shift accounts for 3.9 percentage points, while the sectoral reallocation to-
wards low-skilled labor intensive industries attributes -0.7 percentage points.
Geishecker’s (2002) analysis is based on a sample of 20 manufacturing
industries of uniﬁed Germany pooled over the years 1991 to 2000. As a mea-
surement for international outsourcing, he uses the imported intermediate
goods of the ﬁrm’s same two-digit sector in percent of the total intermedi-
ate goods of the domestic sector. These ratios are derived from data of the
input-output table of the German Federal Statistical Oﬃce. At the aggre-
gate level of the manufacturing industry, this measurement of international
outsourcing increases by around 10 percentage points from 30.6 percent in
1991 to 40.3 percent of the sum of domestic and imported inputs in 2000.
58According to the basic econometric speciﬁcation, Geishecker (2002) re-
gresses the low-skilled workers’ wage bill share WBSLS on international out-
sourcing OUTS, the sectoral capital intensity K/L and the lagged relative
wages of high-skilled workers wHS/wLS. Additionally, the technical change
over time TECH is proxied by the R&D expenditure share in total output.
This variable reﬂects the technical change of the aggregate manufacturing
industry and shows no variation across sectors. Furthermore, industry ﬁxed
eﬀects are included to control for time-invariant characteristics of each indi-
vidual industry. Column (1) of Table 3.5 shows the results of Geishecker’s
(2002) basic regression. However, I replaced the original dependent variable,
the low-skilled workers’ wage bill share by the wage bill share of high-skilled
workers. Simultaneously, I switched the signs of the estimated coeﬃcients
on the explanatory variables to the opposite in order to make Geishecker’s
results immediately comparable with my outcomes below. The reported stan-
dard errors are adjusted for contemporaneous correlation of order one and
for heteroscedasticity.
The coeﬃcient on the variable of interest OUTS is positive and statis-
tically signiﬁcant at the one percent level. It appears that international
outsourcing has a positive impact on the demand for high-skilled workers
and disfavors low-skilled workers. Moreover, it is notable that also tech-
nical change shows the predicted sign and has a skill-biased eﬀect, which
conﬁrms the expected low-skilled labor saving character of technology. In
a further speciﬁcation, which is not reported here, Geishecker (2002) dis-
tinguishes capital into two components, equipment and plant capital. He
states that in this speciﬁcation only equipment capital impacts low-skilled
labor negatively. Thus, he concludes “independent of the speciﬁcation there
is strong evidence for a negative impact of international outsourcing on the
relative demand for low-skilled workers.”26
Nevertheless, are these results robust to the inclusion of additional econo-
metric controls for the panel structure? In a ﬁrst step, I reestimate Geishecker’s
speciﬁcation (1) using a comparable dataset of 19 industries27 for the same
26 See Geishecker (2002), p. 13.
27 Out of 23 NACE D 2-digit industries the following four industries are excluded due
59Table 3.5: Robustness of Estimates of Geishecker (2002)
dependent variable: wage bill share of high-skilled workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OUTS 0.078*** 0.104*** 0.000 0.015 0.013
(0.026) (0.029) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022)
ln K/Y -0.020 3.092** 5.723*** 4.181** 4.875***








lag -0.200** -12.838** -7.202 -7.259 -7.245
(0.091) (6.193) (4.428) (4.662) (4.715)
Constant -0.466* -45.370 -1257.9*** 8.512 10.739
(0.27) (33.02) (106.2) (23.85) (23.26)
industry ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes
linear time trend no no yes no no
time ﬁxed eﬀects no no no yes yes
Adj. R2 0.894 0.979 0.985 0.986 0.985
N 180 171 171 171 162
Notes: Coeﬃcients are estimated by OLS regressions; *** (**) [*] indicates signiﬁcance
at the 1 (5) [10] percent level; standard errors in parentheses are adjusted to contempora-
neous correlation of order one and to heteroscedasticity; estimated coeﬃcient on industry
and time ﬁxed eﬀects are not reported; N denotes the number of observations.
Variables are deﬁned as follows: wage bill share = (wage bill of non-production work-
ers/industry wage bill)*100; OUTS = (imported inputs from same sector/domestic and
imported intermediates from same sector)*100; ln Y = log real output; ln K/Y = ln
[(capital/output)*100]; TECH = (R&D expenditure of manufacturing/output of manu-




lag = ﬁrst lag of ln[(wage of low-skilled workers/wage of high-skilled work-
ers)*100].
Source: Column (1) reports estimates of Geishecker (2002); Columns (2)-(5) report own
calculations.
60period of time 1991 to 2000. Column (2) in Table 3.5 reports the esti-
mated coeﬃcients, which are qualitatively similar to those of Geishecker
(2002), especially the coeﬃcients on the variables of interest outsourcing
and technical change. Based on this speciﬁcation, I replace in column (3)
the manufacturing-wide R&D expenditure ratio with a linear time trend to
catch various sorts of common changes over time. The result is that the co-
eﬃcient on the outsourcing variable becomes insigniﬁcant and is of negligible
size. Moreover, the linear time trend appears signiﬁcantly positive, which
means that outsourcing has no signiﬁcant additional explanatory power to
determine the changes in the labor demand. Although not reported in the
table, it should be noted that the results remain unchanged when addition-
ally the technology variable TECH is included. In this case, the coeﬃcient
on TECH is not statistically signiﬁcant yet it is positive.
A proper OLS estimation for panel data requires a two-way ﬁxed eﬀects
speciﬁcation with industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects. The year dummies pick up
economy wide eﬀects that are speciﬁc to individual years but not industries.
As the results in column (4) of Table 3.5 show, the inclusion of two-way ﬁxed
eﬀects captures all the variation the outsourcing variable contains and makes
the coeﬃcient on OUTS insigniﬁcant.
The last speciﬁcation of this table includes a sector-speciﬁc R&D expen-
diture ratio R&D/Y in the regression which varies over sectors and time.
This makes it possible regress the high-skilled workers’ wage bill share on
technological change and to control at the same time for general eﬀects of
individual years. Again, this speciﬁcation does not change the positive but
statistically insigniﬁcant impact of international outsourcing on the demand
for low-skilled workers.
The estimates suggest that the proposed statistical signiﬁcance of a neg-
ative eﬀect of outsourcing on low-skilled labor is not robust to standard OLS
panel estimation techniques. A more recent empirical study supports this
statement. Geishecker (2005) does not ﬁnd signiﬁcant empirical evidence
on the impact of overall outsourcing on the economic fortune of low-skilled
to data constraints: publishing and printing, oil reﬁning and nuclear fuel, furniture and
manufacturing n.e.c., and recycling.
61workers in German manufacturing. Using a similar set-up, this study ana-
lyzes the eﬀects of outsourcing from Germany to Eastern Europe. Combining
data on international trade and intermediate inputs, he constructs a narrow
and wide measure of outsourcing, distinguishing the imports according to the
geographical origin. In order to account for endogeneity of the outsourcing
variable, Geishecker (2005) applies the General Method of Moments using
ﬁrst and second lags. Furthermore, he includes a full set of time and indus-
try dummy variables whereas the time dummies should capture technological
progress. As a result of the GMM regression analysis, outsourcing to Central
and Eastern Europe lowers signiﬁcantly the relative demand for low-skilled
manual workers. However, there is no unambiguous empirical evidence for
the eﬀects of outsourcing to other countries than Eastern European and for
overall outsourcing. Using OLS ﬁxed eﬀects and GMM estimations, the re-
sults on outsourcing are in most speciﬁcations statistically insigniﬁcant and
the direction of inﬂuence is not robust.
The highly signiﬁcant positive impact of outsourcing to Central and East-
ern Europe on the relative demand for high-skilled labor that Geishecker
(2005) identiﬁes might be plausible, however, the calculation of the geo-
graphical distinction of outsourcing requires a critical note.28 There is no
doubt that distinguishing outsourcing according to the geographical origin is
very useful for analyzing the eﬀects of outsourcing in more detail. It makes
it possible to gain insights on how the source of imported inputs matters
for the impact on the labor market. Furthermore, it could identify the role
of individual countries in the international value-added chain. However, re-
strictions of data do not allow to investigations of this role without stringent
assumptions. If stages of production are moved oﬀshore due to diﬀerences
in factor endowments, then it is indeed likely that the shares of intermediate
goods in total imports diﬀer across trading partners. One might expect that
the mix of intermediate and ﬁnal goods diﬀer substantially between imports
from CEE, and for example, Western European countries. However, when
constructing outsourcing measures for individual regions, the crucial assump-
28 Egger and Egger (2003) construct in a similar way a measure for outsourcing from
Austria to Central and Eastern Europe.
62tion has to be made that the composition of intermediate and ﬁnal goods is
identical across all regions. Therefore, solely the variation of total imports
taken from trade statistics drives the measure of geographical outsourcing.
In the face of these problematic features, it seems reasonable to prefer direct
measures of import competition.29
In a related work, Geishecker and G¨ org (2005) employ micro-data of the
German Socio Economic Panel for the years 1991-2000. The sample covers
1612 individuals and contains detailed information on educational attain-
ment. Geishecker and G¨ org (2005) measure outsourcing by the value of im-
ported intermediate inputs in a sector’s output. This measure corresponds
to the wide deﬁnition of outsourcing. In the econometric analysis, they es-
timate wage equations at the level of individuals. Their results indicate
that international outsourcing aﬀects wages negatively, but the coeﬃcient
appears to not be statistically signiﬁcant. However, distinguishing the in-
dustries into low-skill and high-skill industries reveals that outsourcing has
a signiﬁcant negative impact on wages in low-skill sectors, while the impact
is insigniﬁcant, yet negative, for high-skill sectors. Furthermore, Geishecker
and G¨ org (2005) show signiﬁcant empirical evidence that high-skilled workers
in high-skill intensive sectors are inﬂuenced positively by outsourcing, while
low-skilled workers in low-skill intensive sectors experience a negative wage
eﬀect from outsourcing. Interestingly, high-skilled workers in low-skill in-
tensive sectors are negatively aﬀected by fragmentation in terms of wages.30
The authors conclude that the eﬀects of outsourcing on individual wages de-
pend crucially on the characteristics of the industry in which the individual
is employed.
This overview of existing empirical studies on Germany shows that the
observed overall impacts of outsourcing on the skill-structure are weak. It
might be surprising facing the large relocation of production stages oﬀshore
29 Arguing in this way, Anderton et al (2002a) use total import shares distinguished to
geographic regions as measure for outsourcing.
30 In a more detailed study, Geishecker and G¨ org (2004) distinguish the individuals into
three skill categories. They ﬁnd a strong negative eﬀect of outsourcing on the real wages
of low-skilled workers. Their ﬁndings led them to conclude that in Germany, low-skilled
workers are losers from the internationalization of the production process.
63undertaken by German companies in recent years. Signiﬁcant eﬀects can be
detected only for selected skill groups and industries. Furthermore, I have
shown that the Geishecker’s (2002) ﬁndings of an overall negative impact
of outsourcing on low-skilled workers are not robust to a proper OLS panel
estimation. Therefore, further eﬀorts are required to gain more insights in
the reactions of the German labor market on factor-biased outsourcing.
New aspects might be gained by inspecting the eﬀects of outsourcing on
relative wages and employment separately instead of the composed relative
demand. Furthermore, a closer look at individual sectors which show striking
variation in trends, may be useful. Also some work for Germany has to be
done on investigating technological change and its channels which have to
be approximated in a more accurate way than by time trends and dummies.
Moreover, the question of what role governmental R&D policy and other fac-
tors of technology diﬀusion play in skill-upgrading arises. Finally, the shown
studies on Germany miss all together the developments in the most recent
years. As I have shown, the sectoral pattern of outsourcers shifted substan-
tially in the recent years away from low-skill towards high-skill sectors. It
should have certain eﬀects on the consequences of outsourcing. Therefore,
it makes it reasonable to extend the period of analysis to the early 2000s,




The model of Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) provides a formalization of the
idea that international trade and particularly outsourcing induces a shift in
the factor intensities in domestic production. It is common in the literature
in this ﬁeld to estimate industry cost functions for examining the sources of
the shift in the skill structure. Following Berman et al (1994), the start-
ing point is to consider the variable unit cost function for each industry.
64Feenstra and Hanson (2003) state that “any structural variables that shift
the production function and therefore aﬀect costs should be included as ar-
guments”31 in the cost function. Thus, in order to estimate the eﬀect of
international outsourcing on the relative skilled labor demand, Feenstra and
Hanson (1996a, 1996b) adopt Berman et al’s (1994) regression framework
by including the outsourcing variable. As outlined in Feenstra and Hanson’s
model in Chapter 2, the countries are - by assumption - endowed with three
factors of production: low-skilled labor, high-skilled labor, and capital. In
the production process these three factors are combined, which leads to the










In addition to the three factors of production whose corresponding factor
prices are denoted by wLS
it ,wHS
it , and rit, variables for outsourcing (OUTS)
and technology (TECH) are included. They capture the imported inter-
mediate inputs and the technical change at the sectoral level, respectively.
Following the existing literature, the inclusion of outsourcing as well as tech-
nological progress in the unit cost function is justiﬁed by arguing that merely
including the factors of production will not capture other factors which might
inﬂuence the production costs. In this context, outsourcing can be thought
of as a form of technical change since it acts as an “endogenous technical
change”.32
Starting from this variable cost function and assuming capital to be a
ﬁxed factor of production, two factors of production are variable in the short-
run: low-skilled and high-skilled labor. Following the empirical approach of
Berman et al (1994) a translog cost function can be derived from the unit cost
function. The diﬀerentiation of the translog cost function with respect to the
prices of the variable factors, wLS
it and wHS
it , gives the factor demand equation
in the form of the factor’s share in total variable cost. In my analysis the
factor’s share in total variable cost corresponds to the high-skilled workers’
wage bill in the total wage bill. This wage bill share of the high-skilled
31 Feenstra and Hanson (2003), p. 21.
32 See Feenstra and Hanson (1996a).
65workers (WBSHS) measures the relative demand for high-skilled labor. By
pooling data across industries, I assume that the same cost function applies
for all industries. From diﬀerentiation of the translog function, it comes out
that the relative wages appear on the right-hand side. Berman et al (1994)
mention that it is not plausible to treat the relative wages as an exogenous
explanatory variable. Arguing the variation of wages across industries reﬂects
only diﬀerences in the quality of workers, the relative prices of labor can
be considered constant across industries. Therefore, to avoid endogeneity
problems, relative wages can be omitted from the estimating equation. The
cross-industry variation of relative wages is taken into account by using time




it = β0 + β1lnYit + β2lnKit/Yit + β3OUTSit + β4TECHit +
β5Tt + β6Ii + uit (3.4)
As already mentioned above, the dependent variable is a composite mea-
sure. It incorporates relative wages of non-production workers as well as
their relative employment. Although the decomposition of the labor demand
in wages and employment is based on weak theoretical foundation, it should
provide interesting insights in the mechanism of the labor market. Therefore,
below I will replace the wage bill share as dependent variable with the rela-
tive wages and alternatively with the relative employment of the high-skilled
workers. To control for exogenous variations of the dependent variable which
are systematic across industries or years, I include a full set of time (Tt) and
industry (Ii) dummies.
3.5.2 Data and Variables
The employed dataset comprises data for NACE 2-digit industries of the
German manufacturing sector33 pooled over the years 1991 to 2003. Out of
33 The manufacturing sector corresponds to category D (15-37) of the NACE Rev. 1
classiﬁcation. The European classiﬁcation system NACE corresponds to the international
industry classiﬁcation ISIC. Thus, NACE Rev. 1 is equivalent to ISIC Rev. 3.
66the 23 two-digit industries of NACE D, the following ﬁve industries are ex-
cluded due to missing data on wages and employment, manufacturing of pulp
and paper, printing and publishing, coke and petroleum products, furniture
and other manufacturing, and recycling. Finally, it yields a balanced panel
dataset consisting of 234 observations. Unfortunately, using a longer time
series with data prior to 1991 is not possible due to two reasons. First, the
German reuniﬁcation prevents a longer consistent time series, and secondly,
the adoption of the Eurostat NACE industry classiﬁcation succeeding the
speciﬁc German system does not allow it. The data I use are taken from
diﬀerent sources, as summarized in Table 3.15 in the Appendix.
Labor market data on wages and employment are available for the broad
categories production and non-production workers. The Federal Statistical
Oﬃce provides the data at the sectoral level of NACE 2-digit. For con-
structing the outsourcing measures, data on imported intermediate inputs are
obtained from German input-output tables for selected years. Since input-
output information is not compiled for every year, I estimate the data for
missing years using the import data from trade statistics. Therefore, imports
are the main driving force of this measure. The Appendix provides a detailed
description of the methods for constructing those estimates. For the narrow
deﬁnition of outsourcing, the imported intermediate inputs at the main di-
agonal of the input-output table are utilized. They correspond to the inputs
from the same sector as the output is being produced. Whereas the column
sum of each sector’s imported inputs minus the inputs at the main diagonal
yields the value of imported inputs on which the measure of diﬀerence out-
sourcing is based on. The technological change over time is approximated
by the share of R&D expenditure ratio in value added at the sectoral level.
The data on the remaining variables are obtained from the OECD STAN
Industrial database. Table 3.15 in the Appendix provides the deﬁnitions and
sources of all utilized variables.
The key question in the regression analysis is the sign and the signiﬁcance
of the coeﬃcient on OUTS. The null hypothesis is β3 = 0 which means that
there exists no relationship between outsourcing and the skill-structure of
labor demand. The alternative hypothesis is β3 < 0 or β3 > 0. The out-
67sourcing variable can be interpreted as the relationship between international
outsourcing and a ﬁrm’s unit input requirement for high-skilled labor.34 A
negative sign indicates that increased outsourcing activities disfavor high-
skilled workers relative to low-skilled workers, while a positive sign indicates
that outsourcing saves more low-skilled labor relative to high-skilled labor.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the theoretical model of Feenstra and Hanson
(1996a) predicts a positive relation.
Commonly, it is assumed that technological progress favors the high-
skilled workers.35 The computerization of the production process is associ-
ated with the idea of low-skilled labor saving technology. Hence, the coeﬃ-
cient on technological change should take a positive sign.
The variables of output and capital intensity are included in the regres-
sions as control variables. The level of output controls for eﬀects of economies
of scale that may diﬀer across industries. Output is proxied by value added
which reﬂects the transformation of intermediate inputs into ﬁnished goods.
The coeﬃcient on the output variable should take a negative sign, since in
the short-run business-cycles, output tends to hurt the low-skilled workers
more than the high-skilled workers.36 The presumed complementarity of cap-
ital and skills should imply a positive sign of the coeﬃcients on the capital
intensity.
3.6 Empirical Results
3.6.1 Fixed Eﬀects Estimation
Including industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects, the share of total wage bill going
to non-production workers is regressed on outsourcing, technological change
and additionally on some control variables. The regressions are run cross-
sectionally over 19 NACE 2-digit industries and annually over the period
1991 to 2003. In order to control for omitted variables in the panel dataset
which might cause biased estimates, the two-way ﬁxed estimation technique is
34 See Feenstra and Hanson (1996b).
35 See Berman et al (1994).
36 See Kraft (1994) for this argument of counter-cyclical reaction.
68applied.37 Fixed-eﬀect estimators allow for unobserved heterogeneity across
industries. Industry ﬁxed eﬀects control for variation of omitted variables
across industries for which the explanatory variables do not account. While
these omitted variables are constant over time but vary across industries,
others are constant across industries but vary over time. Therefore, time ﬁxed
eﬀects are also included, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity between
individual years. Time ﬁxed eﬀects pick up aggregate exogenous factors like
economy-wide business cycles or foreign factors which aﬀect all industries
equally. Since the employed sample cannot be considered as a random draw
of a large population, the ﬁxed eﬀects approach appears to be preferable to
a random eﬀects approach.
As statistical tests exhibit,38 the employed data are plagued with the
problem of heteroscedasticity. In order to produce valid statistical inferences,
all standard errors reported in the results are robust to heteroscedasticity.39
Table 3.6 reports the estimates of the diﬀerent two-way ﬁxed eﬀects OLS
regressions for the wage bill share of high-skilled workers. As its main result,
it is striking that the narrow deﬁnition of outsourcing has a negative impact
on the relative demand for high-skilled labor in all speciﬁcations. It suggests
that human capital in Germany is losing from moving stages of production
oﬀshore. This stands in contrast to the results of the existing empirical
literature.
The starting point of the regression analysis is estimating the following
basic speciﬁcation: The non-production workers’ wage bill share is regressed
on narrow outsourcing omitting technology as further determinant. Further-
more, in column (1) the output of each sector proxied by the value added
and the capital to value added ratio are included as controls.
37 See Stock and Watson (2003) and Wooldridge (2003) for a detailed presentation of
panel estimation techniques.
38 The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg and the White/Koenker tests for heteroscedas-
ticity indicate that heteroscedasticity is present. Both tests reject the null hypothesis of
homoscedastic disturbances at the one percent level of signiﬁcance.
39 Additionally, I estimated the regressions using panel-corrected standard errors using
the Stata command xtpcse, corr(ar1). Hence, the disturbances are assumed to be het-
eroscedastic, contemporaneously correlated across panels, and ﬁrst-order autocorrelated
within panels. The results on the variable of interest, narrow outsourcing, are fairly similar
to those reported in the tables of this section.
69Table 3.6: Outsourcing and Demand for High-Skilled Labor in Germany
dependent variable: wage bill share of high-skilled workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OUTSnarrow -0.209** -0.187** -0.259*** -0.244** -0.260*** -0.207**
(0.102) (0.092) (0.099) (0.105) (0.079) (0.088)
OUTSdifference -0.283
(0.289)
ln VA -7.348** -6.642** -7.654** -5.466 -7.701*** -6.816**
(3.115) (3.275) (2.988) (3.364) (2.517) (2.912)
ln K/VA 0.726 2.214 1.940 4.211 2.466 2.852
(3.417) (3.451) (3.373) (3.907) (2.792) (3.241)
R&D EXP -0.144** -0.035 -0.211*** -0.114
(0.057) (0.084) (0.050) (0.069)




Constant 81.269*** 85.239*** 83.282*** 83.282*** 81.807*** 80.614***
(17.314) (17.837) (16.579) (18.655) (13.825) (16.104)
Adj. R2 0.968 0.968 0.969 0.973 0.974 0.977
N 234 234 234 198 234 198
Notes: Coeﬃcients are estimated by two-way ﬁxed eﬀects OLS regressions; *** (**) [*] indi-
cates signiﬁcance at the 1 (5) [10] percent level; standard errors in parentheses are robust to
heteroscedasticity; estimated coeﬃcient on industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects are not reported;
N denotes number of observations.
Variables are deﬁned as follows: wage bill share of high-skilled workers = (wage bill of non-
production workers/total wage bill)*100; OUTSnarrow = (imported inputs from same sec-
tor/gross output of the sector)*100; OUTSdifference = (imported inputs from all sectors
(excl. same sector)/gross output of the sector)*100; ln VA = ln real value added; ln K/VA
= ln [(capital stock/value added)*100]; R&D EXP = (R&D expenditure/value added)*100;
R&D SUB = (governmental R&D subsidies/value added)*100; FDIoutL = (employment in
foreign aﬃliates of German multinationals/sector’s domestic employment)*100.
70In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, the statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on narrow
outsourcing OUTSnarrow indicates that international outsourcing has a neg-
ative impact on the demand for non-production workers in Germany. The
negative sign of the coeﬃcient on the logged value added ln V A suggests
that an increase in production is accompanied by a decline in the relative
demand for skills. This ﬁnding is in line with the argument of Feenstra
and Hanson (1996b) that the relative demand for non-production workers
is countercyclical. The capital intensity is found to have the predicted sign
assuming complementarity between capital and skills. However, the variable
is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Column (2) contains the regression results when including narrow out-
sourcing OUTSnarrow and diﬀerence outsourcing OUTSdifference simultane-
ously. Both measures of outsourcing disfavor non-production workers, yet the
inﬂuence of OUTSdifference is not statistically signiﬁcant.40 It emphasizes the
importance of import competition in intermediate inputs of the same sector
as the good being produced. At the same time, the result conﬁrms the the-
oretical idea that the skill structure of an individual sector’s employment is
not aﬀected by decisions of replacing domestic inputs purchased from other
industries with imported inputs. This outcome occurs in all speciﬁcations
but is not shown in Table 3.6. Feenstra and Hanson (1999) ﬁnd a smaller, yet
signiﬁcant, impact of diﬀerence outsourcing than narrow outsourcing when
including both measures simultaneously.
Columns (3) to (6) present the results when adding control variables
for technological change and foreign involvement of German multinationals
which may inﬂuence the relative demand for high-skilled labor. Speciﬁcation
(3) includes the R&D expenditure ratio R&D EXP as a proxy for tech-
nological change in each sector.41 Including both outsourcing and technical
change aims to attribute any residual variation in the wage bill share to
40 Furthermore, I estimated all speciﬁcations replacing narrow and diﬀerence outsourcing
with wide outsourcing. The results are, however, fairly similar to narrow outsourcing only.
41 Alternatively, I used the R&D employment ratio as proxy for technological change.
The results appear, however, fairly similar to those using the R&D expenditure ratio.
Furthermore, I experimented with data on granted patents to capture the output of R&D
activities. The estimates of this variable are statistically insigniﬁcant and the sign is not
robust. A reason might be that the number of granted patents are not an appropriate
measure particularly across industries.
71structural factors rather than to controls including ﬁxed eﬀects, and a re-
maining unexplained part. The coeﬃcient on this variable shows a negative
sign and is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level.42 It indicates that
technological progress is biased in favor of production workers. The result
is in conﬂict with the commonly-assumed low-skilled labor saving character
of technical change. Moreover, controlling for technical change magniﬁes the
negative impact of OUTSnarrow on high-skilled labor and raises the statistical
signiﬁcance to the one percent level.
In order to control for the role of state R&D policy in the shift towards
more-skilled workers, I additionally include in speciﬁcation (4) the R&D sub-
sidies of the German Federal government R&D SUB. While an average of
6.9 percent of expenditure on R&D undertaken by ﬁrms was ﬁnanced by the
federal government in 1993, the share declined to 3.5 percent in 2003. The
subsidies vary substantially across industries. Thus, less than 1 percent of
the R&D expenditures of the vehicles industry are state-ﬁnanced, whereas
the manufacturing of other transport equipment, which includes aircraft
and spacecraft activities, clearly received the absolute and relative largest
amount. However, the subsidies to the latter industry declined substantially
over time from more than 39 percent of business-ﬁnanced R&D expenditures
in 1993 to 13 percent in 2003. The large variation of R&D subsidies across
industries indicates that they are used as an active policy instrument. Since
the data on this variable are available only from 1993 onwards, the sample
size declines to 198 observations. The signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on R&D SUB
is negative as the R&D EXP. However, R&D EXP becomes insigniﬁcant
which indicates that the subsidy variable captures the explanatory power of
the R&D expenditure ratio. Furthermore, the signiﬁcance of the outsourcing
variable slightly falls which underlines the importance of R&D EXP as a
factor explaining the labor market outcomes.
Following Slaughter (2000), the speciﬁcation in column (5) of Table 3.6
includes the FDI employment share FDIout L in the regression analysis,
while the R&D SUB variable is excluded. Slaughter (2000) uses the em-
42 The result holds when using the R&D employment ratio instead of the R&D expen-
diture ratio, which is not reported in the table.
72ployment of foreign aﬃliates of US multinationals as proxy for international
outsourcing.43 I already mentioned the dramatic increase in the FDI employ-
ment share in Section 3.3.2. The highly signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃcient on
FDIout L suggests that outsourcing, which occurs as intraﬁrm trade between
a domestic parent ﬁrm and foreign aﬃliate, can attribute substantially to ex-
plaining the increase in the relative cost share of high-skilled labor. The eﬀect
is in the opposite direction to narrow outsourcing. The fact that the narrow
outsourcing variable is highly signiﬁcant in column (5), although FDIout L
is included, indicates that both variables cannot be used as alternative mea-
sures. Moreover, as the opposite signs show, they pick up diﬀerent factors
which appear both highly relevant. The intraﬁrm trade which is included as
part of the narrow measure of outsourcing, has seemingly speciﬁc impacts on
the skill-structure. The major diﬀerence between the two measures is that
narrow outsourcing takes into account also arm’s-length purchased inputs
from abroad.44 On the other hand, the FDI variable is related to vertical
FDI but also horizontal FDI that do not induce intraﬁrm trade. The last
column of the table reports the estimates when all variables are included
together. This results conﬁrm the eﬀects seen in the previous speciﬁcations.
As mentioned, in all speciﬁcations a full set of industry and time dummies
is employed that is not reported in the table. However, it is notable that the
time dummies are highly statistically signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcients appear
positive and rising in size over time indicating an increase in the relative
demand for high-skilled labor within each sector. However, this common
trend is not captured by the included explanatory variables. It could be
argued that it reﬂects partly a general trend of changing labor contracts.45
Explaining this general shift towards non-production workers goes beyond
the goal of this chapter to examine the impact of outsourcing on the skill-
structure of labor demand.
To get an idea of the importance of outsourcing relative to the other ex-
planatory variables calculating the contribution of each factor appears to be
43 For further details on Slaughter (2000) see the literature overview in Chapter 2.
44 See Section 3.3.2 for a more detailed description of these measures.
45 Diehl (1999) mentions that the German classiﬁcation according to production and
non-production is based on the labor contract.
73useful. In Table 3.6, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on OUTSnarrow ranges
-0.187 to -0.260. Multiplying the coeﬃcients times the change in narrow
outsourcing between 1991 and 2003 (2.59 percentage points) results in range
of 0.48 and 0.67. It implies that outsourcing can account for at least 8.7
percent of the observed increase in non-production workers’ wage bill share
(5.56 percentage points) in the period 1991 and 2003.46 The contribution in-
creases to 12.1 percent when controlling for technological change. Including
additionally the R&D subsidy variable, the highest contribution of outsourc-
ing is obtained with 25.1 percent in column (4).47 It means that the share of
the wage bill of non-production workers would have increased more strongly
by one quarter in absence of relocating production stages abroad. How rele-
vant is outsourcing for the evolution of the relative high-skilled labor demand
relative to other factors? Technological change can attribute at maximum
4.3 percent, while state-ﬁnanced R&D expenditure reduces the increase of
non-production workers’ wage bill share by at most 4.9 percent. On the
other hand, the FDI employment share can explain about one third of the
increased wage bill share. Concluding, it emphasizes the high importance of
foreign activities of German ﬁrms for the domestic labor market outcomes
of diﬀerent skill groups. The international involvement of German ﬁrms oc-
curs in terms of imports of intermediated inputs and in terms of intraﬁrm
trade induced by foreign investments. Both contribute substantially to the
trends in the labor market, however as already stressed, they act in opposite
directions.
Up to now, I regressed the non-production workers’ wage bill share on var-
ious variables to examine determinants of the relative demand for high-skilled
workers. Table 3.7 shows the regression results when decomposing the wage
bill share into relative wages and relative employment of non-production
workers. It allows me to determine through which channel international
outsourcing and technological change aﬀect the relative demand for human
46 The percentage change is averaged over the 18 manufacturing sectors included in the
regression analysis.
47 The calculation of this contribution bases on changes between 1993 and 2003, since
data on governmental R&D subsidies are only available from 1993 onwards. The corre-
sponding changes in the wage bill share is 2.75 percentage points and 2.84 percentage
points in outsourcing.
74capital. As the negative sign on narrow outsourcing in all speciﬁcations in-
dicates, the relocation of activities to abroad hurts the economic fortune of
non-production workers in terms of employment and compensation, as well.48
Formally spoken, it implies that outsourcing causes an inward shift of the
relative demand curve. At ﬁrst sight, the result on the relative factor prices
seems surprisingly when facing the inﬂexible wages in Germany. However,
as I considered, the trends of relative wages vary substantially across sec-
tors. In columns (1) through (3), where the dependent variables are the
relative wages, the control variable ln V A appears to have a strongly nega-
tive eﬀect. It indicates that a decline in output tends to reduce the wages
of non-production workers relative to production workers who are more of-
ten unionized. The inclusion of the R&D expenditure share in the second
speciﬁcation increases the statistical signiﬁcance of the outsourcing variable
from the one to the ﬁve percent level. Whereas narrow outsourcing becomes
insigniﬁcant, yet negative, when including simultaneously R&D EXP and
R&D SUB in column (3), it is remarkable that the governmental R&D sub-
sidies substantially push up the relative wages of high-skilled workers while
negatively inﬂuencing the relative employment prospects of high skills.
It turns out in column (4) to (6) of Table 3.7 that import competition
in intermediate inputs aﬀects the relative employment of non-production
workers strongly negatively. In the last two speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcient on
the R&D expenditure ratio is positive but not signiﬁcant. While the inclu-
sion of this variable does not aﬀect the outcome of the outsourcing variable,
controlling additionally for state-ﬁnanced R&D expenditures increases the
signiﬁcance and size of the coeﬃcient on OUTSnarrow.
Between 1991 and 2003, the skill premium rose on average over the 18
manufacturing sectors by 4.70 percentage points. Multiplying the estimated
coeﬃcient on outsourcing in column (2) times the change in the outsourcing
variable (-0.663*2.589) yields -1.717. It implies that the relative wages would
have increased more pronounced by 36.5 percent in the absence of moving
any production stages oﬀshore. On the employment side, outsourcing can
48 Feenstra and Hanson (1997) who undertake similar estimates of the decomposed
relative labor demand in Mexico, ﬁnd that the predominant eﬀect of FDI occurred on
relative wages and not on relative employment.
75Table 3.7: Outsourcing and Decomposed Demand for High-Skilled Labor
dependent variable: relative wages relative employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OUTSnarrow -0.560* -0.663** -0.265 -1.334** -1.318** -1.942***
(0.298) (0.301) (0.202) (0.612) (0.604) (0.695)
ln VA -15.603*** -16.239*** -8.603*** 1.326 1.427 3.127
(4.964) (4.730) (3.298) (12.743) (12.677) (17.024)
ln K/VA -8.099 -5.578 1.290 28.116* 27.718* 28.103
(9.288) (8.719) (4.034) (16.246) (16.387) (20.573)
R&D EXP -0.300** -0.417*** 0.047 0.545
(0.141) (0.150) (0.328) (0.491)
R&D SUB 1.519*** -3.474**
(0.493) (1.596)
Constant 253.785*** 257.966*** 216.818*** 35.320 34.660 49.056
(32.071) (31.055) (18.526) (73.759) (73.432) (97.409)
Adj. R2 0.936 0.938 0.966 0.932 0.932 0.936
N 234 234 198 234 234 198
Notes: Coeﬃcients are estimated by two-way ﬁxed eﬀects OLS regressions; *** (**) [*] indi-
cates signiﬁcance at the 1 (5) [10] percent level; standard errors in parentheses are robust to
heteroscedasticity; estimated coeﬃcient on industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects are not reported;
N denotes number of observations.
Variables are deﬁned as follows: relative wages = (wages of non-production workers/wages
of production workers)*100; relative employment = (employment of non-production work-
ers/employment of production workers)*100; OUTSnarrow = (imported inputs from same
sector/gross output of the sector)*100; ln VA = ln real value added; ln K/VA = ln [(capital
stock/value added)*100]; R&D EXP = (R&D expenditure/value added)*100; R&D SUB =
(governmental R&D subsidies/value added)*100.
76account for about 32 percent of the increase in relative employment, as the
coeﬃcients in column (4) and (5) indicate. However, the inclusion of the R&D
subsidies as a further regressor leads to a rapid increase in the contribution of
outsourcing. Narrow outsourcing can negatively account for 85.1 percent of
the increase of the relative employment of non-production workers, while the
subsidy variable can explain 12.6 percent. A speciﬁc case represents spec-
iﬁcation (3) on the relative wages since the skill premium declined slightly
by -0.38 percentage points between 1993 and 2003. Due to data restrictions
of the R&D SUB variable, this regression only relates to the years 1993 to
2003. Thus, the R&D subsidies which also fell by -0.23 percentage points,
can account for almost 95 percent of the variation in the aggregate relative
wages. At the same time, the technology variable has an eﬀect in the oppo-
site direction and contributes more than 100 percent. Overall, the changes in
international outsourcing can contribute substantially with around one third
to the evolution of both relative wages and relative employment.
3.6.2 Robustness
In this section I discuss the robustness of my empirical results. Inspecting
two periods of time reveals certain changes in the eﬀects of international out-
sourcing over time. Secondly, excluding outlier sectors from the sample tests
the robustness of the results for the entire sample. Furthermore, analyzing
groups of sectors detects speciﬁc mechanism in these sectors. Finally, I take
a closer look at the exogeneity of the outsourcing variable.
Time Structure
This section considers whether the results change when distinguishing the en-
tire sample period in two sub-periods. As Section 3.3 descriptively showed,
the pattern of outsourcing activities enormously changed over time. In Ger-
man manufacturing, the broad relocation of stages of production started in
the second half of the 1990s. Therefore, I break down the entire sample
period into two sub-periods and analyze them separately. I use again OLS
77regressions with a full set of industry and time dummies controlling for ex-
ogenous changes in the dependent variable which vary systematically across
industries or years.
Table 3.8: Outsourcing and Demand for High-Skilled Labor in Two Sub-Periods
dependent variable: wage bill share of high-skilled workers
1991-1996 1997-2003
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OUTSnarrow 0.032 0.405** -0.262** -0.257**
(0.143) (0.195) (0.110) (0.117)
ln VA -3.273 4.864 -0.785 -1.161
(3.021) (5.977) (4.030) (4.167)
ln K/VA 2.099 9.502 3.662 2.384
(3.681) (6.257) (4.677) (4.486)
R&D EXP -0.218*** -0.153**
(0.062) (0.071)
R&D SUB -1.300* -0.532*
(0.728) (0.278)
Constant 60.432*** 14.939 53.707** 55.774**
(16.897) (34.429) (22.640) (23.200)
Adj. R2 0.992 0.995 0.985 0.985
N 108 72 126 126
Notes: Coeﬃcients are estimated by two-way ﬁxed eﬀects OLS regressions; *** (**) [*]
indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 (5) [10] percent level; standard errors in parentheses are
robust to heteroscedasticity; estimated coeﬃcient on industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects are
not reported; N denotes number of observations.
Variables are deﬁned as follows: wage bill share of high-skilled workers = (wage bill
of non-production workers/total wage bill)*100; OUTSnarrow = (imported inputs from
same sector/gross output of the sector)*100; ln VA = ln real value added; ln K/VA = ln
[(capital stock/value added)*100]; R&D EXP = (R&D expenditure/value added)*100;
R&D SUB = (governmental R&D subsidies/value added)*100.
78The ﬁrst two columns in Table 3.8 take only data of the early 1990s into
account, while columns (3) and (4) examine the relationship in the more re-
cent years. Column (1) reports the estimated coeﬃcients on the variables of
the basic speciﬁcation. It appears that only the technological change prox-
ied by the R&D expenditure ratio signiﬁcantly aﬀects the relative demand
for high-skilled workers. As for the entire period presented in Table 3.6,
the eﬀect of R&D EXP is again skill-biased in favor of low-skilled workers.
The coeﬃcient on the outsourcing variable OUTSnarrow indicates that the
substitution of a sector’s domestic production of inputs with imports of inter-
mediate inputs shifts the labor demand towards high-skilled workers in the
period 1991-1996. While the eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant in speciﬁ-
cation (1), it becomes signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level when replacing the
R&D expenditure ratio by the R&D subsidy variable. The positive sign of
the coeﬃcient on OUTSnarrow is in line with the predictions of the theoretical
model of Feenstra and Hanson (1996a), outlined in Chapter 2. Furthermore,
it conﬁrms Geishecker’s (2002) ﬁndings of weak evidence of the skill-biased
feature of outsourcing in German manufacturing during the 1990s. The size
of the outsourcing coeﬃcient in column (2) indicates that narrow outsourcing
can account for 63 percent of the increase in the non-production wage bill
share during the period 1993 to 1996.
Turning to the more recent period, however, the outcomes change. During
the years 1997 through 2003, outsourcing appears to discriminate against the
non-production workers in Germany. In both speciﬁcations (3) and (4), the
coeﬃcient on the narrow measure of outsourcing turns out to be signiﬁcantly
negative. During the later period, international outsourcing makes a negative
contribution of around 14 percent in explaining the trend of skill-upgrading.
The coeﬃcient on R&D SUB reveals that state-ﬁnanced R&D expenditure
has in both periods a signiﬁcantly negative impact on the relative high-skilled
labor demand. The controls for output and capital intensity show in both
sub-periods no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the skill-upgrading. Apparently, both
controls cannot attribute to the developments at the labor market since they
do not change remarkably within the short periods of time.
79Table 3.9: Outsourcing and Decomposed Demand for Skills in Two Sub-Periods
1991-1996 1997-2003
dependent variable: relative relative relative relative
wages employment wages employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OUTSnarrow -0.774 2.241** -0.462** -1.389*
(1.066) (0.974) (0.225) (0.745)
ln VA -24.725 43.871** -9.106 25.237
(24.134) (20.010) (6.226) (18.551)
ln K/VA -20.271 58.369** 0.019 32.194
(29.430) (25.628) (7.857) (21.850)
R&D EXP -0.517** -0.104 -0.097 -0.483
(0.240) (0.278) (0.164) (0.321)
Constant 6312.978** -218.342* 218.826*** -61.358
(145.592) (123.309) (34.291) (105.154)
Adj. R2 0.903 0.983 0.977 0.961
N 108 108 126 126
Notes: Coeﬃcients are estimated by two-way ﬁxed eﬀects OLS regressions; *** (**) [*]
indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 (5) [10] percent level; standard errors in parentheses are
robust to heteroscedasticity; estimated coeﬃcient on industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects are
not reported; N denotes number of observations.
Variables are deﬁned as follows: relative wages = (wages of non-production work-
ers/wages of production workers)*100; relative employment = (employment of non-
production workers/employment of production workers)*100; OUTSnarrow = (imported
inputs from same sector/gross output of the sector)*100; ln VA = ln real value added;
ln K/VA = ln [(capital stock/value added)*100]; R&D EXP = (R&D expenditure/value
added)*100.
Table 3.9 reports the coeﬃcient estimates when examining the develop-
ments of the determinants of relative wages and relative employment in the
two sub-periods. Column (1) of the table suggests that only the technological
change has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the increase of the skill premium during
the early 1990s. However, on the employment side, the coeﬃcient on out-
sourcing is positive and signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. It indicates that
international outsourcing can account for about 26 percent of the increased
relative employment of non-production workers. The last two columns of the
table relate to the eﬀects during the years 1997 to 2003. Outsourcing af-
80fects the relative wages as well as the relative employment of non-production
workers signiﬁcantly negatively. The contribution is a 72 percent rise in the
relative non-production workers’ compensation, however, this is almost three
times as large as to the increase in the relative employment. The changes in
technological change as well as in the control variables account less for the
increase in the dependent variables since the these variables are quite stable
in the short-run.
Sectoral Analysis
As shown in Section 3.3.3, the long-run aggregate trends cover up not only
discontinuous trends over time but also a substantial shift in the pattern of
outsourcing sectors. In this section, I will examine how robust the results are
to a sectoral decomposition. Above I already referred to the high volatility of
the computer sector. Therefore, as starting point of the sectoral analysis, I
examine the role of the NACE 2-digit sector “oﬃce, accounting and comput-
ing machinery” by excluding this sector from the sample. Table 3.10 reports
the estimated coeﬃcients on the variables of the basic speciﬁcation, including
outsourcing and technology. Speciﬁcation (1) investigates the determinants
of the wage bill share of non-production workers. It comes out that the sign
on the outsourcing variable turns to the positive when excluding the com-
puter sector from the regressions. It underlines the large explanatory power
of the computer sector based on its highly volatile trends. One could argue
that the computer sector is an outlier which disturbs the “real” impact of
outsourcing. However, to make a statement on the overall relevance of out-
sourcing at the level of the aggregate manufacturing sector this sector has
to be taken into account. Below, I will take a closer look at the role of the
computer sector and test whether it is really an outlier sector with speciﬁc
features.
81Table 3.10: Outsourcing and Relative Demand for High-Skilled Labor
(Computer Sector Excluded)
dependent variable: wage bill relative relative
share wages employment
(1) (2) (3)
OUTSnarrow 0.230** -0.375** 1.364***
(0.103) (0.166) (0.333)
ln VA -5.735*** -13.740*** 8.693
(2.086) (3.496) (7.609)
ln K/VA 2.489 3.157 15.168
(2.522) (5.038) (9.589)
R&D EXP -0.149*** -0.176* -0.229
(0.045) (0.091) (0.152)
Constant 68.507*** 232.653*** -13.327
(11.518) (20.217) (44.573)
Adj. R2 0.969 0.963 0.955
N 221 221 221
Notes: Coeﬃcients are estimated by two-way ﬁxed eﬀects OLS regressions; *** (**) [*]
indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 (5) [10] percent level; standard errors in parentheses are
robust to heteroscedasticity; estimated coeﬃcient on industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects are
not reported; N denotes number of observations.
Variables are deﬁned as follows: wage bill share of high-skilled workers = (wage bill of
non-production workers/total wage bill)*100; relative wages = (wages of non-production
workers/wages of production workers)*100; relative employment = (employment of
non-production workers/employment of production workers)*100; OUTSnarrow = (im-
ported inputs from same sector/gross output of the sector)*100; ln VA = ln real value
added; ln K/VA = ln [(capital stock/value added)*100]; R&D EXP = (R&D expendi-
ture/value added)*100.
Excluding the computer sector, however, does not change the result that
technological change favors the production workers. This impact of technol-
ogy also seems robust in speciﬁcations (2) and (3) where the wage bill share is
replaced by relative wages and relative employment as dependent variables,
respectively. It is notable that the negative impact of outsourcing on the skill
premium in column (2) remains independent of whether the computer sector
is taken into account or not. The coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the
ﬁve percent level. However, the contribution is with 11 percent lower than
when employing all sectors. Finally, in speciﬁcation (3) the narrow measure
82of outsourcing appears to have a highly signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect on the
number of employed non-production workers relative to production workers.
It can account for 28 percent of the increase in relative employment. The
emerged picture infers that the composed positive relative demand eﬀect of
outsourcing is caused by the impact on the employment side which oﬀsets the
negative inﬂuence of outsourcing on the relative wages. The low contribution
of outsourcing (9 percent) to the evolution of the wage bill share conﬁrms
this fact.
As I considered in Table 3.4 in Section 3.3.3, a notable shift in the pat-
tern of outsourcing sectors emerged over time. I identiﬁed that low-skill
intensive and traditional sectors tend to reduce, or at least not increase,
their outsourcing activities, while human-capital intensive sectors increased
rapidly the international fragmentation of the production process during the
mid-nineties. Particularly the electronics, chemicals, machinery, and the
medical and optical instruments sectors experienced a substantial growth in
outsourcing. Furthermore, the computer industry shows in both sub-periods
one of the highest growth rates. Compared to the full sample of 18 sectors,
the selected high-tech sectors moved substantially more value added oﬀshore
during the period 1991-2003. While imported intermediate inputs account
for 5.7 percent of the output in the full sample and the high-tech group in
1991, the high-tech industries sourced in 2003 10.2 percent from abroad and
the full sample of 18 sectors on average 8.3 percent. In order to check if the
computer industry is actually diﬀerent to other sectors and to examine the
trends in more homogeneous group of high-tech industries, I will restrict the
analysis to these industries.
Estimating the same speciﬁcations as in the case of the full sample, Table
3.11 reports in column (1)-(3) the results when including all ﬁve human-
capital intensive sectors, and in the remaining columns, reports the results
when the computer industry is excluded from this group. As becomes evident
from the table, outsourcing has a pronounced eﬀect on the non-production
workers’ wage bill share independent of the computer industry. Since the co-
eﬃcient on OUTSnarrow remains signiﬁcantly negative when excluding com-
puters, the impact of the computer sector is apparently not substantially
83Table 3.11: Outsourcing and Relative Demand for Skills in High-Skill Sectors
dependent variable: wage bill share of high-skilled workers
chemicals, machinery, electronics, chemicals, machinery, electronics,
optics, computer optics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OUTSnarrow -0.561*** -0.529*** -0.542*** -0.221** -0.255*** -0.321**
(0.056) (0.051) (0.052) (0.082) (0.083) (0.140)
ln VA -7.769** -9.290** -12.680*** -5.398* -1.658 -2.726
(2.996) (3.526) (4.236) (3.072) (3.707) (4.476)
ln K/VA -2.798 -4.842 -3.571 -2.914 0.018 0.053
(3.518) (3.797) (3.911) (2.710) (3.169) (3.305)
R&D EXP 0.052 -0.129* -0.080 -0.114
(0.073) (0.066) (0.078) (0.084)
FDIoutL 0.129*** 0.026
(0.025) (0.042)
Constant 114.894*** 115.067*** 138.112*** 92.100*** 69.244*** 75.077***
(17.916) (20.667) (24.492) (19.408) (22.758) (27.079)
Adj. R2 0.987 0.987 0.992 0.986 0.987 0.986
N 65 65 65 52 52 52
Notes: Coeﬃcients are estimated by two-way ﬁxed eﬀects OLS regressions; *** (**) [*] indi-
cates signiﬁcance at the 1 (5) [10] percent level; standard errors in parentheses are robust to
heteroscedasticity; estimated coeﬃcient on industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects are not reported;
N denotes number of observations.
Variables are deﬁned as follows: wage bill share of high-skilled workers = (wage bill of non-
production workers/total wage bill)*100; OUTSnarrow = (imported inputs from same sec-
tor/gross output of the sector)*100; ln VA = ln real value added; ln K/VA = ln [(capi-
tal stock/value added)*100]; R&D EXP = (R&D expenditure/value added)*100; FDIoutL
= (employment in foreign aﬃliates of German multinationals/sector’s domestic employ-
ment)*100.
84diﬀerent than that of other high-tech sectors. It makes clear again that the
increased import of intermediate inputs shifts the labor demand away from
high-skilled workers towards low-skilled workers. In all three speciﬁcations,
when the computer industry is included, the coeﬃcient on international out-
sourcing is statistically signiﬁcant and fairly stable in size. Thus, outsourcing
can contribute around 41 percent to the increase in the wage bill share of 6
percentage points. The negative results on value added indicate that the out-
put elasticity of labor demand is higher for low-skilled than for high-skilled
labor. The regression results when including the R&D subsidy variable are
not reported because the coeﬃcient on R&D SUB is not signiﬁcant and does
not change the estimates of the other explanatory variables.
Speciﬁcations (4) to (6) provide the corresponding estimates when the
computer industry is excluded form the analysis. It comes out that in this
small sample, only the outsourcing variable can signiﬁcantly contribute to
the development in the dependent variable. The estimates on OUTSnarrow
are signiﬁcantly negative and range from -0.221 to -0.321. Depending on the
speciﬁcation, outsourcing can account for 13 to 18 percent of the increase in
relative non-production labor demand. The results indicate that high-skilled
workers employed in human-capital intensive sectors are hurt substantially
by the relocation of production stages oﬀshore.
Until now, I regressed the non-production workers’ wage bill share on
various variables to examine determinants of the relative demand for high-
skilled workers. Table 3.11, however, provides the results for relative wages
and relative employment as dependent variables, respectively. The coeﬃ-
cient on outsourcing in column (1) is negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
Excluding the computer industry raises the signiﬁcance to the one percent
level.
What is the economic meaning of the estimates? While the relative wages
declined substantially by -4.28 percentage points on average over all ﬁve
high-tech industries between 1991 and 2003, they increased slightly by 2.46
percentage points when the computer sector was not taken into account.
Comparing these trends with the remaining sectors, where the skill premium
rose rapidly by more than 10 percent, indicates that the movements in the
85high-tech industries are fairly small. On the employment side, the opposite
is true. The increase in the relative employment of non-production workers
in the human-capital intensive sectors is more than twice as large as the
remaining sectors. It follows for the estimates on OUTSnarrow in column
(1) and (2) that outsourcing can explain far more than 100 percent of the
evolution of the skill premium.
Turning to the employment side, comparing the coeﬃcients on outsourc-
ing in (3) and (4) indicates that the computers matter. Both are statistically
signiﬁcant, however, negative with the computer sector and positive without.
It is noteworthy in speciﬁcation (3) that the coeﬃcient on the technology
variable is positive and signiﬁcant. It is consistent with the idea of skill-
biased technological change favoring high-skilled labor which is commonly
presumed.
86Table 3.12: Outsourcing and Decomposed Demand for Skills in High-Skilled Sectors
dependent variable: relative wages relative employment
chemicals, machinery, chemicals, machinery, chemicals, machinery, chemicals, machinery,
electronics, optics, electronics, optics electronics, optics, electronics, optics
computer computer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OUTSnarrow -1.200** -1.541*** -2.716*** 0.618**
(0.463) (0.430) (0.701) (0.303)
ln VA 14.109 -42.186** -74.434 51.214***
(32.997) (16.916) (47.016) (15.477)
ln K/VA 7.121 -13.671 -23.911 30.248**
(32.441) (14.047) (50.359) (14.062)
R&D EXP -0.827* -0.022 1.810*** -0.319
(0.417) (0.234) (0.592) (0.252)
Constant 116.077 432.586*** 538.502* -234.652**
(192.437) (105.090) (275.993) (96.840)
Adj. R2 0.874 0.967 0.943 0.986
N 65 52 65 52
Notes: Coeﬃcients are estimated by two-way ﬁxed eﬀects OLS regressions; *** (**) [*] indi-
cates signiﬁcance at the 1 (5) [10] percent level; standard errors in parentheses are robust to
heteroscedasticity; estimated coeﬃcient on industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects are not reported; N
denotes number of observations.
Variables are deﬁned as follows: relative wages = (wages of non-production workers/wages
of production workers)*100; relative employment = (employment of non-production work-
ers/employment of production workers)*100; OUTSnarrow = (imported inputs from same sec-
tor/gross output of the sector)*100; ln VA = ln real value added; ln K/VA = ln [(capital
stock/value added)*100]; R&D EXP = (R&D expenditure/value added)*100.
87Exogeneity of Outsourcing
In the literature, it is frequently argued that outsourcing cannot be treated as
exogenous, since it might be aﬀected by the existing wages in each industry.
It would imply a correlation of the outsourcing variable with the error term
on the right-hand side. If it is the case, OLS estimations would deliver biased
results. Following this line of reasoning, I carry out a Durbin-Wu-Hausman
endogeneity test. The null hypothesis of the test states that the regressor is
exogenous. The results are shown in Table 3.13.
Table 3.13: Exogeneity Tests for Narrow Outsourcing
χ2 P-value N Exogeneity
full sample (18 sectors) 0.381 0.537 198 not rejected
restricted sample (17 sectors,
computer sector excluded) 3.592 0.058 187 rejected
1991-1996 1.856 0.173 68 not rejected
1997-2003 1.308 0.253 119 not rejected
Notes: The test statistics are carried out in Stata using the ivendog command.
It appears that the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the outsourcing vari-
able cannot be rejected using the full sample of 18 NACE 2-digit sectors.
However, when excluding the computer industry from the sample, the null
hypothesis that narrow outsourcing is uncorrelated with the error term can
be rejected at the 10 percent level of signiﬁcance. It implies that the outsourc-
ing variable is endogenous in the case of the restricted sample. Furthermore,
I ﬁnd no evidence of endogeneity of the narrow outsourcing variable when
breaking down the restricted sample of 17 sectors in the two sub-periods. As
the p-values indicate, I fail to reject the null hypothesis.
Since the test identiﬁes narrow outsourcing as endogenous in the case of
the restricted sample of 17 sectors, an instrumental variable (IV) should be
applied. However, in the presence of heteroscedasticity, the OLS estimation
with IV generates inconsistent standard errors for the coeﬃcient of IV. When
facing heteroscedasticity of unknown form, the Generalized Method of Mo-
88ments (GMM) should be used to obtain consistent parameter estimates that
are, however, not eﬃcient.49
Table 3.14 reports the IV-GMM estimation results for the wage bill share
as a dependent variable treating outsourcing as endogenous. I choose the
second lag of narrow outsourcing as the instrument for this variable. Test
statistics for the predictive power of the used instrument are documented in
the lower part of the table. As the results of the F-test for the ﬁrst-stage
regressions indicate, the second lag appears a valid instrument. Compared
to the two-way ﬁxed eﬀects OLS estimations in column (1) of Table 3.10,
the coeﬃcient on narrow outsourcing remains positive yet its magnitude in-
creases. It indicates that the result of the OLS estimation is conﬁrmed by
IV-GMM estimates. Furthermore, the size and sign of the coeﬃcient on
value added is fairly similar to the OLS results. The remaining variables in
Table 3.14 appear to have no relevant inﬂuence on the relative demand for
non-production workers.
Furthermore, I replace the wage bill share as the dependent variable with
relative wages and relative employment, analogously to the OLS estimation
presented in Table 3.10. The results for the IV-GMM are not reported here.
However, it reveals that the coeﬃcient on the instrumented outsourcing vari-
able is still positive and highly signiﬁcant in the case of the relative employ-
ment as the dependent variable. Regarding the skill premium, outsourcing
appears to have a negative impact, as was also measured in the ﬁxed ef-
fects OLS estimation. While the size of the coeﬃcient on outsourcing is very
similar to the OLS estimation result, the coeﬃcient now becomes insigniﬁ-
cant.50 However, it is noticeable that contrary to relative employment, the
Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test fails to reject to the null hypothesis
of exogeneity of narrow outsourcing in the case of regressing relative wages
on it.51
49 See Baum et al (2003).
50 The p-value of the coeﬃcient on narrow outsourcing is 0.143 in the IV-GMM esti-
mation of the speciﬁcation with the further explanatory variables; value added, capital
intensity and R&D expenditure ratio.
51 In the case of relative wages as the dependent variable, the Wu-Hausman F-test yields
0.11 with the corresponding p-value of 0.74.
89Table 3.14: Outsourcing and Relative Demand for High-Skilled Labor (IV-GMM)
dependent variable: wage bill share of high-skilled workers
(1) (2) (3)
OUTSnarrow 0.775*** 0.680*** 0.648***
(0.217) (0.211) (0.212)
ln VA -4.508** -4.641** -4.800**
(1.962) (1.925) (1.899)
ln K/VA 0.369 1.114 1.294
(2.769) (2.734) (2.841)




Constant 75.226*** 44.647*** 47.261***
(13.347) (7.982) (7.676)
Centered R2 0.973 0.975 0.976
N 187 187 187
Test of Predictive Power of Instruments
ﬁrst-stage regressions
F-test 18.85 22.12 30.87
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: The employed sample consists of 17 NACE 2-digit manufacturing sectors (com-
puters are excluded); coeﬃcients are estimated by IV-GMM; second lag of OUTSnarrow
is used as instrument for this variable; *** (**) [*] indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 (5) [10]
percent level; standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity; estimated
coeﬃcient on industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects are not reported; N denotes number of
observations.
Variables are deﬁned as follows: wage bill share of high-skilled workers = (wage bill
of non-production workers/total wage bill)*100; OUTSnarrow = (imported inputs from
same sector/gross output of the sector)*100; ln VA = ln real value added; ln K/VA = ln
[(capital stock/value added)*100]; R&D EXP = (R&D expenditure/value added)*100;
R&D SUB = (governmental R&D subsidies/value added)*100.
903.7 Conclusion
In the recent decades, Germany experienced a continuous shift away from
low-skilled towards high-skilled labor. At the same time, the German econ-
omy got increasingly integrated in the international value added chain. This
trend can be seen in rapid increases in investment activities of German com-
panies abroad, which relocate a tremendous amount of their value added to
foreign countries. It also implies a relocation of jobs to abroad. Addition-
ally, arm’s-length international outsourcing accelerated substantially since
the mid 1990s. Both phenomena, the skill-upgrading and rising outsourc-
ing activities, occurred contemporaneously. However, it does not necessarily
imply a causal relationship between them.
The goal of this chapter has been to examine whether the considered
trends in outsourcing can explain the labor market outcomes. Furthermore,
I address the question how outsourcing aﬀects Germany’s human capital.
Does international outsourcing favor high-skilled or low-skilled labor?
As major result, I ﬁnd that international outsourcing hurts human capital
in Germany. The fragmentation of the production process across countries
implies a declining relative demand for high-skilled labor in German manufac-
turing. It contradicts the predominant conclusion of the existing empirical
literature on developed as well as emerging countries. From the empirical
investigation, three broad facts emerge. First, the decomposition of the rela-
tive labor demand in relative employment and relative wages of high-skilled
workers reveals that both parameters are negatively aﬀected by outsourcing.
The negative impact on the relative wages of non-production appears highly
robust to individual sectors. The relocation of production stages oﬀshore can
account for 32 percent of the increase in relative employment and for about
36 percent of the rise in skill premium. It implies that in the absence of inter-
national outsourcing, relative wages for human capital would have increased
more by one third in German manufacturing. Secondly, I have shown that
the negative impact of outsourcing occurred particularly in the recent years,
while, in the early 1990s, outsourcing increased the demand for high-skilled
labor and disfavored low-skilled labor. Reasons for this impact might be the
91disruptive inﬂuence of the German reuniﬁcation in the years immediately
after 1991 and the observed sectoral shift. This leads to the third discov-
ered fact. I identiﬁed an evident shift in the pattern of outsourcing sectors
over time away from low-skill intensive towards human-capital intensive sec-
tors. The estimated results indicate that high-skilled workers employed in
human-capital intensive sectors are most hurt by outsourcing.
Hence, my analysis contributes an extension of previous studies in this
ﬁeld by utilizing a sample period with more recent years to estimate what
appears to be a crucial eﬀect on the changed sectoral pattern during the
recent years. Furthermore, I provide a detailed investigation of trends in
individual sectors and their impacts on the aggregate results. Moreover,
the present work makes the contribution of examining in more detail the
eﬀects of technological change on the relative demand for skilled labor in
Germany. I have shown that the skill-biased eﬀect of technology favors low-
skilled workers. Since it contradicts the common view, some work has to
be done to gain better insights in the relationship between technology and
demand for skills.
The negative impact of outsourcing on human capital and the shift to-
wards more skill-intensive imports of intermediates as an implication of the
sectoral shift suggest that Germany’s role in the international division of
labor is increasingly specializing in low-skill intensive production stages.
Hence, the policy implication has to be to strengthen Germany’s endowment
with human capital. Relative to its trading partners, which provide more
high-skilled labor at lower costs, Germany is less abundant in high-skilled
labor.52
Although the human capital stock of a country is not exogenous in the
long-run,53 there are little incentives to invest in human capital. The policy
advise has to be to strengthen Germany’s endowment with human capital.
52 See Marin (2004) who states that Germany’s education level lies below the average of
OECD countries. Furthermore, Germany is poorly endowed with highly-educated labor
relative to the following Eastern European countries: the Baltic States, Russia, and Hun-
gary. Using data from the ILO, Marin (2004) measures the education level by the share
of the labor force with a tertiary education level.
53 As Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) state in their theoretical model outlined in Chapter
2, the factor endowments are not exogenously ﬁxed in the long-run. They might respond
to changes in the relative factor prices.
92However, the German labor market institutions prevent a widening of the
wage gap. Additionally, outsourcing reduces the skill premium and, therefore,
reduces people’s own incentives to invest in their education. The government
could, however, break this vicious cycle by enforcing the investments in the
education system which marks a weakness as the often cited Pisa-study of
the OECD revealed.
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Notes on calculation of imported intermediate inputs
Imported intermediate inputs are calculated from data of input-output ta-
bles. They distinguish between domestically produced and imported inter-
mediates. However, the tables are compiled infrequently and are, therefore,
not available for each year. For the uniﬁed Germany, the input-output ta-
bles at the level of NACE 2-digit industries are published for the years 1991,
1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000. The date of publishing of the input-output
table for the year 2000 was 2004. For the missing years between 1991 and
2000, I estimated the import input-output tables by interpolating linearly
the input-output coeﬃcients and multiplying them by imported inputs. In
a previous step, the imported inputs are yield from multiplying the linearly
interpolated share of intermediates in total imports times total imports. The
German total imports classiﬁed according to NACE are taken from trade
statistics provided by the OECD that converted them from HS Rev. 1 to
ISIC Rev. 3. In order to receive estimates for the years 2001-2003, I experi-
mented with various methods of extrapolating. There are three parameters
that can be adjusted; the distribution between sectors in rows, ﬁrst, and
secondly, in columns of the input-output matrix and thirdly, the share of
intermediates in total imports. They all can be hold constant, as in the most
“pessimistic” approach, although they show substantial variation in previ-
ous years. Alternatively, they all can be extrapolated using only the changes
during the last two years. One intermediary version takes the average growth
rates of the preceding ﬁve years into account. Finally, I chose the interme-
diary version of extrapolation. Before doing so, I checked the robustness of
the regression results using diﬀerent version of extrapolating. The results
appear fairly stable, while the most “optimistic” approach reveals slightly
more signiﬁcant estimates on the outsourcing variable.
94Table 3.15: Deﬁnition and Source of Variables
Variable Description Source
wage bill share wage bill of non-production workers Federal Statistical
of high-skilled in percent of total wage bill Oﬃce of Germany
workers
relative wages wages of non-production workers Federal Statistical
in percent of wages of Oﬃce of Germany
production workers
relative employment employment of non-production Federal Statistical
workers in percent of Oﬃce of Germany
employment of production workers
OUTSnarrow imported inputs from the same Federal Statistical
NACE 2-digit sector in percent Oﬃce of Germany
of gross output (input-output tables),
OECD STAN database
OUTSdifference imported inputs from all sectors Federal Statistical
(excluding the same NACE 2-digit Oﬃce of Germany
sector) in percent of gross (input-output tables),
output OECD STAN database
VA value added, deﬂated by OECD STAN
sector-speciﬁc producer price Industrial database,
indices, in million EUR Federal Statistical
Oﬃce of Germany
K/VA gross capital stock in per OECD STAN
cent of value added Industrial database
R&D EXP business enterprise R&D OECD ANBERD
expenditure in percent of database
value added
R&D SUB R&D subsidies of Federal Federal Ministry of
Government in percent of value Education and Research,
added OECD STAN
Industrial database
FDIout L employment in foreign aﬃliates UNCTAD,
of German multinationals in per OECD STAN
cent of sector’s domestic employment Industrial database
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Globalization and Austria:
Outsourcing and the Demand
for High-Skilled Labor
4.1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Austria has experienced multiple shocks of
globalization. The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989; Austria’s accession to the
European Union in 1995; and in the year 2004, the large eastern enlargement
of the European Union, including four countries that share a border with
Austria, are some of the most prominent events. Rarely any other western
country has gotten more of a taste of globalization and its consequences than
Austria. And as a small and open economy, it gets notably involved in it.
Which indicators might reﬂect these revolutionary developments?
Phenomena of the globalization process might be changes in the amount
and the pattern of international trade ﬂows as well as factor movements.
One of these phenomena is the frequently cited international slicing-up of
the value added chain,1 which leads to an increase in trade of intermediate
input goods. The international outsourcing of production stages causes a
biased demand for diﬀerent factors, for example diﬀerent types of labor or
skills. Thus, outsourcing activities of ﬁrms aﬀect their relative demand for
1 See Krugman (1995).
96diﬀerent types of labor on the labor market.
In the case of Austria, signiﬁcant changes in international trade as well
as foreign direct investment reﬂect those international developments. Fur-
thermore, Austria is faced by an ongoing and rapidly accelerating technical
change and tremendous increase in international outsourcing, which reﬂects
partly the changes in trade pattern. These dramatic changes document the
importance of globalization for Austria. I will examine these developments
in more detail in the next section.
Through which channels do the mentioned external events aﬀect Austria?
One such a channel is international outsourcing, which should aﬀect the
demand for labor in a biased way according to skills. In this paper, I will take
a closer look at the internal2 consequences, particularly, for Austria’s labor
market and the relative demand for human capital. In a theoretical model,
Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) formalize the idea of a trade-induced within-
industries shift in factor intensities of the production process. Plausibly, such
distributional eﬀects inside a country caused by external events should ﬁnd
stronger expression in the case of a small open economy. The reason is that
such an economy is usually strongly exposed to international interactions.
Austria is a relatively small and open economy,3 and it is the Western Eu-
ropean country that is geographically the most proximate to Eastern Europe.
Austria borders on four Eastern European countries4 and shares roughly 48
percent of its border with the new Eastern EU-Members. As is well known,
Eastern Europe diﬀers dramatically in its factor prices, particularly wages,
compared to Austria.
In comparison to the often-cited trade and outsourcing integration be-
tween the United States and Mexico, the integration between Austria and
Eastern Europe seems to be much more intensive. In particular, if you take
into account Austria’s immediate geographical proximity to countries with a
large diﬀerence in wages. Furthermore, Austria’s labor market is, in contrary
2 Which means inside a country.
3 For example, compared to Germany, Austria is ten-times smaller (measured by in-
habitants), and at the same time, with 56 percent in 2003, Austria’s import ratio is
signiﬁcantly larger than the Germany’s (32 percent). These numbers are based on own
calculations with data taken from WTO Trade Proﬁles.
4 They are the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia.
97to the US, highly inﬂexible. Thus, Austria, a country with one of the highest
unionization rates in Europe is characterized by rigid wages. The external
shocks, particularly the integration with the Eastern European countries,
might result in diﬀerent eﬀects than a widening wage gap between skills as
in the US.
Austria is often called as the springboard to the East. Because of cultural
and historic reasons, Austria is well connected with Eastern Europe and
specializes in oﬀering “outsourcing service”. A comparable role plays Hong
Kong for China since China opened its economy to foreign investors two
decades ago. In the manufacturing sector, Hong Kong’s ﬁrms relocated many
low-skilled jobs to China. At the same time, Hong Kong was specializing in
activities of outsourcing services.5 Section 4.2.2 will take a closer look at this
issue in the case of Austria.
At the same time, Austria acts as “toehold” to Eastern Europe for many
multinational ﬁrms. The importance of foreign ﬁrms for Austria’s invest-
ments abroad appears striking. In particular, the area of Vienna acts as
regional headquarter for Eastern Europe since it receives a lot of foreign
direct investment from global companies which are destined for Austria’s
neighbor countries in the East. In 2000, almost 39 percent of Austria’s FDI
stocks abroad are inﬂuenced by foreign multinational ﬁrms.6 However, only
around one quarter of the number of Austrian investors are controlled by
ﬁrms from abroad. It indicates that the investment volume of this type of
investor lies clearly above an average Austrian investor. Furthermore, 45
percent of FDI which Austria received in 2000, were invested in ﬁrms which
undertake foreign investments by their own. Moreover, data on investors in
Central and Eastern Europe show that 26 percent of Austrian investments
in this region are undertaken by ﬁrms which are by the majority directly
controlled by foreign ﬁrms.7
5 See Hsieh and Woo (2005) for a detailed analysis on the impact of outsourcing to
China on Hong Kong’s labor market.
6 The numbers refer to data from the Austrian National Bank, see Dell’mour (2004).
7 The numbers refer to investments which are undertaken by Austrian ﬁrms owned itself
by foreign companies. The calculations base on data from a unique survey of Austrian
investors in CEE. The survey was undertaken by the Chair of International Economics,
University of Munich. See Section 5.6 of Chapter 5 for detailed description of the data
sample.
98Because of the mentioned facts, Austria should be strongly aﬀected by
the given shocks of globalization. What eﬀects that do external events like
globalization or the EU eastern enlargement have on internal factor markets,
should be discussed in this chapter. Who are the losers, and who are the win-
ners of globalization in an open country like Austria? In order to measure
the impact of outsourcing on labor market outcomes, an ideal experiment
would require a small country which experiences a large exogenous shock
of outsourcing. Austria approaches these requirements fairly well. Eastern
Europe’s opening can be seen as exogenous to Austria. Moreover, the trends
in the Austrian labor market is substantial. It appears that the demand for
high-skilled workers increased in the last decade. Decomposing this increased
demand brings to light that the employment of non-production workers in-
creased strongly, whereas at the same time their wages declined.
In the literature, three central explanations for this shift in the demand
for skills are favored. At ﬁrst, technical change is assumed to increase the
demand for skilled labor, while secondly, international trade is a possible
candidate for explaining this demand shift. Thus, import competition in
ﬁnal goods from low-wage countries might shift resources towards more skill-
intensive industries and to more skill-intensive product types within the same
industry. Another phenomenon of globalization is the outsourcing of produc-
tion to countries with diﬀerences in relative factor endowment. This leads to
shifts in the demand for skills within an industry as well as within a ﬁrm.
The chapter is organized as follows. After these introductory remarks, I
take a closer look at Austria’s major events and trends in the last decade.
Section 4.2 shows the developments in international outsourcing and the de-
mand for skills. The section provides descriptive statistics for the entire man-
ufacturing sector and individual sectors. The subsequent section 4.3 gives a
brief overview of related existing literature for Austria. In Section 4.4, I the
empirical implementation of the theoretical model of Feenstra and Hanson
(1996a) and describe the employed data. Section 4.5 reports the empirical
results of a panel estimation for ﬁfteen sectors. Two speciﬁcations of inter-
national outsourcing are considered. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, outsourcing is
deﬁned as imported intermediate input goods while the second speciﬁcation
99diﬀerentiates Austria’s imports according to their regional origin. The ﬁnal
section concludes and discusses the empirical ﬁndings.
4.2 Facts of Austria
4.2.1 Austria in the Nineties
The fall of Communism states a globalization shock for Austria. This brought
Austria overnight back from a somewhat isolated location at the border of
Europe to its center. The speed of this revolution led the process to appear
as a kind of natural experiment. However, many other shocks have stricken
Austria simultaneously.
As mentioned before, the integration with the former Communist coun-
tries of Eastern Europe is the most prominent external event that aﬀects
Austria strongly. This integration seems to be one among many other inte-
gration processes between a high-income country and a low-income country,
as for example the NAFTA integration between the US and Canada on the
one hand and Mexico on the other.
Although the wages of the Eastern European countries have caught up
very quickly, Austria’s wages are still much higher in 2003. In nominal terms,
the labor costs in the new Eastern European member states are just 18
percent of the labor costs in Austria.8 The wage gap between Austria and
the South-Eastern European countries of Bulgaria and Romania is even more
pronounced. They achieve just 5 percent of Austria’s labor cost level. Also in
PPS terms, the wage gap is quite huge. In PPS, the labor costs in the newly
accessed countries are about one third of the Austrian level. Also, if you keep
in mind that the gap in labor productivity is still extensive, there remains a
substantial wage gap. The newly accessed EU countries achieve roughly 60
percent of the Austrian productivity level, where the two candidate countries,
Bulgaria and Romania are less than one third productive as Austria.9 It
appears noticeable that Austria’s labor costs exceed the average EU-15 level
8 These statements are based on monthly labor costs data taken from Eurostat.
9 These numbers are taken from the Structural Indicators of the Statistical Yearbook
of Austria, Statistics Austria 2005.
100by 13 percent. Therefore, Austria is also compared to other highly developed
European countries a high-wage country.
Recognizing this huge wage gap between Austria and its neighboring tran-
sition countries, it seems plausible that a pattern of division of labor might
emerge with Eastern Europe specializing in the production of low-skilled la-
bor intensive goods and Austria in goods that use high-skilled labor and
capital intensively. According to the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin the-
ory, the lower wages in Central and Eastern Europe might indicate that these
countries are abundantly endowed with labor and especially with low-skilled
labor. Furthermore, it corresponds to the assumption in Feenstra and Han-
son’s (1996a) model. Surely, this applies to the integration of the US and
Mexico or to the former southern enlargements of the European Union as
well.10
But for Austria, this assumption appears to be inappropriate. Compared
to Austria, the Eastern European transition countries are rich in skills; they
are abundantly endowed with human capital.11 As the ILO-data of education
show 15 percent of Austria’s economically active population have a tertiary
education degree in the year 2000.12 This share lies in the lower third of the
Western European countries whose high-skilled share is on average 24 per-
cent. The Eastern European countries exhibit a high-skilled share of around
21 percent, also higher than Austria’s 15 percent. The ﬁgures indicate that
Austria is even more scarcely endowed with high-skilled labor than one would
expect. From the perspective of Austria, the integration with Eastern Eu-
rope is an integration with a low-wage, high-skilled region.
In this section, the following four facts concerning Austria should be
stressed: technical progress, foreign direct investment, general trade ﬂows,
and trade in intermediates. At ﬁrst, the following paragraph presents the
dramatic changes in Austria’s outgoing foreign direct investment. As another
10 Several studies (e.g. Baldwin (1994)) have considered the enlargement of the EU to
Greece, Spain and Portugal as an example for the eastern enlargement in 2004.
11 See Marin (2004).
12 Tertiary education is deﬁned as level 5A-9 according to ISCED-97. Source of data:
own calculations based on ILO labor statistics, several years.
101remarkable fact, the general trade pattern of Austria is sketched. Finally, as
central indicator of globalization in this chapter, international outsourcing
and trade in intermediate goods are considered in the more detail.
Table 4.1: R&D intensity
R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP
1991 1997 2002
Austria 1.47 1.71 2.19
Germany 2.53 2.29 2.52
France 2.37 2.22 2.20
Finland 2.04 2.71 3.46
EU-15 1.90 1.80 1.93
US 2.72 2.58 2.67
Japan 2.93 2.83 3.12
OECD 2.22 2.09 2.26
Source: OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2003 and 2004, and Eurostat.
In the last decade, Austria was aﬀected by technical progress excessively
compared to other countries. Table 4.1 provides a comparison of technical
change across developed countries. As a proxy for technical change, I use
the R&D expenditure share in GDP. While the expenditure ratio of the
aggregates of EU-15 and OECD countries remained more or less constant
during the last decade, the table shows remarkable variation across countries.
Starting from a strikingly low level, in Austria, the expenditure ratio for
R&D was growing on average by 3.7 percent each year. The growth rate
even accelerates in most recent years. Therefore, Austria’s investment in
R&D lies today signiﬁcantly above the EU-15 average. Also in Finland and
other Scandinavian13 countries, the R&D intensity experienced a tremendous
increase and overshoots today clearly the average of the European Union.
13 This is not shown in Table 4.1.













Source: Own calculations based on data of Austrian National Bank, OeNB.
Figure 4.1: Austria’s Foreign Direct Investment Flows
As Figure 4.1 shows, Austria’s foreign direct investment exploded in the
last decade. In the ﬁrst few years of the 21st century, Austrian ﬁrms are
investing over eight times more in the Eastern European transition countries
than they have done in 1992. This reﬂects partly a worldwide rise of invest-
ing abroad, as the trend of Austria’s investment in the remaining countries
indicates. However, CEE has become much more attractive as host region for
Austrian investment activities. As already suggested, Austria’s FDI pattern
has changed dramatically since the beginning of the nineties. Table 4.2 shows
the distribution of the investment ﬂows according to their main destinations.
A huge movement in the distribution has taken place. The distribu-
tion shifted enormously away from the EU-15 countries and other countries
towards Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, the main host countries of Aus-
trian FDIs are now the new EU members in Eastern Europe. In the recent
years, about 55 percent of Austrian FDI has gone to Central and Eastern
Europe, whereas in 1992 just 28 percent went to this region.14 Nearly one
14 In 2003, CEE accounted for 88 percent of Austria’s outgoing FDIs, while only for 4
percent in the case of Germany (see Marin et al (2003)).
103third of FDIs went to Austria’s four former Communist neighbor countries.
The strong presence of Austrian investors in CEE also reﬂects the fact that
Austria is among the largest investors in many Eastern European countries.




Czech Republic 8.54 9.90
Poland 4.78 8.45
Croatia 2.45 5.42










Notes: The numbers show the percentage distribution of Austria’s outgoing foreign
direct investment ﬂows. Countries are ranked according to their average (1992-2004)
importance as host country.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Austrian National Bank, OeNB.
How are FDIs related to international outsourcing? Generally, if invest-
ment abroad is motivated by diﬀerences between the source and host coun-
try, intra-ﬁrm trade might be induced. The large wage diﬀerentials between
Austria and CEE suggest that FDIs to CEE are mainly motivated by lower
production costs and induce substantial intra-ﬁrm trade. Therefore, FDI
ﬂows to Eastern Europe would approximate fairly well international out-
104sourcing. Thus, the changed investment behavior of Austrian ﬁrms might
have substantial eﬀects on the domestic labor market. However, for the
most part, Austria’s economy consists of small specialized ﬁrms rather than
vertically integrated companies. This implies that Austrian ﬁrms buy inter-
mediate goods mainly from other ﬁrms instead of producing them by their
own. Following this reasoning, international outsourcing might not be ob-
servable as intra-ﬁrm trade but rather as arm’s-length purchases of foreign
inputs. Furthermore, Protsenko (2004) states that most Austrian FDIs in
CEE are horizontally motivated. It suggests that FDIs might not approx-
imate adequately international outsourcing. Even in the case of the US,
Slaughter (1995) ﬁnds that intra-ﬁrm outsourcing contributes very little to
the increased wage inequality.
Besides the mobility of factors, as capital in the form of direct invest-
ments, economic integration is characterized by an increased exchange of
goods and services. According to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, the trade pat-
tern can give some insights into the relative factor endowment of the trading
partners. A trade pattern is deﬁned by two dimensions; the trading partners
and the traded goods according to their sector.
Table 4.3: Austria’s Imports
Import Pattern Import Volumes
1990 1995 2000 2004 change of imports
in % of total imports 1990-2004
EU-15 71.20 72.18 66.15 65.98 + 105 %
CEE 3.85 8.95 12.52 14.87 + 753 %
other 24.95 18.87 21.32 19.15 + 70 %
total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 + 121 %
Source: Own calculations based on data from Statistics Austria.
Table 4.3 shows the distribution of Austria’s imports with respect to the
countries of origin. As you can see at a glance, the import pattern of Austria
changed in the last ﬁfteen years in favor of trade with the Eastern European
105transition countries. However, the process of trade integration seems not
ﬁnished yet. The rapid liberalization of trade regulations between the EU
and the transition countries led to the expectation of a speedy emergence of
a new trade pattern, but as the numbers show that this process is still on
the way. So the imports from CEE increased by 42 percent solely during the
last ﬁve years whereas the imports from other countries to Austria rose just
by seven percent.
The third indicator of Austria’s globalization is outsourcing measured by
the imports of intermediate goods. These data are taken from the input-
output table, which depicts the input-output relations between all sectors of
the economy. With respect to international outsourcing, the fact of interest
is that the inputs can be diﬀerentiated between domestic and imported in-
termediate goods. Figure 4.2 gives an overview of the development since the
beginning of the eighties. The intermediate inputs are shown in relation to




















Notes: The numbers show the intermediate inputs in percent of output for the
mining and manufacturing sector (NACE C and D).
Source: Own calculations based on data from the input-output tables, Statistics
Austria.
Figure 4.2: Austria’s Outsourcing - Domestic and Imported Inputs
106The total inputs in percentage of output increased in the years 1983
to 1995 from 57 percent to 63 percent, which indicates an economy-wide
reduction of the value added generated by particular ﬁrms. However, in the
last ﬁve years, the value added share has remained constant, whereas the
imported inputs have exhibited strongly-accelerated growth. In the 1990s,
the measure for international outsourcing shows a growth in imported inputs
from 20 to almost 30 percent of output, while remaining constant in the
previous decade. The increase even accelerates in the late nineties. While
less than 38 percent of all inputs were sourced from abroad in 1995, just ﬁve
years later, about 47 percent of inputs were imported. This might be due
to Austria’s accession to the EU and the progressive integration of Eastern
Europe.
What do these numbers suggest? Can you conclude from the observed
numbers that Austria is exposed strongly to international outsourcing and
globalization, respectively? As was already shown, in 2000, 47 percent of the
inputs of Austria’s manufacturing sector were sourced from foreign countries,
whereas in Germany, just 29 percent of the inputs were imported.15 Since
the degree of value added in Austria is lower,16 the diﬀerence in the share
of intermediate goods in output is slightly less pronounced, 20.0 percent in
Germany and 30.2 percent in Austria.
As mentioned before, Austria’s higher import ratio indicates that Aus-
tria is more exposed to import competition. However, the numbers in this
paragraph show that Austria also faces a higher import competition in inter-
mediate goods. This strong exposure to foreign markets might have extensive
impacts on the Austrian labor market. The question addressed in this chap-
ter is the impact of outsourcing or generally international trade on diﬀerent
kinds of skills. By deﬁnition, this question focuses on trade between diﬀer-
ently endowed countries in goods with diﬀerent factor intensities. This is
valid for imported intermediate as well as imported ﬁnal goods.
15 These numbers are derived from the input-output tables of Austria and Germany for
the mining and manufacturing sector (NACE C and D).
16 63.8 percent in Austria versus 67.7 percent in Germany.
1074.2.2 Outsourcing and Labor Market
Outsourcing refers to the slicing-up of the value added chain. The fragmen-
tation of the production process can appear either between ﬁrms in the form
of a supplier-recipient relation (inter-ﬁrm) or within a ﬁrm as production
linkages and induced trade ﬂows between geographically-separated parent
and aﬃliate ﬁrms (intra-ﬁrm). The term intra-ﬁrm outsourcing can be inter-
changeably used with vertical FDIs. Figure H. 1 in the Appendix depicts this
terminology graphically. In the case of interﬁrm outsourcing, a ﬁrm substi-
tutes in-house production of intermediate goods by at arm’s length purchased
inputs. In this case, inputs can be drawn from domestic or foreign markets.
Whereas in the case of intra-ﬁrm outsourcing, a parent ﬁrm sources its inputs
from aﬃliate ﬁrms that can be located in the same country or abroad. The
last case is well-known as vertical FDIs. In this paper I will focus on an in-
tersection of inter-ﬁrm and intra-ﬁrm outsourcing, the so-called international
outsourcing. In the case of international outsourcing domestic value added is
substituted by imported intermediates, which are used as inputs by Austrian
ﬁrms.
From a ﬁrm’s perspective, the decision process appears in the following
way. First, ﬁrms are concerned with decisions if they produce intermediates
in-house or buy these at markets. It is the decision on the degree of vertical
integration and the frontier of a ﬁrm. However this decision tells nothing
directly about international outsourcing. Second, a ﬁrm has to decide on the
location of its plants and the source countries of inputs. This concerns the
decision of domestic versus foreign sourcing of inputs and refers to interna-
tional outsourcing.
This chapter gives an answer to the question about the consequences of
an increased competition due to imported intermediate goods for the Aus-
trian labor market. What is an appropriate measure of the competition in
imported inputs? The existing literature shows up two deﬁnitions which use
data of input-output tables: wide and narrow deﬁnitions of outsourcing. The
wide deﬁnition refers to the intermediate goods that a particular sector im-
ports from all sectors around the world. In contrast, the narrow deﬁnition of
108outsourcing is related to the imported inputs from the ﬁrm’s own sector. The
reason for favoring the later deﬁnition17 is that the workers of a particular
sector might be solely aﬀected by decisions of ﬁrms at the sectoral level over
“make or buy” inputs. Firms of a particular sector are not able to produce
inputs which they buy from other sectors. Therefore, the factor intensities
and the demand for high-skilled labor should not be aﬀected by the decision
if inputs from other sectors are sourced domestically or from abroad. In this
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Notes: wide outsourcing: imported intermediate goods from mining and manufacturing sector in
percent of value added; narrow outsourcing: imported intermediate goods from own NACE 2-digits
sector in percent of value added.
Source: Own calculations based on data taken from the input-output table, Statistics Austria.
Figure 4.3: Wide and Narrow Outsourcing
Figure 4.3 shows the development of international outsourcing measured
in two diﬀerent ways; wide and narrow deﬁnition. They are measured as the
imported intermediate goods18 from all mining and manufacturing sectors
(wide) and from solely the same sector (narrow) in percent of sector’s value
added. As the lines indicate, both measures rise signiﬁcantly during the
years 1995 to 2002. The narrowly deﬁned outsourcing was growing steadily
17 See Geishecker (2002).
18 Imported intermediate goods are deﬁned according to the input-output table.
109from 25.2 to 37.9 percent, while outsourcing according to the wide deﬁnition
increased by 22 percentage points to 77.1 percent of value added in 2002. It
corresponds to an increase of 50 percent in the case of the narrow deﬁnition
and 41 percent in the case of the wide deﬁnition. Although narrow outsourc-
ing was growing faster than wide outsourcing in terms of percentage change,
today only 51 percent of the imported intermediate goods are sourced from
abroad within the same sector. Whereas in 1994, 54 percent of the imported
inputs came from the same sector and the remaining 46 percent from other
mining and manufacturing sectors. It means that the so-called diﬀerence out-
sourcing19 of intermediates from other sectors than the some one has become
more important. This is contrary to the situation in Germany as outlined in
Chapter 3.
In order to examine the impact of international outsourcing in more detail,
let me ﬁrst take a look at the main developments in the Austrian labor market
in the last decade. In general, how can the demand for high-skilled labor be
empirically implemented? In economics, demand is generally characterized
by prices and quantities. With respect to the labor market, multiplying
these two components of demand, wages times employment, results in the
wage bill. The wage bill share of high-skilled labor is therefore the wage bill of
high-skilled workers divided by the overall wage bill of high-skilled and low-
skilled workers. Besides the wage bill share, Figure 4.4 also depicts the two
elements of the decomposed relative labor demand for high-skilled workers:
the relative wages of the high-skilled workers and their relative employment.
From a empirical point of view, a decomposition of the wage bill might bring
some useful insights in the reaction of labor markets to globalization.
The ﬁgure shows that the demand for high-skilled labor was rising sig-
niﬁcantly. The share of non-production workers’ wage bill in total wage bill
increased by nearly four percentage points in the sample period 1995-2003
to 44 percent. For comparison, Feenstra and Hanson (1996) ﬁnd for the US
an increase in the wage bill share of high-skilled workers from 34 percent to
42 percent in the relatively long period between 1972 and 1990. The annual
19 See Feenstra and Hanson (1999).
110changes are strikingly similar to the development in Austria in the considered
period. However, Berman et al (1994) state a more moderate increase of just
six percentage points for an even longer period from 1959 to 1989. Particu-
larly pronounced is the trend of rising demand for high-skills in Austria in
the leather and shoes sector as well as in the electronic sector (computers,
electronic parts, optical instruments, etc.). In the leather and shoes sector,























Notes: The ﬁgure shows numbers for the mining and manufacturing sector (NACE
C and D).
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Association of Austrian Social
Insurance.
Figure 4.4: Demand for High-Skilled Labor
As can be seen in the ﬁgure, this rise is driven by the increased relative
employment of high-skilled workers, while the relative wages act in the oppo-
site direction. The number of non-production workers relative to production
workers increased strongly from 50.7 percent in 1995 to 60.2 percent in 2003.
It is remarkable that in contrast to many other countries in Austria an in-
crease in the wage gap cannot be observed. In the year 1995, high-skilled
workers earned on average around 42 percent more than low-skilled workers.
This gap declined by two percentage points until the year 2003.
In summary, due to strong labor market institutions in Austria, a growing
111relative employment rather than relative wages reﬂect an increase in relative
demand for high-skilled workers. Moreover, this is in line with experiences of
Sweden. Remarkably, Sweden is comparable to Austria in size and openness
of its economy, as well as, in its high labor market rigidities. As Anderton
et al (2002b) report, relative employment increased steadily from 38 to 55
percent between 1970 and 1993, while the skill premium remained constant
during the 1970s and 1980s and even fell during Sweden’s recession in the
early 1990s.
A decomposition of the relative demand for high-skilled labor allows to
gain interesting insights in the contribution of the changes in relative wages
and employment. In the entire Austrian mining and manufacturing sector,
the wage bill of non-production workers relative to production workers in-
creased by 11.2 percentage points in the period 1995 to 2003. Decomposing
this overall shift in demand20 shows that the increase in relative employ-
ment contributes + 12.6 percentage points. However, the decline in relative
wages negatively accounts for about - 1.4 percentage points of the overall
change. It underlines the well-known fact of highly rigid absolute as well
as relative wages in Austria, as in many other Western European countries.
Furthermore, it indicates the power of unions in the wage setting process in
Austrian industry where traditionally the unionization rate is high primarily
in the group of production workers.
As mentioned, Austria acts as a springboard to Eastern Europe. It im-
plies that Austria’s economy is specializing in oﬀering services which are
related to international outsourcing. Such services support Austrian as well
as multinational companies in their outsourcing activities mainly directed
to Eastern Europe. In the case of Hong Kong, Hsieh and Woo (2005) ﬁnd
a large sectoral shift in employment away from the manufacturing sector
towards outsourcing services.21
20 The decomposition is carried out according to the formula provided by Berman et al
(1994).
21 Between 1981 and 1991, Hong Kong’s employment share of outsourcing services in-
creased by 17 percentage points while the share of the manufacturing sector fell by 20
percentage points. See Hsieh and Woo (2005). They attribute these trends to China’s
opening to foreign trade and investment.
112Table 4.4: Employment by Sector
1990 1995 2000 2003
distribution in percent
agriculture 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.6
industry 51.6 44.4 41.1 38.9
outsourcing servicesa 17.6 21.2 25.8 27.4
other servicesb 29.2 32.7 31.4 32.1
a Outsourcing services is deﬁned as storage and transportation services, communication
services, banking, insurance, real estate, renting, legal, accounting, and consulting.
b Other services is deﬁned as wholesale and retail trade, repairing, hotels, and restau-
rants.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Association of Austrian Social Insur-
ance.
During the 1990s, the Austrian economy experienced also a large sectoral
shift in its economic activities. While in 1990 almost 52 percent of total
working force of the private sector was employed in the industry sector, in
2003 the employment share of the industry sector was less than 39 percent.
At the same time, the employment share of services associated with interna-
tional outsourcing22 increased by almost 10 percentage points and reached
in 2003 27.4 percent of total private employment. At a more disaggregated
level, the sector of accounting, legal and business consulting23 shows with 76
percent between 1995 and 2004 the highest employment growth rate among
all sectors. This sector oﬀers various services which are highly related to
outsourcing activities. At the same time, the employment share of “other
services” of the private sector increased only modestly.24 The mentioned sec-
toral employment shift towards outsourcing services points up the importance
of outsourcing for Austria. In order to analyze the role of the sectoral em-
ployment shift in the increased relative demand for skills, a decomposition
of the aggregated skill-upgrading appears useful. Generally, an aggregate
22 Outsourcing services are deﬁned as storage and transportation services, communi-
cation services, banking, insurance, real estate, renting, legal, accounting, and consulting
(NACE I-K).
23 It corresponds to the NACE 2-digits level sector 74.
24 Also the employment of the state sector (public administration, defense, education and
health) was growing only slightly from 21.5 to 23.0 percent of Austria’s total employment
(1990-2003).
113change in a relative number can be caused by a shift within sectors or a
reallocation of activities between heterogeneous sectors. As the ﬁrst column
of Table 4.5 shows, the share of non-production workers in total employment
increased by 3.8 percentage points in Austria’s private sector in the period
1995-2002. However, the shift in the high-skilled employment share is clearly
smaller in the service sector than in the mining and manufacturing sector.
While the relative employment share increased by 3.6 percentage points in
mining and manufacturing, it rose by only 1.4 percentage points in services
in the considered eight years. A very similar picture emerges considering the
high-skilled workers’ wage bill share.
International outsourcing might aﬀect the economy-wide relative demand
for human capital in two ways; ﬁrst, by reallocating workers from manufactur-
ing to more skill-intensive outsourcing services, and secondly, by skill-biased
demand within individual manufacturing sectors in the sense of Feenstra and
Hanson’s (1996a) model. The decomposition of the change in aggregate em-
ployment share25 indicates that the reallocation of workers from mining and
manufacturing to services, including outsourcing services, accounts for 0.53
percentage points, as column 2 of Table 4.5 shows. It corresponds to 14
percent of the overall increase. The fact that the reallocation is positive,
indicates that services are more skill-intensive than manufacturing.26
25 The decomposition is calculated according to the following formula provided by Hsieh
and Woo (2005):
∆P = ∆Eserv (Pserv − Pmanu) + ∆Pmanu ∗ Emanu + ∆Pserv ∗ Eserv
with P denoting the share of non-production workers in total employment and E denoting
the employment share of the service (serv) and the mining and manufacturing (manu)
sector in total private sector, respectively. Column 2 of Table 4.5 reports estimates of the
ﬁrst term of the right-hand side of the formula. This term captures the sectoral shift eﬀect.
The second and third term measure the aggregate demand shift towards non-production
workers in the manufacturing and service sector, respectively.
26 However, due to the rough distinction between non-production and production work-
ers as proxy for high-skilled and low-skilled workers, this statement has to be taken with
caution.
114Table 4.5: Decomposition of Aggregate Shift in Demand for Skills
overall reallocation within changes in manufacturing
change to services manufacturing overall between within
employment share 3.80 0.53 1.06 3.57 -0.01 3.58
wage bill share 4.03 0.53 0.98 3.34 -0.11 3.34
Notes: The numbers show changes in percentage points between 1995 and 2002. The
manufacturing sector includes the mining sector. Overall change refers to change in the
private sector. employment share: (non-production workers/(non-production workers +
production workers))*100; wage bill share: (wage bill of non-production workers/total
wage bill)*100
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Association of Austrian Social Insur-
ance.
In a further step focusing on the manufacturing sector, I examine the
contribution of shifts within and between individual sectors to the declining
relative demand for low-skilled workers. It gives insights in the role of inter-
national outsourcing for the relative demand shift. Assuming that individual
sectors are aﬀected unequally by outsourcing, shifts within individual manu-
facturing sectors should contribute to the overall decline in relative demand
for low-skilled workers. The decomposition27 indicates the importance of
skill-biased processes like outsourcing, which take place within sectors. Col-
umn 3 in Table 4.5 reports the results on the second right-hand side term
of the between-within decomposition formula weighted by the employment
share of manufacturing. The result is that the skill-upgrading within man-
ufacturing can explain 1.06 percentage points of the rising relative demand.
It corresponds to 28 percent. Hsieh and Woo (2005) get similar results from
their decomposition exercise for Hong Kong. They ﬁnd that the sectoral
reallocation accounts for roughly 16 percent of the economy-wide relative
demand shift for skills between 1981 and 1996, while the skill-biased de-
mand shift within individual manufacturing sectors accounts for roughly 30
percent.
27 The formula for the decomposition of between and within shifts (for further details



















with i denoting the individual sector in mining and manufacturing. The right panel of
Table 4.5 presents the estimates on the three terms of the decomposition exercise.
115Focusing on the impacts of trade, the observed increase in relative de-
mand for high-skilled labor can be attributed to import competition in ﬁnal
goods or, alternatively, intermediate inputs, better known as international
outsourcing. The ﬁrst force suggests that increased imports of low-skill
intensive goods lowers the demand for low-skilled labor in Austria. This
mechanism causes a shift in employment between sectors towards more skill-
intensive sectors. However in the case of the second force, the import of
intermediate goods leads to a relative demand shift for skills within speciﬁc
sectors. While the ﬁrst force refers to the classical Heckscher-Ohlin theory
with trade in ﬁnal goods which diﬀer with respect to their factor intensi-
ties, the second force is captured by the theoretical model of Feenstra and
Hanson (1996a). As outlined in Section 2.1.2 of Chapter 2, they show that
outsourcing of low-skill intensive stages of the production process results in a
within-industry skill-upgrading. However, the decomposing does not allow to
discriminate deﬁnitely between these two impacts of trade since forces such
as skill-biased technological progress are alternative candidates for explaining
the considered demand shifts in the Austrian labor market.
The last three columns of Table 4.5 present the results of the within-
between decomposition for the mining and manufacturing sector over the
period from 1995-2002. Breaking down the period in two sub-periods indi-
cates that the annual average overall change in the years 1995 to 1998 is
with 0.66 percentage points more pronounced than in the years 1999 to 2002
with an annual change of 0.46 percentage points. The decomposition anal-
ysis suggests that in manufacturing no reallocation has taken place towards
more skill-intensive sectors. The overall increase in relative demand for skills
can be completely attributed to skill upgrading within individual sectors. At
ﬁrst view, the results might not be surprising keeping in mind the relative
shortness of the analyzed period of time. However, as Table 4.4 has shown,
also in short term the sectoral pattern can change remarkably. The ﬁnd-
ings strongly suggest that international outsourcing modeled in the Feenstra
and Hanson (1996a) way is an appropriate candidate for explaining the de-
mand shift. Decomposing the wage bill share provides fairly similar results.28
28 The results are shown in the second row of Table 4.5.
116So far, this section has examined primarily aggregate trends in interna-
tional outsourcing and the demand for skills in mining and manufacturing.
However, as Figure 4.5 suggests, there is substantial variation at the level of
individual sectors. Furthermore, the econometric analysis in Section 4.5 is
carried out at the sectoral level. The ﬁgure ranks the ﬁfteen sectors under
consideration according to the changes in their outsourcing activities. In the
examined sample period 1995-2002, all sectors were enforcing their outsourc-
ing activities. The vehicle and chemical sector are the two sectors with the
largest increase in imports of intermediate inputs. Both sectors concurrently
saw the relative wages of high-skilled workers in their sectors decrease above
the national average of the manufacturing sector, while the relative employ-
ment rose at a fairly strong rate.29 The vehicles sector is not only the sector
which experienced the highest increase in imported intermediates between
1995 and 2002. It also shows the highest level of outsourcing intensity. In
2002, imported intermediate goods account for 38.9 percent of the output
of the vehicles sector, while the average value for aggregated mining and
manufacturing is 14.8 percent.
In the Austrian mining and manufacturing sector, the skill premium de-
clined in virtually all sectors. It conﬁrms the aggregate picture presented in
Figure 4.4. Most pronounced is this trend in the textiles and paper industry.
The skill premium in the two sectors declined by 1.66 and 1.53 percentage
points per year, respectively. In 1995, non-production workers in the tex-
tiles sector earned 62 percent more than their production counterparts. It is
the sector with the highest wage gap whereas in the paper sector the wage
for non-production workers exceeds that of production workers only by 17
percent in 2002.
Furthermore, Figure 4.5 presents the sectoral variation of changes in rel-
ative employment of non-production workers. Apparently, the employment
of non-production relative to production workers increased in almost every
sector. Two sectors show clearly the largest changes; the coke and petroleum
29 The relative wages declined annually by 1.02 and 0.83 percentage points in the vehicle





























































































































































Notes: The numbers show average annual changes in percentage points for the years
1995-2002. The sectors are ranked in descending order with respect to outsourcing.
outsourcing is deﬁned in the narrow way. For further details of variable deﬁnition
see Table G.1 in the Appendix.
Source: Own calculations based on data from Statistics Austria and the Association
of Austrian Social Insurance.
Figure 4.5: Outsourcing, Wages and Employment
118sector and the electronics sector. At the same time, these two sectors ex-
perienced more or less no changes in their outsourcing activities and skill
premium. Overall, the ﬁgure suggests that enhanced outsourcing activities
correspond to a reduced skill premium. However, the relationship between





























Notes: The ﬁgure shows annual changes for 15 mining and manufacturing sectors between 1995 and
2003 in percentage points. For the deﬁnition of the variables (relative wages and outsourcing in wide
deﬁnition), see Table G.1 in the Appendix.
Source: Own calculations based on data from Statistics Austria and the Association of Austrian Social
Insurance.
Figure 4.6: Outsourcing and Relative Wages
The scatterplot in Figure 4.6 depicts the relationship between outsourc-
ing and skill premia. It is evident from the ﬁgure that there is some variation
across industries in the relation between changes in these two variables. Most
sectors, however, have reinforced strongly their outsourcing in the years 1995
to 2003, while at the same time, high-skilled workers experienced a decrease
in their relative wages in the majority of the sectors. Graphically, this corre-
lation can be seen from the fact that most sectors are located in the fourth
quadrant. The ﬁgure suggests a strong negative impact of outsourcing on
the skill premium. Section 4.5 provides an econometric analysis of the rela-
tionship by regressing the relative demand for high-skilled labor as well as
relative wages and relative employment on international outsourcing.
119Table 4.6: Outsourcing and Relative Demand for Skills in Selected Countries
Austria Germany USA
1995-2002 1991-2003 1979-1990
annual average growth rates
outsourcing 6.01e 3.86f 3.82g
FDI intensitya 9.06 6.33 -
high-skilled workers’ wage bill shareb 1.14 1.16 1.67
relative wagesc -0.29 0.23 0.72
relative employmentd 2.25 1.98 -
a (employment of FDIs abroad/domestic employment)*100, in mining and manufacturing for Austria,
in manufacturing for Germany.
b (wage bill of non-production workers/total wage bill)*100 in mining and manufacturing for Austria,
in manufacturing for Germany and USA.
c (wage of non-production workers/wage of production workers)*100 in mining and manufacturing for
Austria, in manufacturing for Germany and USA.
d (number of non-production workers/number of production workers)*100 in mining and manufactur-
ing for Austria, in manufacturing for Germany and USA.
e narrow deﬁnition of outsourcing = (imported inputs from same sector/value added)*100, mining
and manufacturing.
f narrow deﬁnition of outsourcing = (imported inputs from same sector/gross output)*100, manufac-
turing.
g (imported inputs from the same sector/total non-energy material purchases)*100, manufacturing.
Source: Austria and Germany: own calculations; USA: data from Feenstra and Hanson (1996b).
To evaluate internationally the trends in Austria, Table 4.6 provides a
comparison of trends in outsourcing in selected countries and the develop-
ment in the relative demand for skills. The examined periods are not the
same for the European and American part of this table. However, these peri-
ods of time have something in common. The eighties in North America were
marked by the integration of the US and Canada with Mexico facing the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). On the other hand, since
the fall of the Iron Curtain, Europe is battling with the economic integration
between western and eastern part crowned with the eastern enlargement of
the European Union. Firms in the US as well as in Austria and Germany
started in the respective period to rely more on imported intermediate goods
in their production.
In the examined periods all three countries experienced enormous in-
creases of foreign activities. With an annual growth rate of outsourcing of 6
percent, Austria shows clearly the strongest increase in import competition
120from intermediate inputs since its accession to the European Union. The
annual increase in international outsourcing in Germany and the US are of
the same order of magnitude. However, compared to Austria, the increases
in outsourcing activities of German and US ﬁrms appear to be small. The
importance of Austrian and German ﬁrms’ foreign activities gained sharply
in terms of domestic employment, by annually 9 and 6 percent, respectively.
While the development of the wage bill of high-skilled workers relative
to the wage bill of total workers are almost identical in Austria and Ger-
many, it rose more pronounced in the US in the 1980s. Particularly the skill
premium increased substantially in the US economy. In Germany, the wage
gap widened slightly between 1991 and 2003, while Austria’s skill premium
even declined modestly. The annual increase in the relative employment of
high-skilled labor is similar between Austria and Germany.
A large widening wage gap is the motivation of analysis for many in-
vestigations, especially the large wage gap in the US but also in Eastern
Europe.30. However in the case of Austria, the wage gap is closing while
the relative number of high-skilled workers is rising. Therefore, the ques-
tion I address in this chapter diﬀers somewhat from other studies. Given
the great exposure of the small Western European country Austria to global
competition, what consequences does this have for its labor market?
4.3 Existing Empirical Literature
Egger and Egger (2003) provide a theoretical model on outsourcing in the
case of a small open economy, like Austria. In their empirical investigation
of Austrian manufacturing, they ﬁnd evidence for outsourcing to Eastern
Europe as being a driving force for a substantial shift towards high-skilled
labor.
Under the assumption of a unionized labor market particularly for low-
skilled workers, Egger and Egger (2003) analyze in a three countries frame-
work an trade integration of two small open countries which diﬀer in their
30 For example in Poland, the skill premium increased from 44 to 106 percent in the last
decade (1994-2003). Also Hungary and the Czech Republic experienced a sharp widening
of the wage gap between high-skilled and low-skilled workers, see Lorentowicz et al (2006).
121factor endowments. They propose that trade cost reduction stimulates out-
sourcing activities and leads, therefore, to a higher relative employment of
high-skilled workers in the skill abundant country with an unionized labor
market. Allowing for fragmenting the production process of the ﬁnal good
across countries induces trade in intermediate goods. Their model predicts
an increase in relative employment and wages of high-skilled workers in the
country which moves stages of production oﬀshore, associated with Austria.
In the empirical examination for Austria, Egger and Egger (2003) iden-
tify a strong increase of relative high-skilled workers’ employment during the
years 1990-1998. In the same period, outsourcing from Austria to Eastern
Europe was rising dramatically. They construct a narrow measure of out-
sourcing to Eastern Europe combining data from input-output tables and
trade statistics. Labor market data are taken from statistics of the Austrian
Chamber of Commerce which allow to distinguish skill groups according to
workers’ utilization in the production process. Furthermore, trade cost are
proxied by tariﬀ rates and non-tariﬀ barriers. Arguing that in an unionized
economy mainly the employment side is aﬀected from outsourcing, they focus
their analysis on relative employment. Using panel data for twenty 2-digit
NACE sectors over 9 years, Egger and Egger (2003) identify in a ﬁrst step
low-wage cost as major determinant of outsourcing to the East. Secondly,
they ﬁnd in various instrumental-variables speciﬁcations that outsourcing to
the Eastern formerly planned economies signiﬁcantly shifts the relative labor
demand towards high-skilled workers. Thus, outsourcing to Eastern Europe
can account for 20 up to 29 percent of the increase in relative employment
of high-skilled workers in Austria.
In a more recent work, Egger and Egger (2005) use econometric tech-
niques that allow to take into account inter-sectoral spillover eﬀects. They
state that usually direct impacts of outsourcing on the labor demand are
analyzed ignoring spillover eﬀects of outsourcing. This might lead to an
underestimation of the role of international outsourcing. In an empirical
investigation on Austrian outsourcing to Eastern Europe, Egger and Egger
(2005) show that indirect spillover eﬀects can account for about two-thirds
of the employment eﬀect of outsourcing.
1224.4 Estimating Equation and Data
Analogously to the investigation on German manufacturing in Section 3, I
make use of a cost share equation in oder to estimate the impacts of out-
sourcing on the Austrian relative demand for human capital. The basic wage




it = β0 + β1lnYit + β2lnKit/Yit + β3OUTSit + β4TECHit +
β5Tt + β6Ii + uit (4.1)
where WBSHS
it denotes the share of non-production workers’ wage bill in
total wage bill in industry i and year t. Yit is the sector’s output and Kit/Yit
is the capital intensity for each sector i. Moreover, OUTSit denotes inter-
national outsourcing, the variable of interest. Additionally, technological
change (TECHit) is included in the equation. Furthermore, a full set of time
(Tt) and industry (Ii) dummies are included in the estimating equation.
The employed data sample comprises annual data of 15 industrial sectors
that are pooled over the years 1995-2002. The sectors are classiﬁed according
to the European NACE system at the 2-letter level.31 Unfortunately, sys-
tematic changes in the sector classiﬁcation prevent the usage of longer time
series before 1995. Therefore, the sample period starts in 1995 which marks
the year of Austria’s accession to the EU.
The labor demand data are taken from the Association of Austrian Social
Insurance. The skill levels are proxied by the commonly used broad deﬁnition
of production (“Arbeiter”) and non-production workers (“Angestellte”) for
low-skilled and high-skilled workers. The statistics report the wages and the
employment separately for production and non-production workers.
Furthermore, I deﬁne the variable international outsourcing OUTS as the
share of imported inputs in value added. In the case of the wide deﬁnition
(OUTSwide), the imported intermediate goods refer to the imported inputs
from all manufacturing sectors (NACE C and D). In opposite to this, the
31 The considered sectors belong to NACE C and D.
123narrow deﬁnition of outsourcing (OUTSnarrow) takes into account solely the
imported inputs of the same NACE 2-letter sector, as the good being pro-
duced. Alternatively, some other studies are using the imported intermediate
inputs as a share of the sum of domestic and imported inputs.32 The advan-
tage of measuring outsourcing in relation to value added rather than inputs
is that it controls for changes in the degree of value added. Consequently, the
measure I use takes into account general changes in the use of intermediate
goods. Since I want to analyze the importance of outsourcing for the labor
market, it might not be appropriate to look just at the relative importance
of imported inputs compared to total inputs.
As control variables, I use data on output Y , value added V A, and
gross ﬁxed capital formation K from the OCED STAN database. Since
no industry-level measure of capital stocks is available,33 I use gross ﬁxed
capital formation data to construct a measure for the capital stocks. For this
calculation, I employ the perpetual inventory method.
Technological change is proxied by the variable R&D L meaning R&D
personnel as a proportion of sector’s employment. In addition to the R&D
employment ratio, the regressions are carried out with data on R&D ex-
penditures relative to value added. However, the results for the estimated
coeﬃcients are fairly similar to that for R&D employment.
See the Data Appendix for a further description of the data and their
sources.
4.5 Empirical Analysis
This section analyzes the consequences of increased competition due to inter-
national trade for the Austrian labor market. In particular, I want to address
the question of how import competition aﬀects the relative demand for high-
skilled labor in Austria. Import competition arise in form of imports of ﬁnal
goods or intermediate goods. The latter refers to outsourcing of intermedi-
32 See for example Feenstra and Hanson (1996b) and Geishecker (2002).
33 Data of capital stocks are available only at the aggregated level of ISIC 1-letter sectors
for the years 1988 to 2000.
124ates that are imported by Austrian ﬁrms as inputs for their production in
Austria. Section 4.5.1 presents the estimation results for this measure, while
Section 4.5.2 focuses on import penetration.
For the empirical analysis, a panel estimation technique with two-way
ﬁxed eﬀects is employed. The diﬀerent speciﬁcations are estimated with
ﬁxed eﬀects, since any variation between units not accounted for by the in-
dependent variables creates unobserved heterogeneity in the model. Given
that industries diﬀer from each other in time-invariant characteristics not in-
cluded in the empirical model, estimating OLS without industry ﬁxed eﬀects
would relegate the omitted heterogeneity to the error term and the coeﬃ-
cients would be biased. Furthermore, the estimation also incorporates time
ﬁxed eﬀects. By including time dummies, I assume that there are aggregate
trends which all industries in the same way and vary only over time. Time
ﬁxed eﬀects control for such common trends.
4.5.1 International Outsourcing
The estimation results on the basic equation 4.4 are presented in Table 4.7.
The table reports OLS results for diﬀerent speciﬁcations with industry and
year dummies using the narrow deﬁnition of outsourcing. The main ﬁnding
on foreign outsourcing is that the international fragmentation of production
stages has a negative impact on the relative demand for human capital in
Austria.
In column (1) of Table 4.7, the wage bill share of the high-skilled work-
ers is regressed on OUTSnarrow and the two control variables, Y and the
capital output ratio K/Y . The results suggest that outsourcing has a sig-
niﬁcant negative eﬀect on the demand for high-skilled labor. Thus, rather
than saving on low-skilled labor as is commonly assumed, outsourcing saves
on high-skilled labor relative to low-skilled labor. Furthermore, the sector’s
output and capital output ratio have a positive impact on the non-production
workers’ share of the wage bill.34 This suggest that the output elasticity is
higher for high-skilled labor than for low-skilled labor.
34 I have also run all the regressions with investments (gross ﬁxed capital formation)
instead of capital stocks, but the results are very similar.
125Table 4.7: Outsourcing and Demand for High-Skilled Labor in Austria
dependent variable: wage bill share of high-skilled workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OUTSnarrow - 0.018* - 0.030** - 0.034*** - 0.036***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
ln Y 3.999* 4.256** 3.721* 2.704
(2.100) (1.962) (1.964) (2.031)
ln K/Y 3.440* 4.740** 4.098* 2.826
(2.059) (2.064) (2.067) (2.098)
R&D L 0.414** 0.362* 0.365**
(0.198) (0.183) (0.179)




Constant - 3.647 - 11.677 - 4.552 10.394
(25.443) (24.341) (24.353) (25.474)
Adj. R2 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997
N 120 120 120 120
Notes: Coeﬃcients are estimated by two-way ﬁxed eﬀects OLS regressions; *** (**) [*]
indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 (5) [10] percent level; standard errors in parentheses are
robust to heteroscedasticity; estimated coeﬃcients on industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects
are not reported; N denotes number of observations.
Variables are deﬁned as follows: wage bill share of high-skilled workers = (wage bill
of non-production workers/total wage bill)*100; OUTSnarrow = (imported inputs
from same sector/value added)*100; ln Y = ln real output; ln K/Y = ln [(cap-
ital/output)*100]; R&D L = (R&D employment/employment)*100; R&D SUB =
(R&D subsidies/value added)*100; FDI L = (employment in foreign aﬃliates in Aus-
tria/employment)*100.
126Additionally, speciﬁcation (2) includes the R&D employment ratio (R&D
L) as a proxy for technical change,35 which is positively signed and statis-
tically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. This indicates that labor saving
technical change shifts the demand toward non-production workers. It is in-
teresting to note that the inclusion of R&D L in column (2) magniﬁes the
negative impact of OUTSnarrow on high-skilled labor and raises the signiﬁ-
cance to the ﬁve percent level.
In the case of Austria, multiple factors inﬂuence the technological progress.
The inclusion of two additional variables R&D SUB and FDI L in the re-
gression allows me to determine what eﬀects the kind of ﬁnancing and the
source of R&D expenditures do have. I include these two variables to control
for further factors which may have put pressure on the relative demand for
high-skilled labor in Austria.
R&D SUB measures public subsidies to the private sector in percent
of value added. The reason for including this variable in the regression is
that the government in Austria pursued an active technology policy. I might
push up the relative demand for high-skilled labor in Austria. R&D SUB
is supposed to control for this policy induced eﬀect on relative demand for
high-skilled workers.36 Compared to other OECD countries, governmental
R&D policy plays an important role in Austria. In 2001, 38.2 percent of
R&D expenditures are ﬁnanced by the government, whereas only 29.1 per-
cent of R&D expenditures are state-ﬁnanced on OECD average (see Table
4.8). Since these state-ﬁnanced R&D expenditures are used as a policy in-
strument, they might be unequally distributed among sectors. As a proxy
for R&D subsidies I use in my analysis the R&D subsidies of the state-owned
research foundation for enterprises (“¨ Osterreichische Forschungsf¨ orderungs-
gesellschaft”). The subsidies vary from 2.3 percent of the sector’s R&D
expenditures in the coke and oil sector to 21.6 percent in the wood sector.
35 The regressions are also carried out with data on R&D expenditures relative to value
added. The results for the estimated coeﬃcients (not reported here) are very similar to
those for R&D employment.
36 For the R&D policy induced eﬀect on relative wages for skilled workers in Austria
see Marin (1995). She shows that the same policy has contributed to the slowing of the
speed by which the pattern of trade moved up the technological ladder in Austria.
127Table 4.8: Who Contributes to R&D
Financing R&D in 2001 (in percent)
Austria USA France Japan Finland
State Aid 38.2 27.8 36.9 18.5 25.5
Domestic Firms 41.8 67.3 54.2 73.0 70.8
Foreign Firms 19.7 - 7.2 0.4 2.5
Notes: Due to other (not speciﬁed) contributors the numbers have not to sum up to
100 for each country.
Source: Statistische Nachrichten 6/2004, Statistics Austria.
The positive and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on R&D SUB indicates
that an increase of state-aided R&D expenditures in percent of value added
by 1 percentage point is pushing up the relative wage bill of high-skilled
workers by 0.83 percentage points. The technology policy eﬀect on the rela-
tive wage bill of skilled workers is of much larger magnitude than the eﬀect of
technical change and outsourcing. Furthermore, the simultaneous inclusion of
R&D L and R&D SUB increases the statistical signiﬁcance of OUTSnarrow
to the one percent level.
In the last speciﬁcation of Table 4.7, I include FDI L measuring the per-
centage of employment of foreign aﬃliates in Austria by sector. The reason
why I include this variable is that foreign ﬁrms play an important role in
the R&D and trade activity taking place in Austria. In 2001, 20 percent of
total R&D expenditures are ﬁnanced by foreign ﬁrms (see Table 4.8). The
share is even higher considering only business R&D expenditures.37 This
share is the largest one among OECD countries.38 The R&D expenditures
ﬁnanced from abroad are overwhelmingly R&D activities which conduct aﬃl-
iated companies of foreign ﬁrms in Austria. One reason for the attractiveness
of Austria as location of R&D activities might be governmental incentives in
form of tax privileges.39 The technology transfer from abroad should favor
37 30.2 percent of R&D expenditures of the business sector in 2001 are ﬁnanced by
abroad.
38 In the EU-15 countries 7.7 percent of the R&D activity is undertaken by foreign
multinationals. See Statistische Nachrichten 6/2004, Statistics Austria.
39 See Statistische Nachrichten 6/2004, Statistics Austria.
128the high-skilled workers in Austria.
Furthermore, foreign aﬃliates in Austria generate a large share of Aus-
trian imports. Table 4.9 shows, that roughly one third of all imports are
done by foreign multinationals in Austria. The presence of foreign ﬁrms in
Austria varies strongly according to the sector. The share of employment of
foreign aﬃliates in percent of sector’s employment ranges from 3.8 percent
in the furniture sector to 70 percent in the coke and oil sector.40
Table 4.9: Role of Foreign Firms for Austria’s Trade and Labor Market
1995 1998 2002
share of FDIs employment in total employment 16.26 17.00 16.65
share of FDIs-imports in total imports - 21.75 32.08
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Austrian National Bank, OeNB, the
OECD STAN database, and Eurostat Comext database.
As the estimation results in Table 4.7 show, foreign multinationals tend
to increase the relative demand for low-skilled labor in Austria. It suggests
that they invest mainly in sectors which use low-skilled labor intensively.
This is consistent with the fact that Austria is a human capital poor country
relative to its main trading partners.41 The estimated coeﬃcient on FDI L
is negative and signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level.
It is remarkable that the inclusion of R&D variables increases signiﬁcantly
the magnitude of the coeﬃcient estimates on OUTSnarrow. The economic
impact of outsourcing implied by the estimates is substantial over the con-
sidered period. The annual change in the non-production wage bill share was
0.48. Multiplying the coeﬃcient on outsourcing in speciﬁcation (4) times the
annual change in outsourcing (1.81) and dividing this by the change in wage
bill share [(-0.036*1.81)/0.48] results in a contribution of -0.136. It implies
that the wage bill share would have increased more strongly by 13.6 percent
if the outsourcing would have not changed in the last decade. It is notewor-
40 The numbers show averages for 1995 to 2002.
41 For a comparison of Austria’s skill endowment with other OECD and Eastern Euro-
pean countries see Marin (2004).
129thy that the technological change (R&D L) can account for only 3.4 to 3.9
percent of the rise of the wage bill share.
How robust are these results? A decomposition of the wage bill share in
prices and quantities, known as relative wages and relative employment may
deliver interesting insights. In Table 4.5.1, the dependent variable wage bill
share is replaced by relative wages42 and relative employment of high-skilled
labor, respectively. I then run similar regressions as in Table 4.7.43 Arguing
that labor markets are not ﬂexible, several studies concerning continental
Western European countries44 concentrate their analysis exclusively on the
employment side.
The coeﬃcient on the outsourcing variable is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant at the one percent level in all three relative wage regressions and
somewhat less signiﬁcant but also negative in the relative employment regres-
sion. It indicates that international outsourcing has a substantially negative
impact on Austria’s human capital in terms of wages and employment. More-
over, both R&D measures have a strong and signiﬁcant impact on the relative
employment. The R&D L ratio and the R&D SUB inﬂuence the relative
employment of high-skilled workers positively, whereas the FDI L ratio has
a strong negative impact, which is not reported in the table. These variables,
however, have only a minor eﬀect on relative wages.
It results that international outsourcing can explain 38 percent of the
decrease in the wage gap between the 70-percentile of the non-production
workers and the 30-percentile wage of the production workers. Furthermore,
relative employment would have grown by 24 percent more in the absence of
outsourcing activities that occurred in the considered period of 8 years. As
shown in Table 4.5.1 outsourcing has a negative impact on relative wages, as
well as on relative employment. However, while the wage gap is decreasing,
42 See the Data Appendix for a note on calculation relative wages. Due to missing values
on the 70-percentile wages of the mining (NACE C), coke and petroleum (NACE DF),
and vehicles (NACE DM) sector the sample reduces to 13 sectors.
43 The reason why I use now value added instead of output (as in Table 4.7) as control
variable, is simply because of value added performs slightly better.
44 See, for example, Egger and Egger (2003) in the case of Austria, Brenton and Pinna
(2001) in the case of Italy, and Anderton and Brenton (2000b) in the case of Sweden.
130outsourcing contributes signiﬁcantly to this development, and it acts against
the rise in relative employment.
Using the wide deﬁnition of outsourcing, the results in Table H.2 in the
Appendix conﬁrm the above mentioned estimation results on the narrowly
deﬁned outsourcing. Wide outsourcing is deﬁned as the share of imported
inputs from all mining and manufacturing sectors in percent of the sector’s
value added. As the coeﬃcient estimates on OUTSwide indicate, outsourcing
has a statistically signiﬁcant and negative impact on the relative high-skilled
labor demand also when using the wide deﬁnition. Furthermore, wide out-
sourcing aﬀects the relative wages signiﬁcantly negatively and has no signif-
icant eﬀect on the relative employment.
131Table 4.10: Outsourcing and Decomposed Demand for High-Skilled Labor in Austria
dependent variable: relative wages relative employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OUTSnarrow - 0.155*** - 0.148*** - 0.179*** - 0.109* - 0.149** - 0.142***
(0.056) (0.055) (0.061) (0.063) (0.067) (0.051)
ln VA - 20.131** - 27.179*** - 22.592*** 67.617*** 52.529*** 66.058***
(8.557) (9.386) (8.270) (14.162) (9.758) (15.608)
ln K/VA - 17.521* - 22.064** - 19.831** 57.372*** 51.123*** 54.806***
(9.145) (9.115) (8.724) (10.280) (7.831) (11.164)
R&D L 2.637* 3.074***
(1.516) (1.073)
R&D SUB 2.349 4.923**
(1.664) (2.025)
Constant 449.505*** 520.155*** 480.238*** - 721.512*** - 582.880*** - 697.668***
(104.218) (109.201) (100.009) (152.852) (106.720) (168.349)
Adj. R2 0.975 0.976 0.975 0.994 0.995 0.994
N 96 96 96 120 120 120
Notes: Coeﬃcients are estimated by two-way ﬁxed eﬀects OLS regressions; *** (**) [*] indicates
signiﬁcance at the 1 (5) [10] percent level; standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroscedas-
ticity; estimated coeﬃcients on industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects are not reported; N denotes number
of observations.
Variables are deﬁned as follows: relative wages = (70-percentile wage of non-production workers/30-
percentile wage of production workers)*100; relative employment = (number of non-production work-
ers/number of production workers)*100; OUTSnarrow = (imported inputs from same sector/value
added)*100; ln VA = ln real value added; ln K/VA = ln [(capital/value added)*100]; R&D L =
(R&D employment/employment)*100; R&D SUB = (R&D subsidies/value added)*100.
132A further robustness check concerns the assumed exogeneity of inter-
national outsourcing. So far, I have neglected the potential correlation of
the outsourcing variable with the error term of the dependent variable. If
the outsourcing variable is aﬄicted with endogeneity, the OLS estimates are
inconsistent.45 Therefore, in oder to evaluate if the outsourcing variable
(OUTSnarrow) is actually endogenous in my sample I carry out the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman endogeneity test. Table 4.11 reports the test statistics.
Table 4.11: Exogeneity Tests for Narrow Outsourcing
χ2 P-value Exogeneity
wage bill share regression 0.0764 0.782 not rejected
relative wages regression 0.0546 0.815 not rejected
relative employment regression 0.2498 0.618 not rejected
Notes: The test statistics are carried out in Stata using the ivendog command; numbers refer to 105
observations; test statistics show results for the ﬁrst lag of OUTnarrow.
The table suggests that the outsourcing variable appears to be exoge-
nous. This is true for all three dependent variables, the wage bill share,
relative wages, and relative employment. The high p-values indicate that I
cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. Therefore, the estimates are
consistent when using OLS. Nevertheless, I undertake instrumental variable
regressions to see if the results diﬀer from OLS. Applying the General Method
of Moments (GMM) I use the own ﬁrst lag as an instrument for OUTSnarrow.
Thus, I can estimate the parameters in a consistent way. However, the results
using GMM are generally not eﬃcient.
Table 4.12 shows the results of the IV-GMM estimation. In all three spec-
iﬁcations, the coeﬃcient of the variable of interest, OUTSnarrow, is negative.
However, narrow outsourcing appears only to have a signiﬁcant impact on
the relative wages of non-production workers. It conﬁrms the results received
from OLS estimations. However, facing the exogeneity of the outsourcing
variable, OLS estimations appear to be preferable over GMM since the OLS
estimates are more eﬃcient.
45 See also Section 3.6.2 of Chapter 3 where I considered the problem of endogeneity in
the case of Germany.
133Table 4.12: Outsourcing and Relative Demand for High-Skilled Labor (IV-GMM)
dependent variable: wage bill relative relative
share wages employment
(1) (2) (3)
OUTSnarrow -0.027 -0.063** -0.105
(0.028) (0.025) (0.113)
ln Y 4.482** -7.007** 46.870***
(1.752) (3.273) (9.097)
ln K/Y 4.756** -3.044 53.002***
(1.933) (3.567) (13.681)
R&D L 0.352 0.235 -0.157
(0.225) (0.300) (1.205)
Constant -18.195 184.506*** -544.624***
(21.122) (39.409) (127.812)
Centered R2 0.997 0.995 0.995
N 105 105 105
Test of Predictive Power of Instrument F-test 16.75
P-value 0.000
Notes: Coeﬃcients are estimated by IV-GMM; ﬁrst lag of OUTSnarrow is used as
instrument for this variable; *** (**) [*] indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 (5) [10] per-
cent level; standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity; estimated
coeﬃcient on industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects are not reported; N denotes number of
observations.
Variables are deﬁned as follows: wage bill share of high-skilled workers = (wage bill
of non-production workers/total wage bill)*100; relative wages = (70-percentile wage
of non-production workers/30-percentile wage of production workers)*100; relative em-
ployment = (number of non-production workers/number of production workers)*100;
OUTSnarrow = (imported inputs from same sector/value added)*100; ln Y = ln
real output; ln K/Y = ln [(capital stock/output)*100]; R&D L = (R&D employ-
ment/employment)*100.
1344.5.2 Import Penetration
In this section I examine the consequences of Austria’s changed import pat-
tern on the relative demand for high-skilled labor in domestic sectors. Par-
ticularly, I focus my analysis on the increased importance of imports from
Eastern Europe. As already mentioned, due to data restrictions, this ques-
tion cannot be answered by the outsourcing data used in the previous section
which were received from input-output tables. Therefore, in this section I
will analyze the eﬀects of imports disaggregated by their geographical source.
The import data for this analysis are taken from the Eurostat trade data
base Comext and are recoded from the trade classiﬁcation system SITC to
the industry classiﬁcation system ISIC.46 The resulting sector-speciﬁc import
ratios represent a measure for import penetration. They indicate how strong
particular sectors are exposed to competition arising from imported goods.
It notable that the import shares are capturing trends in both outsourcing of
intermediate inputs and direct import substitution of ﬁnal goods. Anderton
et al (2002a)47 argue that restricting outsourcing to the imports solely of
intermediate inputs does not take into account outsourcing of ﬁnal goods.
They mention that outsourcing of the ﬁnal stage of the production process
or the entire production process by German ﬁrms might have similar eﬀects
like outsourcing in intermediates.
I seek to assess to what extent imports from certain regions, particularly
from Central and Eastern Europe, contribute to the within-sector variation
in the demand for high-skilled labor in Austria.
This analysis is based on the same theoretical considerations and esti-
mating equation as the previous section. In the speciﬁcations of Table 4.13,
the wage bill share of high-skilled workers is regressed on the sector-speciﬁc
import ratios. In column (1) to (3) the imports from all countries excluding
Central and Eastern Europe are taken into account, while in columns (4) to
(6) solely imports from the Eastern European transition countries are con-
46 According to the correspondence table from Eurostat, I transformed the original
trade data from the trade classiﬁcation SITC at 5-digit level to the industry classiﬁcation
at ISIC 4-digit level. See the Data Appendix for a more detailed description of the trade
data and their transformation.
47 See Chapter 2 for a more detailed description of Anderton et al (2002a).
135sidered. The data are pooled across ﬁfteen sectors and eight years, from 1995
to 2002, resulting in 120 observations.
The results in the table suggest that only the imports from Central and
Eastern European countries (measured by the import ratio IMCEE/Y ) have
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects. The coeﬃcient indicate that imports from
Central and Eastern Europe have a positive inﬂuence on relative demand
for high-skilled labor, whereas imports from other countries have no skilled-
biased eﬀect on the labor demand. As Anderton and Brenton (1999) state
for the UK, the source of imports matters with respect to the relative de-
mand for skills. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the imports from the other
countries IMROW/Y are dominated by intra-EU-15 imports and particularly
by imports from Germany.48 Similarly to the regressions with outsourcing
data from the input-output table, the R&D intensity and the R&D subsidies
provided by the government have positive impacts on the relative demand
for high-skilled workers.
48 Roughly 50 percent of all imports to Austria come from Germany.
136Table 4.13: Import Penetration and Demand for High-Skilled Labor
dependent variable: wage bill share of high-skilled workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IMROW/Y 0.001 0.001 - 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
IMCEE/Y 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.050***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
ln Y 3.917** 3.284* 3.452* 3.942** 3.182* 3.558*
(1.969) (1.907) (1.936) (1.779) (1.668) (1.801)
ln K/Y 3.561* 3.090* 3.236* 4.185** 3.648** 3.893**
(1.810) (1.771) (1.835) (1.710) (1.614) (1.753)
R&D L 0.161* 0.192*
(0.096) (0.100)
R&D SUB 0.780** 0.693**
(0.378) (0.317)
Constant - 4.063 2.737 1.085 - 9.708 - 1.569 - 5.296
(23.372) (22.673) (23.080) (20.924) (19.528) (21.238)
R2 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997
N 120 120 120 120 120 120
Notes: Coeﬃcients are estimated by two-way ﬁxed eﬀects OLS regressions; *** (**) [*] indi-
cates signiﬁcance at the 1 (5) [10] percent level; standard errors in parentheses are robust to
heteroscedasticity; estimated coeﬃcients on industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects are not reported; N
denotes number of observations.
Variables are deﬁned as follows: wage bill share of high-skilled workers = (wage bill of non-
production workers/total wage bill)*100; IMROW/Y = worldwide Austrian imports (excluding
from CEE)/output)*100; IMROW/Y = Austrian imports from CEE/output)*100; ln Y = ln real
output; ln K/Y = ln [(capital/output)*100]; R&D L = (R&D employment/employment)*100;
R&D SUB = (R&D subsidies/value added)*100.
1374.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I have examined the importance of outsourcing for the labor
market outcomes in Austria. In contrary to other studies on the topic, I
ﬁnd that international outsourcing has hurt the economic fortunes of human
capital in Austria. Moreover, outsourcing has a negative impact on the skill
premium as well as the relative employment of high-skilled workers.
At the ﬁrst glance, the obtained results seems to contradict the predic-
tions of the theoretical model of Feenstra and Hanson (1996a). However, it
might depend on that the model’s assumption on the factor abundance of
the outsourcer country is not reasonable in the case of Austria. The model
assumes that the North which undertakes outsourcing to the South, is rel-
atively well endowed with capital and high-skilled labor. However, Austria
appears to be a poor human capital country compared to its trading partners
and host countries of FDIs.49
Table 4.14 provides a summary of my ﬁndings for Austria and Germany.
Furthermore, the table compares the results with the empirical ﬁndings of
Feenstra and Hanson (1996b) for the US. Several points appear noteworthy
from the table.
First, the contribution of outsourcing to the development of the wage
bill share appears to be substantially smaller in both European countries
than in the US. Furthermore, as the negative signs in the case of Austria
and Germany indicate, international outsourcing works against a stronger
increase of the relative skilled labor demand. Secondly, the contribution of
outsourcing to the evolution of the skill premium appears strikingly similar
in Austria and Germany. In both countries outsourcing can account for
roughly 35 percent of the change in the relative wage for high-skilled workers.
It means that in the absence of outsourcing the relative wages for human
capital would have declined by 35 percent less in Austria, while the relative
wages in Germany would have increased by one third more. Finally, the
table shows that outsourcing reduces substantially the relative employment
of high-skilled workers in both countries. However, the contribution to the
49 See Marin (2004).
138increase in relative employment is with on average 58 percent clearly higher
in Germany.
Furthermore, it is remarkable that governmental R&D policy has diﬀer-
ent eﬀects on skill-upgrading in Germany and Austria. While R&D subsidies
have a positive impact on the relative demand for high-skilled labor in Aus-
tria, they only aﬀect the skill premium positively in Germany. However, in
Germany, the governmental R&D policy disfavors the relative employment
of high-skilled workers.




wage bill shared -6.8 - -13.6 -8.7 - -25.1 30.9 - 51.3
relative wages e 33.0 - 38.1 -30.8 - -36.5 -
relative employment f -18.4 - -25.2 -31.8 - -85.1 -
a narrow deﬁnition of outsourcing = (imported inputs from same sector/value added)*100, mining and
manufacturing.
b narrow deﬁnition of outsourcing = (imported inputs from same sector/gross output)*100, manufac-
turing.
c (imported inputs from the same sector/total non-energy material purchases)*100, manufacturing.
d (wage bill of non-production workers/total wage bill)*100.
e (wage of non-production workers/wage of production workers)*100;.
f (number of non-production workers/number of production workers)*100;.
Source: Austria and Germany: own calculations; USA: calculations taken from Feenstra and Hanson
(1996b).
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First,
it uses very recent data which allows to evaluate appropriately the eﬀects
of the economic integration between Austria and Eastern Europe. It comes
out that human capital in Austria loses in the recent years. Furthermore,
I have identiﬁed that outsourcing has a negative impact on the wages and
employment of high-killed workers relative to their low-skilled counterparts.
Secondly, a detailed analysis of the channels of technology allows to distin-
guish between diﬀerent eﬀects. Thus, I found empirical evidence that R&D
subsidies and technological progress favor human capital. Particularly, R&D
139policy pursued by the Austrian government has a strong positive eﬀect on
the relative demand for high-skilled workers.
Concerning the role of Austria in the international value-added chain, I
found evidence that Austria is specializing in providing outsourcing-related
services. It emphasizes Austria’s role as toehold for investments in Eastern
Europe. Moreover, Austria’s role for Eastern Europe appears to be similar
to Hong Kong’s role as bridge to China. I focus my investigation on the
Austrian manufacturing sector. However, there must be future research on
the impacts of Austria’s concentration in providing outsourcing services for
investors in Eastern Europe. Particularly, what eﬀects does this have on the
demand for human capital in the service sector.
140Appendix
4.7 Data
Notes on calculation of variables
wages: Since Austria’s wages are recorded according to at most to the so-
cial security contribution ceiling, an accurate measure of mean wages is not
possible. The capping of high earnings which are highly correlated with
non-production workers, introduces a downward bias in relative wage rates.
However, the statistics of the Association of Austrian Social Insurance report
diﬀerent percentile wages for production and non-production workers.
For calculating the wage bill share and relative wages, I experimented with
various approaches including ratios of mean, median, and diﬀerent percentile
wages. Furthermore, I used those alternative calculations as dependent vari-
able for the regression analysis in order to check for robustness. Finally, I
decided to use the mean wages for calculating the wage bill of production and
non-production workers. Therefore, all reported wage bill share regression
show results on the wage bill share of mean wages. For regressions with rel-
ative wages as dependent variable, I calculated the ratio of the 70-percentile
wage of the non-production workers to the 30-percentile wage of the produc-
tion workers.
imported intermediate goods: As in most countries, input-output ta-
bles for Austria are compiled not annually. The most recent available input-
output tables are from 1995 and 2000. Therefore, I estimate the input-output
tables for the missing years by interpolating the input-output coeﬃcients
and multiplying them by imported inputs. The extrapolation of data for the
years 2001 and 2002 is undertaken analogously to the extrapolation of Ger-
man input-output tables. In the case of Austria, however, I used averages
over the years 1995 and 2000. See Appendix of Chapter 3 for further details.
141These imported inputs are obtained from the interpolated share of interme-
diate goods in total imports and the value of total imports. In absence of
trade data classiﬁed according to NACE, I calculated the total imports by
transforming import data at the HS Rev.1 6-digit level to ISIC Rev. 3 cat-
egories at 4-digit level. The import data in HS classiﬁcation are taken from
the Eurostat Comext database. For the transformation, I used a detailed
conversation table provided by the UN. Since the data on labor market de-
termine the level of sectoral aggregation, I aggregated the imported inputs to
the chosen NACE 2-letter level of analysis. Therefore, Austria’s imports at
the sectoral level formulate the estimated input-output tables for the missing
years.
capital stock: Gross ﬁxed capital stocks are calculated according to the per-
petual inventory method using data on gross ﬁxed capital formation (GFCF),
which are deﬂated by a general price index for investment goods.50 The ini-
tial capital stock for the year 1994, K1994, is estimated by using the values
of capital formation in the preceding years, 1990 to 1993.
K1994 = (GFCF1990 + GFCF1991 + GFCF1992 + GFCF1993 + GFCF1994)∗2
The gross ﬁxed capital stocks for the sample period are calculated according
to the following simple formula, assuming a constant depreciation rate of 10
percent.
Kt = 0.9 ∗ Kt−1 + GFCFt
To check the validity of this estimation, we compare the aggregate estimate
for NACE D with the net capital stocks provided by Statistics Austria. The
size of these stocks diﬀer somewhat, but the development is very similar.
50 For this calculation see Egger (2000).
142Table G.1: Deﬁnition and Source of Variables
Variable Description Source
wage bill share share of non-production workers’ Association of Austrian
wage bill in total wage bill, Social Insurance
in percent
relative wages 70-percentile non-production Association of Austrian
wage relative to 30-percentile Social Insurance
production wage, in percent
relative non-production workers Association of Austrian
employment relative to production Social Insurance
workers, in percent
OUTSnarrow share of imported inputs Statistics Austria
from the same NACE 2-letter (input-output table),
sector in value added, OECD STAN database
in percent
OUTSwide share of imported inputs Statistics Austria
from the mining and (input-output table),
manufacturing sector in OECD STAN database
value added, in percent
IMROW/Y share of Austria’s imports Comext database,
from all over the world Eurostat
(except from CEE) in output,
in percent
IMCEE/Y share of Austria’s imports Comext database,
from CEE in output Eurostat
in percent








K/Y gross ﬁxed capital stock OECD STAN database
relative to output, in percent
K/VA gross ﬁxed capital stock OECD STAN database
relative to value added,
in percent
R&D L R&D employment relative Eurostat,
to total employment, OECD STAN database
in percent
R&D SUB R&D subsidies relative Austrian Research
to value added, in percent Promotion Organization,
OECD STAN database
FDI L employment in foreign aﬃliates OeNB,
in Austria relative to total OECD STAN database
sector’s employment, in percent


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Central Europe and Location
Choice of FDIs
5.1 Introduction
The fall of the Iron Curtain which intersected Europe in its heart for more
than 40 years, is supposed to entail profound impacts on the location of
economic activity in the uniﬁed Europe. A new economic geography might
emerge in Europe. The economic integration between countries aﬀects the
spatial organization of production. It applies to the relocation of industry
across countries but even inside countries. The movement towards a more
integrated market inﬂuences the internal economic geography of countries.
The fall of the Communism acts like an external shock and can, therefore,
be seen as a natural experiment. What eﬀects does the opening-up of East-
ern Europe have on existing spatial pattern of economic activity in Europe
which emerged in the last half century? The integration of Eastern Europe
into the international economy implies a re-organization of the production
process in Europe. The economic geography might be aﬀected inside, espe-
cially, those countries along the removed border between the East and the
West. The former border regions became overnight central regions with an
excellent market access. Will a new economic center emerge in the middle of
146Europe? Furthermore, will the former border regions in immediate proximity
to the Iron Curtain be the most beneﬁting regions when Eastern and Western
Europe integrate? It concerns the Western European border regions in Aus-
tria and Germany as well as the regions of the former Communist countries
which border the EU-15.
Since the beginning of the nineties, several steps of economic integration
have been undertaken concerning Central Europe. Rapidly, tariﬀs and other
trade barriers have been reduced between the EU and EFTA, and the tran-
sition countries of Eastern Europe. A further step of integration marks the
accession of Austria to the European Union in 1995. The process culmi-
nates for the moment in the accession of eight Eastern European transition
countries. Hence, a new single market evolved in the heart of Europe.
The former centrally planned economies pursued an import-substitution
policy and restricted their international trade relations, in particular with
Western European countries.1 The result was a monocentric inward-looking
agglomeration of economic activity in the capital region. This spatial distri-
bution of industry location might change now in favor of a more dispersed
pattern. Those regions will gain which border the export markets in Western
Europe. Simultaneously, the Western European regions which are neighbors
of the new EU members, might also beneﬁt from an improved market access.
The goal of this chapter is to investigate how the economic integration of
Eastern and Western Europe inﬂuences the internal economic geography of
the aﬀected countries. At ﬁrst, I will examine the recent trends in location
of industrial activities. Thereby, I focus my analysis on the two Western
European countries, Austria and Germany, and the four neighboring Eastern
European countries; the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.
Changes in the economic geography might be caused by relocating of existing
production sites within a country or by entering of new ﬁrms. While the
former factor involves the free movement of activities across regions that was
formerly restricted by the political system, the latter factor is mainly related
to the entrance of foreign ﬁrms by settling aﬃliates.
In a second part of the chapter, I will focus on location decisions of new
1 Economic relations between Communist states were organized by the Comecon.
147market entrants. Facing the enormous capital inﬂows, investing multina-
tional companies might play an crucial role in the fortune of individual re-
gions in Eastern Europe. The location decisions might be not random. What
does the choice of location of foreign establishments determine? Do outsourc-
ing FDIs tend to locate in regions bordering Western Europe? Outsourcing
FDIs are characterized by moving individual stages of production oﬀshore. I
examine these questions by analyzing the location decisions of Austrian and
German companies. They tend to establish their Eastern European aﬃliates,
particularly, in regions which border on the European Union and in capital
regions.
The chapter is organized as follows. After highlighting brieﬂy the geog-
raphy of Europe given the Iron Curtain in Section 5.2, I review the related
theoretical and empirical literature in Section 5.3. The subsequent section
5.4 is concerned with the recent trends in the economic geography of indus-
try in the two Western European countries, Austria and Germany, and the
bordering Eastern European countries. Section 5.5 lays out the geographical
location of Austrian and German aﬃliates in Eastern Europe. Section 5.6
presents the results of an econometric analysis on determinants of FDIs lo-
cation in Central Europe. Finally, Section 5.7 gives a conclusion.
5.2 Central Europe and the Iron Curtain
After the World War II, the Iron Curtain intersected Europe in its heart for
more than 40 years. Thus, during the Cold War, Europe was divided polit-
ically and economically into East and West. While the Western European
countries organized their economic activities in a market-oriented system,
the states on the East to the Iron Curtain planned their economies centrally
by governmental administration. Furthermore, the Iron Curtain did allow
neither movements of persons nor goods and services, as well as capital be-
tween the two parts of Europe. Before Europe was split in half, the cultural
and economic relations between Western and Eastern Europe were intensive.
Not surprisingly, Eastern and Western Europe has a common historical
148background. Particularly, before the World War I, the westernmost former
Warsaw Pact countries were strongly tied to Western Europe. During the
Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, this multi-national region was culturally and
economically highly integrated. The Empire’s territory enclosed Austria,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and
Slovenia. Furthermore, parts of the neighboring countries belonged to the
Empire in Central Europe. In total, the territory includes 49 million people.2
However, the economic development was marked by wide discrepancies within
the Empire, although the new technologies spread rapidly throughout the
territory. In the northern part of the Central European area, the German
Empire was located. Its territory comprised large parts of Poland and the
Russian region Kaliningrad in the East.
Figure 5.1: Europe and the Iron Curtain
2 See Wikipedia for an outline of the history of Austria-Hungary.
149The map highlights the situation of Europe during the Cold War. It
shows up the course of the Iron Curtain. Today, Austria, Germany, and
Italy share a border with the former Communist countries in the center
of Europe.3 I this chapter, I focus my analysis on Austria and Germany
which were most aﬀected by the opening-up of Eastern Europe. Germany is
speciﬁcally aﬀected since the Iron Curtain divided the country internally in
East and West Germany. After the reuniﬁcation, Germany lies in the center
of the European market. On the other hand, Austria is fairly closely located
to Eastern Europe in terms of geography but also in terms of culture and
economic relations.
Beyond the former Iron Curtain, I consider the so-called Visegr´ ad group.
The Visegr´ ad group corresponds to the former Warsaw Pact countries; the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia which are all lying in Central
Europe.4 Central Europe denotes the region lying in the middle of Europe
between the vaguely deﬁned areas of Eastern and Western Europe.
After the end of the Cold War in 1990, the Eastern European countries
opened rapidly their economies to the world market. However, during the
division of Europe, the economic development of the East and the West was
strongly diverging. It results in an enormous welfare gap in the center of
Europe. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the border between Western and
Eastern Europe marks the frontier between two highly diﬀerently developed
regions. The GDP per capita of the new EU members reached 42.2 percent
of the average EU-15 level in 1995. This gap was closing to 47.4 percent
in 2002. Comparing the directly bordering countries, Austria and Germany,
with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia reveals a larger
gap of 39.0 percent in 1995 that closed rapidly to 46.8 percent in 2002.5
The economic gap in Central Europe is still striking along the former Iron
Curtain, although Eastern Europe is catching up recently.
3 Furthermore, Finland borders Russia in Northern Europe and Greece is a neighbor
country of the former Communist Bulgaria in the South-East.
4 The Visegr´ ad group originated in a summit held in the Hungarian city Visegr´ ad.
The governments of the four Central European countries agree to establish co-operation
in economic and political matters.
5 The numbers correspond to GDP per inhabitant in purchasing power parities. For
the calculation data from Eurostat online database are used.
150During the last decades or even centuries, a certain pattern of agglom-
eration of economic activity emerged in Western Europe. Economic activity
agglomerates along a banana-shaped axis running from London to Milan,
containing Belgium, Luxembourg, Eastern France, Western and Southern
Germany, and Northern Italy. It is called the ’Blue Banana’.6 This core
region proves to be the pole of growth and innovation of Western Europe.
Facing the uniﬁed Europe, the following question has arisen; is the existing
agglomeration persistent?
The Iron Curtain split Central Europe, a former integrated region, in
two parts for almost half a century. Thus, this period can be seen as a
natural experiment. As the theory of new economic geography suggests,
such shocks can produce persistent changes in spatial structure.7 Krugman
and Venables (1995) provide a model of agglomeration outcomes when two
countries integrate. At a certain level of trade costs, multiple equilibria are
sustainable. It means that economic activity could be dispersed over both
countries or agglomerated in one country. However, the country in which the
agglomeration takes place, depends on the initial market size. Thus, history
matters for the agglomeration of production.
What implications does it have on the current situation of Europe? Even
if the shock of the fall of the Iron Curtain is immense, the agglomeration along
the ’Blue Banana’ may be a sustainable equilibrium. However, if the opening-
up of Eastern Europe causes a weakening of ’old’ linkages, a new economic
geography could emerge in the center of Europe. Hospers (2003) states that
a ’Yellow Banana’ could be expected reaching from Paris to Warsaw. It
would connect Western and Eastern Europe and give rise to a new Central
Europe. However, statements beyond such speculations are a matter of time
and empirics.
Before considering the trends in spatial distribution of economic activity,
the next section outlines a theoretical model and related empirical literature.
The model of new economic geography explains the location of economic
activity inside a country facing an international economic integration.
6 According to Heidenreich’s (1998) outline of Europe’s history of cities and regions,
the ’Blue Banana’ dates back to Medieval or even Roman times. See also Hospers (2003).
7 See Krugman (1998) for an outline of the idea of ’new economic geography’.
1515.3 Economic Geography - Theoretical Back-
ground and Related Literature
In new economic geography models, spatial agglomerations usually involve
the existence of linkages. In the absence of interactions among economic
units, like persons or ﬁrms, no agglomeration would emerge in a world of pos-
itive transport costs. Inside a country, economic activity might concentrate
in individual regions. A region that oﬀers a large market for intermediate and
ﬁnal goods, appears more attractive for locating production. In a world of
positive transport costs, the geographical proximity to the purchasing power
matters. This demand eﬀect corresponds to the concept of backward linkage.
On the other hand, industry agglomeration in a region implies a large supply
of intermediate inputs. In order to avoid transport costs ﬁrms are attracted
to this region. The eﬀect of lower costs of production refers to the concept of
forward linkage.8 The interaction of increasing returns to scale and transport
costs creates a self-reinforcing process of industrial agglomeration.
The empirical considerations in the next section are based on the new geo-
graphy model of Krugman and Livas (1996).9 They provide a formal expla-
nation of the existence of large cities observed in Third World countries. Such
national industry agglomerations arise as a consequence of backward and for-
ward linkages in an economy in which ﬁrms serve a small domestic market.
Hence, they conclude that giant cities result from import-substitution policies
of those countries. Opening-up the economy to international trade leads to
the reorganization of the internal economic geography. The production will
disperse spatially since the orientation to foreign markets weakens national
linkages. This let Krugman and Livas (1996) conclude that international
trade aﬀects the internal economic geography of countries.
Hanson (1998) analyzes empirically the eﬀects of the NAFTA integration
on the location of economic activities in Canada, Mexico, and the United
States. He ﬁnds that Mexico experienced a dramatic expansion of manu-
8 See Krugman and Venables (1995) and Fujita et al (1999) for presenting the concept
of backward and forward linkage.
9 See also Fujita et al (1999), Chapter 18, for presenting Krugman and Livas’ (1996)
model.
152facturing employment in its northern regions which border the US. At the
same time the agglomeration of the employment in the previous economic
center Mexico City contracts. Moreover, Hanson (1998) states that the wage
premium for skills increased in the border regions facing the NAFTA integra-
tion. Contrary to the changes in Mexico, only the US cities on the Mexican
border show a signiﬁcant growth in employment. However, the distribution
of economic activities in the remaining US and Canadian regions remain
unaﬀected.
Br¨ ulhart et al (2006) explore the internal economic geographies of ﬁve
Central European EU countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slove-
nia, and Slovakia. They formulate a “Comecon hypothesis” according to
which the spatial distribution is strongly concentrated in the capital region.
However, foreign market of regions has played no systematic role in the cen-
trally planned economies of Eastern Europe. Br¨ ulhart et al (2006) ﬁnd em-
pirical evidence for their hypothesis. They state that wages are higher in
capital regions and service employment is strongly concentrated in those re-
gions. Furthermore, compared to EU-15 countries, the concentration in the
capital regions are signiﬁcantly stronger.
Furthermore, Lorentowicz (2006) ﬁnds for Poland strong evidence that
market-seeking FDIs locate in the capital region. In her investigation, she
distinguishes between vertical and horizontal FDIs and analyzes the deter-
minants of location in the case of Polish regions. She identiﬁes that export-
oriented investors choose low-wage regions which are at the same time rel-
atively well endowed with high-skilled labor. Furthermore, the empirical
results show that vertical FDIs tend to locate in western border regions of
Poland. Additionally, Lorentowicz (2006) provides a comprehensive overview
of existing empirical literature on location choice of multinational ﬁrms.
5.4 Agglomeration in Central Europe?
In order to explore the economic geography of the uniﬁed Central Europe,
I present recent trends in industry location in the following. Thereby I dis-
tinguish three types of regions inside each country to the West and East
153of the former Iron Curtain; border, capital, and other regions. In the case
of Austria and Germany, border regions correspond to regions neighboring
the Visegr´ ad countries. On the other hand, border regions in the new EU
members refer to regions bordering Austria and Germany.10
The internal spatial distributions shown below refer to employment of
the industry sector. The reason of why the location of service activities are
not taken into account, is related to the fundamental diﬀerence between ser-
vices and industry in locating. Usually, services establish in regions where
their customers are located since a large number of service activities are not
tradeable. Furthermore, some services like engineering, investment banking
and other high-skill activities, beneﬁt at most from economies of agglomer-
ation. Such positive agglomeration eﬀects occur particularly in the capital
area which corresponds to the economic center in relatively small Eastern
European economies. Furthermore, border regions provide a rather inade-
quate access to the local market but a good access to export markets. Thus,
the attractiveness of border regions is of only minor relevance for service
activities. In opposite to services, ﬁrms of the industrial sector appear to
be more mobile. They might respond to improved access to foreign mar-
kets by relocating production sites close to the border. In accordance with
this argumentation, I concentrate my analysis on the location of industry
employment. The next section considers the trends in Austria and Germany.
5.4.1 Austria’s and Germany’s Border Regions
Austria shares borders with the following former Communist countries; the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia. Table 5.1 displays the
distribution of Austrian industry employment across regions over the period
1991-2001. Since ﬁve out of nine Austrian NUTS 2 regions11 border next
to Eastern European countries, I use data at the more disaggregate level
of NUTS 3 in order to classify the districts into border, capital, and other
regions.
10 See the Appendix (A. Deﬁnition for distribution (Section 5.4)) for a detailed descrip-
tion of how regions are deﬁned.
11 The NUTS 2 regions correspond to Austrian “Bundesl¨ ander”.
154Table 5.1: Distribution of Industry Employment in Austria
distribution in percent of national industry employment
1991 1995 1998 2001
border regions 16.9 16.8 17.0 17.7
capital region 24.0 22.5 20.9 18.7
other regions 59.2 60.7 62.1 63.7
Notes: Regions are deﬁned according to NUTS 3. See Appendix for further details.
Source: Own calculations based on data from Statistics Austria.
The table suggests that Austria experienced a decentralization of its pro-
duction. It is striking that the employment shifted dramatically away from
Vienna towards border regions and western regions. The share of industry
employment in regions which border the new EU members has risen slightly
from 16.9 to 17.7 during the period of ten years under consideration. More-
over, the movement to western regions which border on Germany and Italy,
was more pronounced. It occurred mainly after 1995, the year of Austria’s
accession to the European Union. Therefore for Austria, it seems to be the
case that the eﬀect of the own accession dominates forces of agglomerating
at the border to Eastern Europe.
Table 5.2: Distribution of Industry Employment in Germany
distribution in percent of national industry employment
1991 1995 1998 2001
border regions 9.1 8.4 8.4 7.9
capital region 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.4
other regions 87.5 88.5 88.9 89.7
Notes: Regions are deﬁned according to NUTS 3. See Appendix for further details.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Federal Statistical Oﬃce of Germany.
Table 5.2 shows the geographic distribution of industry employment in
Germany for the years 1991-2001.12 As in the case of Austria, the employ-
ment shifted away from the capital region. Furthermore, also the relative
12 Using data on German districts at the NUTS 3 level, I declare districts which border
directly and indirectly to Poland and the Czech Republic as border regions. Germany is
broken down in 439 administrative districts.
155industry employment has diminished in border regions. Facing the tremen-
dous re-structuring in Eastern Germany, the changes in spatial distribution
appear only marginal.
However, a closer look at the case of Eastern Germany reveals a sub-
stantial shift towards regions which border Western Germany. In 2001, 17.8
percent of the Eastern German industry employment13 takes place in districts
at ’inner German border’, while it was only 14.1 in 1991. The employment in
Eastern German regions bordering Poland and the Czech Republic increased
slightly from 31.8 to 32.7 percent of total employment of the ’New L¨ ander’
but declined in percent of national employment from 7.1 to 5.7 during the
period 1991 and 2001. In the Western German border regions to the Czech
Republic, the agglomeration remains unchanged.14 While 12.9 percent of
the Bavarian industry employment was located in border regions in 1991,
ten years later it was with 12.8 percent almost the same.
It appears that the economic geography of both Western European coun-
tries is less aﬀected by opening-up of Eastern Europe. The European Com-
mission states that Western European border regions might even lose in the
short-run. However, they expect that those regions gain in the long-run due
to their central location.15
Why does the economic integration of Eastern and Western Europe have
no impacts on the agglomeration structure in Austria and Germany? First,
Eastern Europe plays only a minor, if increasing role as trading partner for
Austria and Germany. In 2002, 17.6 percent of Austria’s exports went to
Eastern Europe, while more than 60 percent were shipped to the EU-15
region. However, in the year 1989 when the Iron Curtain fell, only 9 percent
of exports ﬂowed to Eastern Europe. Germany is even less integrated with
Eastern Europe than Austria. However, the exports to this region grew from
6.9 percent in 1989 to 11.7 percent in 2003. At the same time, the exports
to other EU-15 countries are more than four-times as large.16 It seems to be
13 Excluding Berlin.
14 In Western Germany, only Bavaria borders directly on Eastern Europe.
15 See European Commission (2001) for an outline of the impacts of the Eastern EU-
enlargement on the Western European border regions.
16 The data are taken from the Statistical Yearbooks of Austria and Germany.
156obvious that the small size of Eastern Europe relative to the large market
of the pre-2004 European Union plays a crucial role. The trade orientation
implies that Austrian and German economic activity might be concentrated
rather in regions which border other EU-15 members. This is in line with
the mentioned ’Blue Banana’.
A second factor for the slight eﬀects on the industry location in Austria
and Germany might be the spatial pattern which established over decades.
The emerged economic geography appears to be stable since the agglomera-
tion forces are suﬃciently strong. The incentives for ﬁrms to relocate their
production sites to regions along the border with Eastern Europe are of less
importance. On the other hand, if they decide to move they will move the
production stages immediately oﬀshore to Eastern Europe.
5.4.2 New Agglomerations in Eastern Europe
During the era of Communism, the economy in Eastern Europe was centrally
planned. It also applied to the location of production. The transformation to
the market economic system accompanies with ﬁrms’ free choice of location.
Thus, the companies can now relocate their production according to new
opportunities of individual regions. Considering the relocation of existing
sites, Br¨ ulhart et al (2006) state that the shift towards regions with good
market access depends on the mobility of ﬁrms. However, a second factor that
might determine the geographic location of economic activity comes up; the
entrance of new ﬁrms. The Eastern European transition countries received
a tremendous amount of FDI inﬂow during the last 15 years. If foreign
multinationals enter the market by greenﬁeld investments, the impact on
the economic geography appears to be obvious. However, the acquisition of
existing companies might also inﬂuence the location of employment inside a
country. Presumingly, the new foreign owner might restructure the acquired
production site and adjust the capacity. Therefore, the opening up to foreign
investors might cause the emergence of new agglomerations.
Analogously to presenting changes in the spatial pattern of Austria and
Germany, this section takes a look at the location of industry employment
157in Eastern Europe. In doing so, I focus my analysis on the four Eastern
European transition countries which share a border with Western European
EU-15 members, Germany and Austria.17 They are Poland which borders on
Germany, and the Czech Republic which borders on Germany and Austria.
Additionally in the East, Slovakia and Hungary are neighbors of Austria.
Table 5.3 shows up the regional distribution of industry employment in
Poland for the period 1985 to 2001.18 From the table it becomes evident that
since 1989 the Polish industry employment reallocates towards the capital,
Warsaw. Surprisingly, the relative employment in western regions bordering
Germany declined from 15.3 percent in 1985 to 13.6 percent in 2001. During
the same period, employment taking place in the capital region increased
from 11.8 to 14.5 percent. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the spatial distri-
bution remained unchanged during the eighties when Poland’s economy was
centrally planned. This is in accordance with the idea of dynamic relocations
after the fall of the Communism.
Table 5.3: Distribution of Industry Employment in Poland
distribution in percent of national industry employment
1985 1989 1993 1997 2001
border regions 15.3 15.0 14.6 14.0 13.6
capital region 11.8 11.8 12.4 13.5 14.5
other regions 72.9 73.3 73.0 72.5 71.9
Notes: Regions are deﬁned according to NUTS 2. See Appendix for further details.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Central Statistical Oﬃce of Poland.
How has the geographic distribution changed in other transition coun-
tries? Table 5.4 shows the trends in the Czech Republic. During the past
ten years, the regional pattern of industry employment has altered consider-
ably. In 1991, the regions which border Austria and Germany, accounted for
17 Slovenia is not taken into account in the investigation due to its relative small country
size. The NUTS classiﬁcation of regions does not allow to distinguish suﬃciently many
regions.
18 It draws on data of NUTS 2 regions which I classify as border, capital and other
regions. See the Appendix (A. Deﬁnition for distribution (Section 5.4)) for a detailed
description of how regions are deﬁned for the four Visegr´ ad countries.
15834 percent of the Czech industry employment. Ten years later, Czech border
regions host with over 39 percent substantially more of the national indus-
try employment. Also the other regions gained slightly, while the industry
employment in the capital area dropped dramatically.
Table 5.4: Distribution of Industry Employment in the Czech Republic
distribution in percent of national industry employment
1991 1995 1999 2001
border regions 34.0 38.4 39.5 39.4
capital region 12.3 6.0 5.7 5.3
other regions 53.7 55.6 54.8 55.4
Notes: Regions are deﬁned according to NUTS 2. See Appendix for further details.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Czech Statistical Oﬃce.
For Slovakia, the investigation on the impact of international integration
on internal location is somewhat complicated due to the geographical location
of the capital city, Bratislava. Slovakia’s capital region is simultaneously a
border region. Table 5.5 provides the spatial trends in industry employment
between 1990 and 2002. Apparently, the industry agglomeration shifted to
the west during the last thirteen years. Together, the border and capital
region gained almost ﬁve percentage points of relative employment.
Table 5.5: Distribution of Industry Employment in Slovakia
distribution in percent of national industry employment
1990 1994 1998 2002
border region 9.2 8.9 10.0 10.3
capital region 37.3 37.9 39.1 41.0
other regions 53.5 53.2 50.9 48.8
Notes: Regions are deﬁned according to NUTS 2. See Appendix for further details.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Statistical Oﬃce of the Slovak Re-
public.
Finally, Table 5.6 shows the geographic distribution of the Hungarian
industry employment over the period 1985 to 2001. Apparently, the employ-
ment shifted broadly away from the capital area towards regions which border
159on Austria. Between 1989 and 2001, the share of employment located in the
border regions increased rapidly by ﬁve percentage points to 15.6 percent in
2001. Again, the stable distribution before 1989 illustrates the impact of the
international opening-up on the internal location of production.
Table 5.6: Distribution of Industry Employment in Hungary
distribution in percent of national industry employment
1985 1989 1993 1997 2001
border regions 10.1 10.5 12.8 14.9 15.6
capital region 29.1 28.0 25.4 21.6 22.5
other regions 60.8 61.4 61.8 63.6 62.0
Notes: Regions are deﬁned according to NUTS 2. See Appendix for further details.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Hungarian Central Statistical Oﬃce.
In summary, the opening-up of Eastern Europe aﬀected the spatial dis-
tribution of economic activity in the transition countries remarkably. In all
Visegr´ ad countries except Poland, the location of industry shifted towards
regions bordering the EU-15. It indicates that a new agglomeration in Cen-
tral Europe might emerge. According to the predictions of Krugman and
Livas’ (1996) model, the agglomeration shifted away from the capital re-
gion. However, there is one exception, Poland, where the opposite occurred.
While moving away from border and other regions, production agglomerates
increasingly in the capital there. The most important diﬀerence between
Poland and the other countries of the Visegr´ ad group, is its size.19 Relative
to the foreign market, the domestic market is more important than in the
clearly smaller economies. This fact corresponds to the small trade ratio of
Poland. In 2003, the share of combined imports and exports in GDP was 51
percent in Poland and distinctly more than 100 percent in the other Visegr´ ad
countries.20
At the same time, the spatial structure of production in the EU-15 regions
which border the East shows no clear evidence of shifting towards the new
19 Poland alone has 38.2 million inhabitants and is, thus, almost 50 percent larger than
the other three Visegr´ ad countries together.
20 The numbers (for 2003) refer to own calculations using data from IMF, IFS database.
160members of the European Union. The result is in line with ﬁndings of other
studies. As outlined above, Hanson (1998) states for the NAFTA integration
only less eﬀects on the economic geography of the USA and Canada, while
in Mexico the distribution shifts substantially away from the capital towards
regions bordering on the US.
In the remaining of the chapter, I concentrate my analysis on foreign
subsidiaries in the Visgr´ ad countries owned by Austrian and German multi-
national ﬁrms. The employed data are taken from a unique ﬁrm survey
among Austrian and German investors. Section 5.6 provides a description of
the data.
5.5 The Role of FDI - Economic Geography
of Austrian and German FDI in Eastern
Europe
Eastern Europe experienced a tremendous inﬂow of FDI since the fall of
the Iron Curtain. Especially, the new EU members host a large part of
this capital transfer. However, the geographical pattern of the origin of FDI
diﬀers across the host countries. What role do the two neighboring Western
European countries Austria and Germany play?
Table 5.7 displays the relative importance of each six largest investor
countries for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. The table
indicates that both Austria and Germany play an important role in all those
four countries. Together, Austrian and German investors can account for 24
percent in Poland to 45 percent in Slovakia of incoming FDIs from all over
the world. Relative to its size, Austria’s multinationals are strongly present
in three out of four countries considered. However in Poland, Austrian in-
vestments play an only minor role. This might be the case because Poland
does not border on Austria and, furthermore, Austria’s historic ties are much
stronger with the other Visegr´ ad countries. It is notable that Netherlands’
161importance as investor is comparable to that of Austria while having similar
country size.
Table 5.7: FDI Inward Stocks by Country
distribution in percent
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia
Netherlands 29.0 Germany 22.2 Netherlands 22.5 Germany 26.2
Germany 28.3 Austria 18.7 Germany 20.2 Austria 19.0
Austria 10.3 Netherlands 15.7 USA 11.6 Netherlands 15.9
USA 6.5 USA 10.3 France 10.8 Czech Rep. 7.8
France 5.2 France 5.8 Italy 5.3 USA 6.8
Belgium 3.7 Belgium 4.2 Austria 3.7 Hungary 2.5
Notes: The numbers show FDI stocks averaged over 1996 (Hungary: 1992, Czech Re-
public: 1997) and 2000. Belgium corresponds to Belgium and Luxembourg.
Source: Own calculations based on data from UNCTAD World Investment Directory,
Central and Eastern Europe 2003.
5.5.1 Geography of FDI Locations
The question that I examine in the empirical analysis is whether FDIs are
randomly distributed across the surface of the host country. How does the
geographic pattern of the location of foreign aﬃliates look like? Are there
agglomerations observable? And where are such agglomerations located?
The view of the distribution of foreign-owned ﬁrms compared to the gen-
eral spatial distribution of ﬁrms gives a ﬁrst idea of the location of foreign
aﬃliates across regions inside the four Visegr´ ad states. In Hungarian border
regions, 23 percent of all ﬁrms are owned by foreign multinational companies.
This share is almost twice as large as the share in other non-capital regions.
However, also in the capital region, relatively many foreign subsidiaries are
located. In Budapest, one ﬁfth of all incorporated ﬁrms are foreign-owned.21
Comparable patterns can be found in all Visegr´ ad countries. In Poland, the
diﬀerences are less pronounced across regions. However, the Polish regions
21 The numbers refer to the year 2000. They are calculated by using data from the
Statistical Yearbook of Hungary.
162bordering on Germany, show with 34 percent a higher import penetration
than the other Polish regions, including Warsaw.22
Notes: The spots indicate the location of Austrian aﬃliates in Visegr´ ad countries. The
size of the spots corresponds to the number of aﬃliates agglomerated at one place.
Source: Own calculations based on data from ﬁrm survey of 2200 investment projects in
Eastern Europe by 660 ﬁrms, Chair of International Economics, University of Munich.
Figure 5.2: Location of Austrian Aﬃliates
Figure 5.2 maps the locations of foreign aﬃliates owned by Austrian ﬁrms
in the four Visegr´ ad countries. The red spots present graphically the loca-
tion of 616 Austrian subsidiaries of the service and industry sector. At the
ﬁrst view, it appears that the location choice is not random, neither across
countries nor inside countries. The largest spots in each country mark the
agglomerations in the respective capital area. Can there any other patterns
be detected? A closer look reveals that the foreign activities of Austrian
22 The share of foreign ﬁrms in total ﬁrms refers to 2001, calculated on data from the
Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland.
163companies accumulate in border regions. However, it seems to be crucial
whether the region borders on Germany or Austria. Only the direct border
to Austria appears to have a positive impact. The density of subsidiaries
located in regions of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary which share
a border with Austria is striking. Particularly, the investments in Hungary
show very low spatial dispersion. The establishments are concentrated in
Budapest and close to the western border. These statements are in general
also valid for German investments, as Figure 5.3 indicates.
Notes: The spots indicate the location of German aﬃliates in Visegr´ ad countries. The
size of the spots corresponds to the number of aﬃliates agglomerated at one place.
Source: Own calculations based on data from ﬁrm survey of 2200 investment projects in
Eastern Europe by 660 ﬁrms, Chair of International Economics, University of Munich.
Figure 5.3: Location of German Aﬃliates
The map of Figure 5.3 depicts the location of 775 German subsidiaries in
the four Visegr´ ad countries. Compared to the location of Austrian aﬃliates,
the pattern appears more dispersed. Moreover, German multinationals tend
164to establish their aﬃliates mainly in the Czech Republic and regions in Poland
and Slovakia which border on the Czech Republic. The spatial pattern of
German FDIs in Poland might foremost inﬂuenced by the history. Before the
end of the World War II, Germans were settled in the Poland’s south-western
region, Silesia.
Strikingly, there are no German aﬃliates located in the Czech regions bor-
dering Austria. Furthermore, the spatial pattern for Hungary indicates what
role does the nationality of the owner play. While Austrian FDIs concentrate
highly in the region bordering Austria, German subsidiaries agglomerate in
Budapest and in the northern area of Hungary.23
The maps have shown that FDIs tend to locate on the one hand in capitals
and on the other hand in regions bordering Germany and Austria, respec-
tively. However, the inspection has revealed that the country of investors’
origin inﬂuences substantially the location choice. Hence, only the direct
border matters and not the fact if the region borders the EU-15 market.
5.5.2 Intra-Firm Linkages
If the new economic geography theory proves to be true, backward and for-
ward linkages should play a dominant role in the location decision. Usually,
the linkages refer to interactions among local ﬁrms or markets. In the fol-
lowing analysis, I deﬁne backward and forward linkages as relations between
parent and foreign aﬃliate ﬁrm. While forward linkages correspond to in-
puts shipped from the parent ﬁrm to the foreign aﬃliate for re-processing,
backward linkages are related to the aﬃliate’s output delivered to the parent
ﬁrm for re-processing or marketing.24
The intra-ﬁrm linkages are related to the motivation for investing abroad.
The theoretical literature distinguishes two broad types of foreign direct in-
vestment; horizontally and vertically motivated FDI. While the former refers
23 Those regions where Austrian and German subsidiaries agglomerate attract also much
FDI from other countries. Thus, Boudier-Bensebaa (2005) states for total FDIs to Hungary
that they agglomerate in western and northern regions.
24 Protsenko (2004) and Hauser (2006) deﬁne vertical backward and forward FDIs in a
similar way. Protsenko (2004) explores the question whether horizontal and vertical FDIs
have diﬀerent impacts on the Czech economy, see Protsenko (2004) Chapter 5.
165to international engagement in order to serve foreign local markets, the lat-
ter aims to take advantage of international diﬀerentials in production costs.25
Vertical FDI corresponds to fragmentation of the production process when
locating separate production stages in diﬀerent countries. This type of FDI
implies intra-ﬁrm trade.
The starting point of my analysis is the inﬂuence of those diﬀerent types
of foreign engagement on the location decision. In the case of vertical FDIs,
intra-ﬁrm trade between the parent ﬁrm and the foreign aﬃliate can take
place in form of forward or backward linkages. Both linkages are aﬄicted
with transport costs. When parent and aﬃliate are linked forwardly and
backwardly at the same time, they are burden twice by transport costs.
Thus, minimizing transport costs is crucial for vertical FDIs. Border regions
oﬀer the best opportunity to reduce the distance between parent ﬁrm and
foreign subsidiary.




border regions 44.9 42.2 35.2
capital region 15.0 11.5 40.3
other regions 35.9 30.9 33.5
Notes: The numbers show average values over Austrian and German aﬃliates in the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia; referring to the industry sector.
Variables are deﬁned as follows: export share = (aﬃliate’s output exported/aﬃliate’s
output)*100; backward linkage = (aﬃliate’s output shipped to parent ﬁrm for re-
processing or marketing/aﬃliate’s output)*100; forward linkage = (aﬃliate’s inputs
delivered from parent ﬁrm/aﬃliate’s total inputs)*100.
Source: Own calculations based on data from ﬁrm survey of 2200 investment projects in
Eastern Europe by 660 ﬁrms, Chair of International Economics, University of Munich.
Table 5.8 displays the export and outsourcing orientation of Austrian
and German FDIs in the Visegr´ ad countries. The numbers suggest that
there are substantial diﬀerences between the type of regions. It is striking
25 The theory of horizontal FDI model the interaction between trade costs and ﬁrm-
level economies of scale, see Markusen (1984) and Brainard (1993). On the other hand,
Helpman and Krugman (1985) provide a formalization of the idea of vertical FDI. See
Protsenko (2004) for an enlightening discussion of both phenomena.
166that foreign aﬃliates in border regions export with 45 percent of their output
more than aﬃliates in other non-capital regions. Compared to subsidiaries
located in the capital, they export actually triple of their output.26 A similar
picture emerges when considering the backward linkage. It indicates that
a large share of exports is shipped to the parent company in Austria and
Germany. Inspecting forward linkages, it appears that the diﬀerences are
less pronounced, while aﬃliates in the capital receive the most inputs from
their parents abroad.
Overall, the picture suggests that FDIs in border region are substantially
more vertical orientated. This becomes true, especially, when comparing
FDIs in border and capital regions. The regression analysis in the next
section will show whether the diﬀerence across regions are statistically sig-
niﬁcant. Furthermore, it will reveal if the export and outsourcing-orientation
of FDIs can explain the location choice.
5.6 Determinants of FDI Locations -
An Econometric Analysis
In this section, I examine empirically the characteristics of ﬁrms which deter-
mine the location of a foreign direct investment. When the investment takes
place in a border or capital region, what are the respective characteristics of
the parent ﬁrm? And on the other hand, which types of investments take
place in these region? I will employ an estimation technique with a binary
dependent variable corresponding to the chosen region. Before presenting
the estimation results, I describe brieﬂy the data under consideration.
The following investigation concentrates on the location decision from a
parent company’s point of view concerning foreign aﬃliates. It is assumed
that the Austrian and German investors decide in a ﬁrst stage which kind of
activities they intend to operate abroad. As comprehensively described by
theoretical models, ﬁrms undertake direct investments in foreign countries on
26 It is true although only industry investments are taken into account and FDIs in the
service sector are excluded.
167the one hand in order to gain access to new local markets and on the other
hand to exploit diﬀerences in production costs by outsourcing.
In a second step, the ﬁrms make a decision where to locate a new foreign
aﬃliate. In which country and at the same time in which region? For some
investments the decision about the region might dominate the decision about
the country. For example, the location decision of many service ﬁelds like
business consultancy, investment banking, or headquarters of subsidiaries
might be deﬁnitely the capital of each country. Companies of such sectors
are looking only for sites in capitals independently on the individual country.
On the other hand, ﬁrms which intend to ship inputs and output within the
ﬁrm might locate close to the border to avoid transportation costs.
It is a well-known fact that the Eastern European countries received
tremendous FDI inﬂows after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The empirical
literature on determinants of capital inﬂows focuses mainly on the distribu-
tion of FDIs across the transition countries. However, there is less empirical
evidence, particularly at the level of ﬁrms, on the geographical distribution of
FDIs within countries. Are they located systematically in individual regions
inside a country? What factors do determine such a pattern of unequally
distributed locations?
Data
The data sample consists of unique ﬁrm-level information on investment
projects in Eastern European transition economies. The data relate on 2200
investment projects which were undertaken by 660 Austrian and German
multinational ﬁrms during the period 1989 to 2001. The survey among Ger-
man and Austrian investors has been conducted by the Chair of Interna-
tional Economics at the University of Munich. Since the survey is almost
a full population sample, the data set is highly representative for German
and Austrian investments in this region.27 The cross-sectional data set com-
27 As Marin (2004) states, in terms of investment value the 1200 German investment
projects of the sample represent 80 percent of total German FDI in Eastern Europe. The
1000 investment projects undertaken by Austrian ﬁrms represent actually 100 percent of
engagement of Austria’s economy in Central and Eastern Europe. See Marin (2004) and
Marin et al (2003) for a detailed description of the data.
168prises information on the Western European investors and on the aﬃliates
in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the sample provides information on the
interaction between parent and aﬃliate ﬁrm.
Empirical Results
In order to identify the determinants of the location decision of ﬁrms I es-
timate the probability of that an investor locates its aﬃliate in a region
which borders on the parent’s country. The starting point of my analysis
is the inﬂuence of two diﬀerent types of foreign engagement, vertical and
horizontal FDIs, on the location decision. Particularly, vertical FDIs which
generate intra-ﬁrm trade, are aﬄicted by transport costs. The intra-ﬁrm
trade between the parent ﬁrm and the foreign aﬃliate can take place in form
of forward and backward linkages. I estimate the following equation using a
probit regression:28
Borderi = β0 + β1BackwardLinkagei + β2ForwardLinkagei +
β3WEp + β4EEa + β5Y ear + ui (5.1)
where i is the cross section unit, the individual aﬃliate ﬁrm. Border denotes
the dependent binary variable. It takes the parameter value one when the
aﬃliate is located in a border region and zero when the location is somewhere
else in the four countries under consideration. Besides the two intra-ﬁrm
variables, Backward and Forward Linkage, the dummy variable WEa is
included which indicates if the investor comes from Austria or Germany
p = A,D. Furthermore, the discrete variable EEa corresponds to the Eastern
European host country (a = CZ,HU,PL,SK). Both country variables are
included to control for characteristics of the investor’s country and the host
country of the aﬃliates. Additionally, the linear time trend Y ear takes into
account the year of building up the foreign aﬃliate. It ranges from 1989 to
2001. The employed sample comprises data on about 1300 subsidiaries29 in
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia owned by Austrian and
28 I estimated all following speciﬁcations also with OLS regressions. The probit and
OLS results appear, however, fairly similar.
29 Due to missing values, the exact number of observations depends on the variables
included in the respective speciﬁcation.
169German companies. The investments take place in the industry and service
sector.
Table 5.9: intra-ﬁrm Linkages and Location of FDIs in Border Regions
dependent variable: border region dummy (=1 if border region, =0 otherwise)
(1) (2) (3)
Backward Linkage 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)




Constant -56.789** -70.523** -71.318**
(26.279) (27.451) (28.124)
Pseudo R2 0.075 0.075 0.102
N 1336 1230 1230
Notes: Coeﬃcients are estimated by probit regressions; dummies for investor country
(Austria or Germany) and host countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia)
are included but not reported; additionally, a linear time trend for date of investment
is included but not reported; *** (**) [*] indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 (5) [10] percent
level; standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity; N denotes number
of observations; sample consists of service and industry subsidiaries.
Variables are deﬁned as follows: backward linkage = (aﬃliate’s output shipped to parent
ﬁrm for re-processing or marketing/aﬃliate’s output)*100; forward linkage = (aﬃliate’s
inputs delivered from parent ﬁrm/aﬃliate’s total inputs)*100; industry dummy = dummy
variable corresponding to aﬃliate’s sector (=1 if industry, =0 if services).
Table 5.9 reports the results of backward and forward linkages as explana-
tory factors of the location decision. In speciﬁcation (1) the border dummy
is regressed solely on the backward linkage variable. The highly statistically
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient indicates that aﬃliates with strong backward linkages
to the parent ﬁrm clearly tend to be located close to the border between
Western and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the co-
eﬃcient on the included linear time trend is statistically signiﬁcant in all
speciﬁcations. The positive sign suggests that the foreign investors increased
their engagement in border region relative to other places over time.
170Column (2) shows the results when including both backward and forward
linkages. While the coeﬃcient on the backward linkage remains unchanged,
the coeﬃcient on the forward linkage is negatively and signiﬁcant at the
ten percent level. It indicates that subsidiaries in the border region receive
less inputs from the Western European parent ﬁrm than aﬃliates located
in other regions. However, the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on the forward
linkage measured in percent of inputs is smaller than that of the backward
linkage which is deﬁned as percentage share of output.
What role do sectoral characteristics play? The impact of intra-ﬁrm trade
on locating might diﬀer substantially between the industry and service sec-
tor. The intra-ﬁrm exports and imports in the service sector is characterized
by immaterial transfers which cause only negligible physical transportation
costs. However, shipping industry goods between the domestic and foreign
production site generates substantial transportation costs. Therefore, speci-
ﬁcation (3) in Table 5.9 controls for those diﬀerences by including an industry
dummy. It does not aﬀect the result on the backward linkage, while the coef-
ﬁcient on the forward linkage gets insigniﬁcant. It implies that subsidiaries in
border regions are signiﬁcantly more strongly tied to their owner in Austrian
and Germany than subsidiaries located in other regions also when controlling
for the broad sector. However, this linkage occurs only on the export side of
aﬃliate output and not on the input side of intra-ﬁrm trade. Thus, backward
linkages appear to be more important. The reason might be that the value of
goods shipped back to parent ﬁrm is higher than the inputs which the aﬃliate
receives from the parent ﬁrm. It is the case because the foreign production
site in Eastern Europe adds value on the delivered inputs. Therefore, trans-
port costs and consequently the importance of locating close to the parent’s
country is of higher relevance for the re-processed intra-ﬁrm trade, namely
the backward linkage. The positive and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the
binary variable Industry Dummy suggests that mainly investment projects
of the industry sector are concentrated in the border regions. It emphasizes
the low importance of the distance between the parent and the aﬃliate ﬁrm
in the case of the service sector. A look at the descriptive statistics conﬁrms
this view.




Industry 28.8 27.3 43.9 729
Services 12.2 73.4 14.4 662
Notes: Industry sector corresponds to the production of goods classiﬁed according to
SITC and Services correspond to non-SITC activities; N denotes number of aﬃliates.
Source: Own calculations based on data from ﬁrm survey of 2200 investment projects
in Eastern Europe by 660 ﬁrms, Chair of International Economics, University of Mu-
nich.
Table 5.10 displays the distribution of the investment projects over bor-
der, capital, and other regions when distinguishing between aﬃliates of the
industry and services sector. It appears at the ﬁrst glance that the geo-
graphical patterns diﬀer substantially between the two broad sectors. In the
industry sector 29 percent of the subsidiaries owned by Austrian and Ger-
man companies are located in border regions and slightly less in the region of
the respective capital; Prague in the Czech Republic, Budapest in Hungary,
Warsaw in Poland, and Bratislava in Slovakia. While aﬃliates belonging to
the industry sector are roughly equally distributed across border and capital
regions, services are apparently highly agglomerated in capital regions. Al-
most three quarters of Austrian and German subsidiaries in the four new EU
members are located in the political and economic center of the respective
country. However, only 12 percent of the foreign aﬃliates in the service sec-
tor are located in border regions. Considering each host country separately
shows that in Hungary the service FDIs of Austrian and German investors
are at most concentrated in the capital. Thus, 88 percent of foreign direct
investment in the service sector ﬂow to Budapest. On the other hand, the
Polish capital Warsaw receives only 61 percent of service FDIs. In the case of
the industry sector, 42 percent of the investments of Austrian and German
ﬁrms in the Czech Republic go to regions which border on EU-15 members.
However, comparisons across countries have to be taken with caution since
they depend highly on the deﬁnition of border and capital regions. Since
the pattern appears to be dramatically heterogeneous between the industry
and services sector, the determinants of locating might also diﬀer. Further-
172more, because of the marginal role of service branches in border regions, I
will concentrate the further empirical investigation on the industry sector.
Table 5.11 provides the results of a more detailed analysis of the inﬂuences
of trade related features of the subsidiaries on the location decision. As in all
following estimations, the sample is restricted to subsidiaries of the industry
sector. Outsourcing activities can be measured in diﬀerent ways. However,
most of these measures appear to be correlated at the level of subsidiaries. For
example, the export share of a subsidiary and the intra-ﬁrm shipments to the
parent ﬁrm are by deﬁnition correlated. Therefore, I include the explanatory
variables in Table 5.11 mutually. Column (1)-(4) examine the probability of
investing in a border region versus any other region of the Visegr´ ad countries
as in the preceding regressions. However, as already seen when considering
the service sector, the capital region is characterized by special features which
might also be the case in the industry sector. Therefore, in column (5)-(8)
only subsidiaries located in non-capital regions are taken into account. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of locating the production
site in a border region versus another region except the capital region.
The coeﬃcient on Backward Linkage in column (1) corresponds to the
result reported in Table 5.9. Thus, the result does not depend on the service
or industry sector. As the coeﬃcient on the explanatory variable in the
second speciﬁcation shows, the inputs shipped from the parent to the aﬃliate
ﬁrm plays no role in the location decision. However, in speciﬁcation (3), the
export orientation of the subsidiary has a strongly positive inﬂuence on the
location decision in favor of border regions. The coeﬃcient is statistically
signiﬁcant at the one percent level and of the same magnitude as that of
the backward linkage in column (1). Furthermore, the export share can be
disaggregated according to destination. Column (4) reports the estimation
results for exports to the respective parent country, Austria or Germany, and
the EU-15 region excluding the parent country. It appears that the investors
prefer border regions as location for subsidiaries which export a substantial
part of their output to both the parent country and other countries of the
EU-15. The result implies that not only intra-ﬁrm linkages are an important
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































174The last four speciﬁcations of Table 5.11 highlight the robustness of these
ﬁndings when comparing border regions with non-capital regions which might
be more homogeneous than the capital region. In this restricted sample, the
results on the export orientation seems to be mainly driven by intra-ﬁrm
exports, as the insigniﬁcant diﬀerence between border and other non-capital
region shows concerning the exports to other EU-15 countries. Moreover, the
coeﬃcient on Forward Linkage in column (6) indicates that the delivering
of the inputs from the parent to the aﬃliate ﬁrm favors a location in the
border region compared to other regions except the capital.
The ﬁndings of the table suggest that the access to foreign markets, par-
ticularly the EU-15, plays an important role in locating foreign owned pro-
duction sites in regions neighboring “old” Europe. Since the border regions
in the transition countries are at the same time regions in the center of Eu-
rope they oﬀer an excellent place to export the output to other European
countries. Thus, they exhibit an favorable combination of the feature of a
good market access to countries with high purchasing power and the feature
of low production cost.
In the next table, I take a look at further characteristics of the subsidiaries
which are decisive for establishing production sites in border regions. Besides
intra-ﬁrm relations in form of trade, the employed technology and skills might
diﬀer across foreign subsidiaries in individual regions. In column (1) and
(2), two diﬀerent measures of technology address this question. The dummy
variable Technology captures how easy the utilized technology can be copied.
It takes the value one when the technology is only hard or not possible to
copy and zero otherwise. HC Intensity proxies the human capital intensity
of the aﬃliate’s production process by the share of employees with college or
university degree in total employment. The coeﬃcients on both variables are
highly statistically signiﬁcant and negative. It implies that technologically
more advanced production stages tend to settle down not in border regions.
175Table 5.12: Characteristics and Motives of Austrian and German Aﬃliates in Border Re-
gions
dependent variable: border region dummy (=1 if border region, =0 otherwise)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
















Constant -37.228 31.922 -17.611 -26.263 27.180 -58.469
(36.297) (84.314) (37.390) (37.819) (52.011) (36.582)
Adj. R2 0.078 0.101 0.081 0.086 0.058 0.102
N 664 134 639 639 296 701
Notes: Coeﬃcients are estimated by probit regressions; dummies for investor country (Austria or
Germany) and host countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) are included but not
reported; additionally, a linear time trend for date of investment is included but not reported; ***
(**) [*] indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 (5) [10] percent level; standard errors in parentheses are robust
to heteroscedasticity; N denotes number of observations; sample consists of industry subsidiaries.
Variables are deﬁned as follows: technology = dummy variable corresponding to aﬃliate’s technol-
ogy (=1 if hardly or non copyable technology, =0 if easily copyable technology); HC intensity =
(aﬃliate’s employees with college or university degree/aﬃliate’s total employment)*100; local for-
eign suppliers = importance of local presence of foreign suppliers, ranked by investor between 5
(decisive) and 1 (not at all important); relocation = dummy variable, =1 if investment is relocation
of existing capacity, =0 if investment is capacity expansion or new product line; decision powerp−a
= distribution of decision power between parent and aﬃliate ﬁrm, ranked by investor between 1
(decision taken by parent ﬁrm) and 5 (decision taken by aﬃliate ﬁrm); labor costs = importance of
labor costs as investment motive, ranked by investor between 5 (decisive) and 1 (not at all impor-
tant); market access = importance of local market access as investment motive, ranked by investor
between 5 (decisive) and 1 (not at all important); transport costs = importance of transport costs
as investment motive, ranked by investor between 5 (decisive) and 1 (not at all important).
176In speciﬁcation (3), Local Foreign Suppliers is included additionally to
Technology. The variable reﬂects the importance of agglomeration of foreign
ﬁrm in a speciﬁc region. The coeﬃcient estimate suggests that the presence
of other foreign ﬁrms which provide inputs for the own aﬃliate, is decisive
for investors which choose the border region as location. It implies that
establishing foreign aﬃliates in the border region creates a self-reinforcement
process of industry agglomeration. The process might result in the emergence
of a new Central Europe.
The positive coeﬃcient on Relocation in column (4) indicates that those
investments locate in border regions which move existing production abroad.
It is in line with the idea that mainly outsourcing FDIs take place in Central
European border regions. At the same time, it conﬁrms the result on tech-
nology that subsidiaries in border regions do not fabricate very innovative
products.
How are parent and aﬃliate ﬁrms linked besides intra-ﬁrm trade? Decision
Powerp−a captures the degree of centralization of decision making. Deci-
sions can be made by the parent ﬁrm or the foreign aﬃliate can decide au-
tonomously. The variable takes the value one if all decisions are centralized
at the parent ﬁrm and ﬁve if the aﬃliate makes all decisions. On average
the variable takes the value 2.95 which means that the decision power is
equally distributed between parent and aﬃliate ﬁrm. It reveals that the
subsidiaries of Austrian ﬁrms are slightly more centralized than German for-
eign subsidiaries.30 The coeﬃcient estimate on Decision Powerp−a suggests
that subsidiaries in border regions are more hierarchical organized than sub-
sidiaries in other regions. The Austrian and German parent ﬁrm holds more
decision power compared to aﬃliates in non-border regions. Again it empha-
sizes the outsourcing character of FDIs located in regions in Eastern Europe
bordering on Austria and Germany. Since the purpose of this kind of in-
vestment is priorly to take advantage of low production cost, it can be done
without workers’ initiative.31
30 See Marin and Verdier (2005). They ﬁnd that Austrian ﬁrms are in general more
hierarchical organized than German ﬁrms.
31 See Marin and Verdier (2003a, 2003b) who approach the relationship between hier-
archical organization and workers’ initiative.
177In the last speciﬁcation of Table 5.12, I consider what role the moti-
vation for investing in Eastern Europe does play in the location decision.
The three parameters, Labor Costs, Market Access, and Transport Costs,
reﬂect qualitative evaluations of the investors’ motives. While labor costs
driven FDIs take place in border regions, market seeking investments do not.
The positive sign on Transport Costs suggests that subsidiaries which are
transport costs intensive, locate in border regions. The border location al-
lows to minimizes costs of transportation when importing intermediates or
exporting manufactured goods. All three motive variables highlight the ver-
tical character of investments established in border regions.
Up to now, I considered Austria and Germany as one region and con-
trolled for diﬀerences by including a country dummy. In order to evaluate
diﬀerences in the location decision between the two Western European coun-
tries, I will break down the sample in Austrian and German investors. For
the sample of the Austrian parent ﬁrms, I take into account only investments
in the directly bordering Eastern European countries, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Slovakia. As border regions are deﬁned the regions of those three
countries which share a border with Austria. Analogously, the sample of
German investors comprises only subsidiaries in the Czech Republic and
Poland. I undertake the same probit regressions for aﬃliates owned by Aus-
trian multinationals and German multinationals. The results on the former
are reported in the left panel (column (1)-(6)) of Table 5.13, while the last
six columns refer to German aﬃliates in Eastern Europe.
The coeﬃcients in the ﬁrst two columns for the Austrian and the German
sample look very similar and conﬁrm the results of Table 5.9. Indicating, both
the backward linkage and the export orientation towards the parent country
have a signiﬁcantly positive impact on the location decision in favor of bor-
der regions. However, the eﬀects are more signiﬁcant in the case of German
investors. The export orientation towards other EU-15 countries is positive
for both countries yet insigniﬁcant for Austria and only slightly signiﬁcant



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































179Concerning the technology variable in column (3) and (9), respectively, it
reveals that only the German subsidiaries operate in the border regions with
signiﬁcantly more conventional technology. Moreover, the result in column
(4) indicates that the Austrian parent ﬁrms hold signiﬁcantly more decision
power in the case of foreign aﬃliates located in border regions. Among
other factors, it reﬂects the geographical proximity of many Austrian ﬁrms
to Eastern European border regions. It allows the centralization of decisions
combined with an intensive monitoring. In opposite to the Austrian case, the
coeﬃcient in column (10) is positive yet not signiﬁcant in the case of German
investors. One explanation could be the geographical distance between the
German economic centers and the border regions. Thus, the relative closeness
of border regions compared to others seems to be negligible.
The estimates on the coeﬃcients on Relocation and Expansion conﬁrm
the fact that FDIs in border regions are mainly relocations of existing pro-
duction sites of the investor. The negative sign on the variable of expanding
the capacity mirrors the results on the relocation variable. Although the
direction of the eﬀects is the same in both countries, only the estimates for
Germany are statistically signiﬁcant.
Finally, Austrian and German FDIs diﬀer also with respect to the time
structure. While the signiﬁcant and positive linear time trend in the case of
German subsidiaries indicates that German investors tend to increase their
engagement in border regions over time, it is the other way around concerning
Austrian investors.
Summing up, the country where the investor is from matters for the loca-
tion decision. As the results in Table 5.13 show, the behavior where to locate
the subsidiary diﬀers strikingly between Austrian and German investors with
respect to the degree of innovation of the relocated production and the cen-
tralization of decisions.
180So far, I looked at the determinants of establishing subsidiaries in border
regions. However, what factors do induce investors to locate production sites
in the capital of a country? I mentioned that service activities are highly
agglomerated in the capital region. However, why are ﬁrms of the industry
sector investing there? In order to answer this question, I replace the border
dummy variable as dependent variable with a dummy variable indicating if
the subsidiary is located in the capital region versus somewhere else. Table
5.14 reports the results on the probit regressions. The estimates mirror the
results on the border region regressions. Moreover, all coeﬃcients appear
highly signiﬁcant. The results indicate that foreign production sites located
in capitals export substantially less of their output to the parent ﬁrm and, in
general, to foreign countries. Surprisingly, the intra-ﬁrm linkage concerning
shipping inputs from the parent ﬁrm to the aﬃliate ﬁrm is positively related
to the location in the capital. Furthermore, the table shows that the coeﬃ-
cients on all three investment motives take the opposite sign as in the case of
the border regression. Thus, low labor costs and transport costs play a minor
role for investments in the capital. However, the access to the local market
appears to be a crucial motive. As the last column of the table indicates, it
is more probable that subsidiaries which hold substantial decision power, are
located in the capital.
181Table 5.14: Austrian and German Aﬃliates in Capital Regions
dependent variable: capital region dummy (=1 if capital region, =0 otherwise)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Backward Linkage -0.013*** -0.007*** -0.006** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Forward Linkage 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
EXP Share -0.009*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002)








Constant 144.744*** 146.408*** 139.386*** 122.555*** 9.012
(42.371) (43.029) (43.291) (39.882) (62.936)
Pseudo R2 0.144 0.171 0.187 0.171 0.169
N 660 636 636 701 280
Notes: Coeﬃcients are estimated by probit regressions; dummies for investor country (Aus-
tria or Germany) and host countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) are in-
cluded but not reported; additionally, a linear time trend for date of investment is included
but not reported; *** (**) [*] indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 (5) [10] percent level; standard
errors in parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity; N denotes number of observations;
sample consists of industry subsidiaries.
Variables are deﬁned as follows: backward linkage = (aﬃliate’s output shipped to parent
ﬁrm for re-processing or marketing/aﬃliate’s output)*100; forward linkage = (aﬃliate’s
inputs delivered from parent ﬁrm/aﬃliate’s total inputs)*100; EXP share = (aﬃliate’s out-
put exported/aﬃliate’s output)*100; labor costs = importance of labor costs as investment
motive, ranked by investor between 5 (decisive) and 1 (not at all important); market access
= importance of local market access as investment motive, ranked by investor between 5
(decisive) and 1 (not at all important); transport costs = importance of transport costs
as investment motive, ranked by investor between 5 (decisive) and 1 (not at all impor-
tant); decision powerp−a = distribution of decision power between parent and aﬃliate
ﬁrm, ranked by investor between 1 (decision taken by parent ﬁrm) and 5 (decision taken
by aﬃliate ﬁrm).
1825.7 Conclusion
After the fall of the Iron Curtain, Europe’s ’heart’ seems to re-industrialize.
Thus, Eastern Europe’s opening-up leads to a new spatial organization of
production in Europe. Particularly, the liberalization of trade and foreign
investment has severe impacts on the economic geography of Eastern Eu-
rope. Such shifts take place not only between countries but merely inside
countries. How does the new spatial pattern of Central Europe look like?
Furthermore, Western European FDI in this region plays an important role.
What determines their location choice? The shock of the fall of the Iron
Curtain creates the situation of a natural experiment for exploring location
determinants. I addressed both questions in this chapter.
First, I identiﬁed that the industry location in Eastern Europe shifted
substantially towards Western Europe. Particularly in Eastern Europe, a
relocation of production took place towards regions which border on the EU-
15 and oﬀer, therefore, an excellent market access. In all Visegr´ ad countries,
except Poland, the industry employment moved towards regions bordering
the EU-15 away from the respective capital region. Hanson (1998) observed
similar trends in Mexico when facing the NAFTA integration with the US
and Canada. In contrast to these dynamics in Eastern Europe, the spatial
organization of production in Austria and Germany remained unchanged.
The West contributes to this shift when investing immensely in the Eastern
European border regions.
Secondly, analyzing ﬁrm-level data on Austrian and German investors, I
found strong empirical evidence that vertical FDIs prefer to locate in regions
that border on the EU-15. Mainly outsourcing and export oriented FDIs
choose to locate their production sites in the border regions of the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Those types of foreign aﬃliates
are aﬄicted with high transport cost and, thus, the location close to the
country of destination appears to be crucial. Furthermore, the results showed
that foreign subsidiaries located in border regions are more strongly labor
cost driven than those in other regions. Moreover, investments in border
regions tend to be a relocation of existing capacities in Western Europe.
183Aﬃliates in border regions are also more centrally organized which means
that those aﬃliates have less decision power. Additionally, I found that the
more technology-intensive and the more market-seeking investment projects
are, the lower is the probability that they locate in border regions. All
these results are mirrored when exploring determinants for locating in capital
regions. In summary, the choice of location appears not to be random.
The major contribution of this chapter is the analysis of the location
choice using ﬁrm-level data. I focused on the role of linkages between the
parent ﬁrm and the foreign aﬃliate. Directions for future research are exam-
ining changes in choosing locations in Eastern Europe over time. The rapid
economic development of the Visegr´ ad states accompanies lower diﬀerences
in production costs between Western and Eastern Europe. Therefore, verti-
cal FDIs may relocate. Will they move to eastern regions bordering potential
EU candidates? In such a scenario, horizontal FDIs might increasingly locate
in Central Europe.
184Appendix
Notes on Deﬁnition of Regions
A. Deﬁnition for distribution (Section 5.4)
The industry employment in the countries considered is categorized as em-
ployment in border, capital, and other regions according to NUTS classiﬁca-
tion of Eurostat. The regions are deﬁned in the following way:
Austria:
border regions: AT 111, AT 112, AT 113, AT 124, AT 125, AT 211,
AT 213, AT 224, AT 226, AT 313
capital region: AT 126, AT 127, AT 130
Notes: Employment corresponds to manufacturing employment (NACE D);
data of 1991 are converted from the national classiﬁcation of districts to
NUTS 3; data beyond 1991 at the level of NUTS 3.
Source: Own calculations based on data taken from Statistical
Yearbook (various issues), Statistics Austria.
Germany:
border regions: DE 224, DE 225, DE 228, DE 229, DE 22B, DE 231,
DE 233, DE 234, DE 235, DE 237, DE 239, DE 23A,
DE 244, DE 249, DE 24D, DE 402, DE 403, DE 405,
DE 406, DE 409, DE 40A, DE 40B, DE 40C, DE 40G,
DE 40I, DE 80B, DE 80F, DE 80I, DE D11, DE D12,
DE D13, DE D14, DE D15, DE D16, DE D17, DE D18,
DE D19, DE D1A, DE D1B, DE D21, DE D22, DE D23,
DE D24, DE D25, DE D26, DE D28, DE D29, DE D2A,
DE D2B, DE D33
capital region: DE 301, DE 302
Notes: Employment corresponds to industry (including construction)
employment (NACE C-F); data at the level of NUTS 3.
Source: Own calculations based on data taken from Federal Statistical
Oﬃce of Germany
185Czech Republic:
border regions: CZ 03, CZ 04, CZ 06
capital region: CZ 01
Notes: Employment corresponds to industry employment (NACE C-E);
data at the level of NUTS 2.
Source: Own calculations based on data taken from Statistical
Yearbook of the Czech Republic (various issues), Czech Statistical Oﬃce.
Hungary:
border region: HU 03
capital region: HU 01
Notes: Employment corresponds to industry employment (NACE C-E);
data at the level of NUTS 2.
Source: Own calculations based on data taken from Statistical
Yearbook of Hungary (various issues), Hungarian Central Statistical Oﬃce.
Poland:
border regions: PL 01, PL 04, PL 0G
capital region: PL 07
Notes: Employment corresponds to industry employment (NACE C-E);
data until 1997 are converted from the national classiﬁcation of districts to
NUTS 2; data of 2001 at the level of NUTS 3.
Source: Own calculations based on data taken from Statistical
Yearbook of the Republic of Poland (various issues), Central Statistical
Oﬃce of Poland.
Slovakia:
border region: SK 02
capital region: SK 01
Notes: Employment corresponds to industry employment (NACE C-E);
data at the level of NUTS 2.
Source: Own calculations based on data taken from Statistical
Yearbook of the Slovak Republic (various issues), Statistical Oﬃce of
the Slovak Republic.
186B. Deﬁnition for regression (Section 5.6)
The locations of Austrian and German subsidiaries in the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia are categorized as border, capital, and other
regions according to NUTS 2 classiﬁcation of Eurostat. The correspond-
ing dummy variables employed in the regression analysis are border region
dummy and capital region dummy. The regions are deﬁned in the following
way:
border regions which border on Austria and Germany:
in the Czech Republic: CZ 03, CZ 04, CZ 06
in Hungary: HU 03
in Poland: PL 01, PL 04, PL 0G
in Slovakia: SK 02
border regions which border on Austria:
in the Czech Republic: CZ 03, CZ 06
in Hungary: HU 03
in Slovakia: SK 02
border regions which border on Germany:
in the Czech Republic: CZ 03, CZ 04
in Poland: PL 01, PL 04, PL 0G
capital regions:
in the Czech Republic: CZ 01 (Prague)
in Hungary: HU 01 (Budapest)
in Poland: PL 07 (Warsaw)
in Slovakia: SK 01 (Bratislava)
187Table G.1: Deﬁnition of Variables
Variable Description
border region dummy =1 if the aﬃliate is located in border region,
=0 otherwise
capital region dummy =1 if the aﬃliate is located in capital region,
=0 otherwise
backward linkage share of aﬃliate’s output shipped to parent ﬁrm
for re-processing or marketing in percent of
aﬃliate’s output
forward linkage share of aﬃliate’s inputs delivered from parent
ﬁrm in percent of aﬃliate’s total inputs
industry dummy =1 if the aﬃliate is engaged in industry sector,
=0 if the aﬃliate is engaged in service sector
EXP share share of aﬃliate’s output exported to foreign
countries in percent of aﬃliate’s output
EXPpcoun share share of aﬃliate’s output exported to respective
parent country, Austria and Germany, in per
cent of aﬃliate’s output
EXPEU−15 share share of aﬃliate’s output exported to EU-15
countries (excluding Austria and Germany,
respectively) in percent of aﬃliate’s output
technology dummy variable corresponding to aﬃliate’s
technology (=1 if hardly or non copyable technology,
=0 if easily copyable technology)
HC intensity share of employees with college or university
degree in percent of aﬃliate’s total employment
local foreign suppliers importance of local presence of foreign suppliers
for investment decision, ranked by investor between
5 (decisive) and 1 (not at all important)
relocation dummy variable corresponding to relocation
investment (=1 if relocation of existing capacity,
=0 if capacity expansion or new product line)
expansion dummy variable corresponding to capacity
expansion (=1 if capacity expansion or new product
line, =0 if relocation of existing capacity)
188Table G.1 (continued): Deﬁnition of Variables
Variable Description
decision powerp−a distribution of decision power between parent
and aﬃliate ﬁrm, combined measure of 14
decisions concerning ﬁnancial, strategic and
operational matters, ranked by investor between
1 (decision taken by parent ﬁrm) and 5
(decision taken by aﬃliate ﬁrm)
labor costs importance of labor costs as investment motive,
ranked by investor between 5 (decisive) and
1 (not at all important)
market access importance of local market access as investment motive,
ranked by investor between 5 (decisive) and
1 (not at all important)
transport costs importance of transport costs as investment motive,
ranked by investor between 5 (decisive) and
1 (not at all important)
Source: All variables are own calculations based on data from ﬁrm survey of 2200 invest-
ment projects in Eastern Europe by 665 Austrian and German multinational ﬁrms, Chair of
International Economics, University of Munich.
189Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
Since the fall of the Communism, the world economy has revolutionized. The
economic integration of large parts of the world in the global economic system
has several impacts. Besides the eﬀects on the relations between countries, the
process of globalization has dramatic consequences for the economic situation
inside countries.
In this thesis, I concentrated on the internal eﬀects of globalization. In
particular, I examined the role of international outsourcing on the labor
market and the economic geography. I have shown that outsourcing has
a substantial skill-biased impact on the labor demand in Austria and Ger-
many. Furthermore, the analysis on the location decision of Austrian and
German investors in Eastern Europe has identiﬁed that outsourcing FDIs
prefer clearly border regions as location.
The empirical analysis of Austria and Germany contributes to the ex-
isting literature by showing that human capital is losing from international
outsourcing. This result stands in contrast to other studies in this ﬁeld on
developed and emerging countries. Furthermore, the result contradicts the
predictions of the theoretical model of Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) which I
outlined in Chapter 2. The ﬁndings might be surprising, however they shed
some light on the factor endowment of Austria and Germany. Both countries
appear to be poorly endowed with human capital relative to their trading
partners.
In Chapter 3, I found that international outsourcing undertaken by Ger-
190man ﬁrms disfavors high-skilled workers in domestic market. Three broad
facts emerged from my empirical investigation. First, not only the relative
demand but also the relative wages and employment of high-skilled work-
ers are negatively aﬀected by outsourcing. Thus, international outsourcing
can account for 32 percent of the increase in relative employment and about
36 percent of the rise in skill premium. It suggests that relative wages for
human capital would have increased more by one third in the absence of in-
ternational outsourcing. Secondly, I have found that the negative impact of
outsourcing on human capital occurred particularly in the recent years, while
in the early 1990s, outsourcing favored high-skilled labor. This is related to
the third revealed fact. I identiﬁed an substantial shift in the pattern of
outsourcing sectors over time away from low-skill intensive towards human-
capital intensive sectors. The estimations indicate that high-skilled workers
employed in human-capital intensive sectors are most hurt by international
outsourcing. This is a major contribution of the chapter.
The empirical investigation on Austria in Chapter 4 revealed that inter-
national outsourcing has hurt the economic fortunes of human capital also in
Austria. Moreover, outsourcing has a negative impact on the skill premium
and the relative employment of high-skilled workers. I have shown that out-
sourcing can account for roughly 35 percent of the change in the relative
wage for high-skilled workers. It means that in the absence of outsourcing,
the relative wages for human capital would have declined by 35 percent less
in Austria.
What is Austria’a and Germany’s role in the international value added
chain? The ﬁndings suggest that both countries are increasingly specializing
in low-skill intensive production stages. Therefore, the policy advice has to
be to strengthen the country’s endowment with human capital. However,
the strong labor market institutions prevent a widening of the wage gap.
Additionally, outsourcing reduces the skill premium. Thus, the unfavorable
perspectives for human capital in Austria and Germany lowers the incentives
to invest in human capital and education. However, the government could
break this vicious cycle by enforcing the investments in the education sys-
tem which marks a weakness as the often cited OECD Pisa-study revealed,
191particularly in the case of Germany.
My investigation on Austria and Germany contributes to previous studies
in this ﬁeld by utilizing a sample period of more recent years. This allows
to detect the impacts of the recent wave of outsourcing. Thus, the sectoral
pattern of outsourcing activities have changed during the recent years. The
analysis provides a detailed investigation of trends in individual sectors and
their impacts on the aggregate results. Moreover, the present work makes the
contribution of examining the eﬀects of technological change on the relative
demand for skilled labor in more detail. It is noteworthy that governmental
R&D policy has diﬀerent eﬀects on skill-upgrading in Germany and Austria.
While R&D subsidies have a positive impact on the relative demand for high-
skilled labor in Austria, they aﬀect negatively high-skilled labor in Germany.
Chapter 5 was concerned with the recent trends in industry location in
Eastern Europe. The opening-up of Eastern Europe led to a new spatial
organization of production in Central Europe. I identiﬁed that the industry
location in Eastern Europe shifted substantially towards regions bordering
on the EU-15. Consequently, in all Visegr´ ad countries except Poland, the
industry employment moved away from the capital regions. The ﬁndings
are in line with Hanson (1998) who observed similar trends in Mexico when
integrating with the US and Canada. Furthermore, I have shown that the
spatial organization of production in Austria and Germany remained un-
changed. However, Austrian and German companies invested enormously in
the Eastern European border regions since the fall of the Iron Curtain.
A major goal of Chapter 5 was to identify the determinants of location
choice of FDIs. Analyzing ﬁrm-level data on Austrian and German investors,
I found a strong empirical evidence that vertical FDI locate mainly in regions
that border on the EU-15. The avoidance of transport costs appears to play
a crucial role in locating outsourcing- and export-oriented foreign aﬃliates.
On the other hand, more technology-intensive and market-seeking investment
projects tend to locate in capital regions. In summary, the choice of location
appears not to be random. This analysis contributes to the literature on
location choice by employing ﬁrm-level data that allow to inspect the role of
intra-ﬁrm linkages in the choice.
192In conclusion, I found empirical evidence that the external shocks of glob-
alization have substantial impacts on economic perspectives inside countries.
International outsourcing as a major force of globalization, hurts the eco-
nomic fortunes of human capital in Austria and Germany. Furthermore, I
identiﬁed that industry employment in Eastern Europe relocates substan-
tially towards border regions which host mainly outsourcing FDIs.
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